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ABSTRACT 
Andrew M. Hutson: Diffusion of Environmental Practices through Supply Chain Mandates: 
Evidence from Mexican Industry 
(Under the direction of Richard N.L. Andrews, Ph.D., Sudhanshu Handa, Ph.D., Daniel 
Gitterman, Ph.D., Meenu Tewari, Ph.D., and Randall A. Kramer, Ph.D.) 
 
This study explores the emergence of supply chain mandates, initiatives by which businesses 
demand changes in the social or environmental behavior of suppliers and business partners 
over whom they exert economic influence.  Under these mandates, firms within a 
corporation’s production network are contractually obliged to adopt verifiable codes of 
conduct or certification institutions using the promise of future business, or threats of no 
future contracts, as incentives. It examines how major first-tier auto suppliers have 
themselves received and implemented mandates from the auto manufacturers to adopt formal 
environmental management systems (EMS), and how Mexican automotive suppliers in turn 
have responded to these mandates. Finally, it identifies other factors that influence the 
adoption of more systematic environmental management practices.  Evidence for the study 
was collected through interviews with automotive manufacturers and large multinational 
suppliers and through a survey of Mexican automotive suppliers, and the resulting data were 
analyzed using several regression techniques including ordinal logistic regression and two-
stage treatment effects models. The analyses find a large discrepancy between those facilities 
subject to supply chain mandates from major customers and those who actually adopt EMSs.  
However, several factors including the perceived importance of mandates, technical 
considerations related to more general industrial upgrading strategies, and ownership by US 
firms affect the adoption of EMSs by suppliers operating in Mexico.  It also finds that while 
 iv 
supply chain mandates may have a negligible affect on the emphasis facilities place on 
specific environmental objectives, including regulatory compliance, pollution prevention, 
and eco-efficiency, having an EMS in place does influence prioritization of these objectives.  
Therefore, in cases where supply chain mandates effectively lead to EMS adoption, deeper 
commitments can be expected.  The study also discusses the institutional failures related to 
monitoring and enforcement that hinder diffusion throughout the value chain and the 
potential for these quasi-regulatory private mechanisms to provide public benefits, 
particularly in industrializing nations.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
Rising economic globalization over the past two decades has resulted in substantial shifts in 
manufacturing from locations in the first world to developing countrie s across the globe in 
response to increasingly liberalized trade and advantages in factor prices.  While this shift 
has brought considerable foreign direct investment and in some cases sizable economic 
growth, it has also resulted in significant negative social and environmental externalities 
associated with the production process.  The absence of clear rights for workers has been 
pronounced in many export-oriented industries from Asia to Latin America, and in many 
regions of the developing world, unsustainable natural resource use and industrial emissions 
to air and water threaten human health, damage the biosphere, and offset gains to social 
welfare provided by increases in economic activity.   
Compounding these problems is the inability or unwillingness of the state to create and 
enforce laws to protect workers and the natural environment.  Governments in many 
developing countries simply lack sufficient resources and the administrative capacity to 
enforce existing laws and draft necessary labor and environmental standards.  Others 
purposely look the other way for fear of hampering investment and economic growth, 
assuming that such problems are a necessary byproduct, or stage, of the development 
process.  Disappearing too is the influence of the vertically integrated multinational firm, 
with direct control over the entire production process – from the acquisition of raw materials, 
to the assembly of final products.  In its place have emerged complex production networks, 
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where thousands of firms, large and small, collaborate with varying degrees of coordination 
in the manufacture of goods.  This process of “vertical disintegration” has removed much 
oversight and responsibility over the manufacture of goods with large social and 
environmental risks from firms with active shareholders, customers, and sensitive brand 
images to less visible suppliers who often possess lower degrees of management experience, 
access to state-of-the-art production technologies, and are subject to little pressure from 
domestic civil society.   
It is under these conditions that governance gaps have arisen – where host country 
governments are unwilling or unable to address the negative externalities of manufacturing, 
where production occurs outside the jurisdiction of applicable labor and environmental 
standards of industrialized nations, and where trade agreements fail to account for these 
considerations (see Gereffi and Mayer 2004).  Such gaps are further exacerbated when the 
reach of multinational firms is hampered by the complexities of the global market, in which 
close scrutiny of the actions of suppliers and business partners is a complicated and 
expensive proposition.  In response to these gaps, a variety of codes of conduct have emerged 
seeking to establish general standards of practice and safeguards for workers and the natural 
environment in a variety of sectors (World Bank 2003; Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 
2001; Conroy 2001).  Such codes, often created by coalitions of global advocacy groups, aim 
to exert market-based pressures upon firms to promote more stringent standards of social and 
environmental responsibility (Conroy 2001).  However, while promoting high ethical 
standards and providing firm guidelines for behavior, the actual market leverage these codes 
of conduct have been able to produce on their own has been limited and the concrete changes 
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that have resulted have been variable, often due to weak institutions and incomplete 
enforcement mechanisms (Esbenshade 2004; O’Rourke 2003). 
With an understanding that the presence of such guidelines without some form of 
validation may bring little external credibility, some trade associations and business groups, 
most notably in the chemical and forest products sectors, have created voluntary programs to 
self-police their social and environmental behaviors.  These groups have done so in an effort 
to protect shared reputations, stave off citizen action and forestall potential future regulation 
(Kollman and Prakash 2002; Nash 2002).  The result has been the creation of certification 
institutions that incorporate specific standards of behavior and process requirements that 
entail varying degrees of stringency and external verification (Garcia-Johnson 2001; Gereffi, 
Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser 2001).  Participation in such programs is voluntary, and therefore 
requires a degree of enlightened self- interest on the part of firms who join them.  That is, 
only firms who believe they will benefit from participation in the program, either through 
improved public relations, better relationships with regulators, or improved collective 
reputation in the industry, are likely to sign on (Kollman and Prakash 2002; Potoski and 
Prakash 2005).  Firms that do not believe the benefits of participation are worth the costs are 
not obligated to join despite the potential threat their social and environmental behaviors may 
pose customers, business partners, or the sector as a whole.1   
Partially in response to these shortcomings, corporations in several industries have begun 
to develop and apply supply chain mandates, where businesses demand changes in the social 
or environmental behaviors of suppliers and business partners over whom they exert 
economic influence.  Under these mandates, firms within a corporation’s production network 
                                                 
1 Membership in some trade associations does require participation in voluntary programs.  The chemical 
industry’s Responsible Care program is the most notable of these. 
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are contractually obliged to adopt verifiable codes of conduct or certification institutions 
using the promise of future business, or threats of no future contracts, as incentives.  
These institutions, arising in response to social and environmental problems associated 
with increased globalization, may represent something larger than isolated initiatives to 
address crises affecting individual corporations or industries.  Rather, supply chain mandates 
are quickly emerging as part of a new generation of quasi-regulatory policy tools, where 
private organizations use economic leverage in order to affect changes in pursuit of public 
goals.  Among the most noteworthy of recent efforts to extend the reach of social 
responsibility from major corporations to their suppliers are the Electronics Industry Code of 
Conduct (EICC), promulgated by Dell, HP and IBM to require mandatory labor, 
environmental and human rights provisions for its networks of global suppliers; McDonald’s 
restriction of antibiotics use by beef and poultry suppliers; Home Depot and Lowe’s 
preference for suppliers of wood certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) who 
have eliminated purchases from old growth and endangered forests; and the mandates from 
Ford, General Motors and DaimlerChrysler that all direct suppliers be certified to the ISO 
14001 environmental management systems (EMS) standard.   
While the efficacy of certification institutions in general is still an open question, the 
emergence of supply chain mandates to force improvements along the value chain marks an 
important evolution in the development of strategies aimed at the improving the behavior of 
industrial actors.  It is, in essence, a phenomenon in which corporations find themselves in 
the new role of regulators: responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of the policies 
they require.  However, the degree to which suppliers adhere to these mandates, adopt the 
values of their customers, and the extent to which the programs are diffused throughout the 
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value chain is yet unclear.   How thoroughly are suppliers adhering to the specific 
requirements of their customers?  What mechanisms are in place to assure compliance?  How 
widely are such practices diffused beyond direct supplier relationships?   
To date, the majority of studies examining the role of corporate influence on the actions 
of supplier behavior and the institutions that have emerged to do so have focused on issues 
pertaining to labor and human rights (Gordon and Miyake 2000; OECD 2001; Elliot and 
Freeman 2001; Esbenshade 2004; Fung, O’Rourke and Sable 2001; Harvey, Collingsworth, 
and Athreya 2002; ILO 2002; O’Rourke 2003) and have largely ignored developments in the 
environmental realm. This study begins to address this lacuna in the literature by exploring 
the emergence of environmental supply chain mandates in the North American automotive 
industry.  Specifically, it examines how widely mandates are diffused through production 
networks and how thoroughly the specific requirements are adopted by autoparts 
manufacturers in Mexico.   
In the past seven years, major automotive manufacturers have moved to require their 
direct (tier-1) suppliers to adopt formal environmental management systems consistent with 
the ISO 14001 EMS standard, and have encouraged these firms to demand the same of their 
suppliers (see Hutson 2001).  While not all automakers have expressly mandated the 
adoption of a formal EMS of their first tier suppliers (as Ford, General Motors and 
DaimlerChrysler have), virtually all the major global automakers have communicated it as an 
expectation and mark of quality in one form or another.  In short, it is becoming a de facto 
requirement of participation in the industry as a whole.   
Firms may adopt environmental management activities, and demand the same of 
suppliers, for reasons related to corporate strategy and performance.  However, 
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environmental management may also be influenced by institutional pressures and factors 
related to industrial organization not necessarily predicated on environmental grounds.  This 
study addresses three primary research questions surrounding these issues and the supply 
chain mandate policies of the automotive manufacturers.  First, how are supply chain 
mandates to adopt ISO 14001 interpreted and implemented by suppliers in the automotive 
value chain?  Second, are the mandates effective in their aims?  That is, does the existence of 
the policies lead to adoption of complete EMSs in accordance with specific requirements of 
the standard?  Further, are the systems that are adopted by plants in Mexico geared towards 
achieving a range of environmental goals, or are they simply “paper systems” that meet 
minimum requirements of the standard without addressing more intractable problems or 
moving “beyond compliance”?  Third, have these policies been replicated and passed along 
the value chain to lower tiers of suppliers, or has penetration been limited to the first tier?  
What factors have contributed to, or hindered, diffusion of these policies? 
Two parallel trends have contributed to the rise and evolution of supply chain mandates 
in global industry: the growing role and importance of corporate social responsibility to 
multinational firms, and twin forces of vertical disintegration and globalized production.  
Over the past two decades, major corporations across the globe have increased their 
participation in a variety of initiatives that can broadly be classified as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) or sustainability efforts.  Such initiatives intend to address the 
environmental, labor and human rights issues associated with business activity beyond that 
which is required by law, or promote activities with societal benefits that may not directly be 
associated with a firm’s profit-making imperative.  The adoption of these initiatives can often 
be an expensive and complicated endeavor for firms, particularly when attempting to do so 
 7 
for vast global production networks.  Accordingly, many such efforts have been dismissed as 
“mere philanthropy” and disparaged by critics as distractions from the primary societal 
function of business (i.e. earning profits and increasing shareholder value).  Despite such 
criticisms, more and more companies are defining sustainability principles as core values and 
central to a firm’s survival.  Presumably such businesses do so not only because these 
endeavors are viewed as the “right thing to do,” but also because they serve as a source of 
value creation and brand protection.   
Initiatives developed to address environmental and social aspects of a firm’s operation 
have been driven by both internal efficiency considerations and external threats that pose 
reputational risks.  Particularly with respect to environmental behaviors, specific actions 
taken to decrease a firm’s social footprint can result in significant efficiency gains (Melnyk et 
al. 1999; del Brio et al. 2001; Hutson 2001; Morrow and Rondinelli 2002; Andrews et al 
2003).  Moreover, such efficiencies may ultimately lead to improvements in the bottom line 
and therefore serve as strong drivers to improve environmental performance (Porter and van 
der Linde 1995a,b; Hart and Ahuja 1996; Klassen and McLaughlin 1996; Sharma and 
Vredenburg 1998; Dowell, Hart and Yeung 2000; Christmann 2000).  Some firms have 
found that enlightened self- interest is best served by optimizing a “triple bottom line,” 
incorporating social and environmental considerations alongside traditional economic ones 
(Elkington 1998, Hart and Milstein 1999, van Heel et al 2001).  
Because large branded firms are often the most visible and easiest targets for NGOs, 
community groups and regulators, active participation in sustainability activities serves as an 
added layer of protection for such companies, both in terms of proactively addressing 
existing problems and for the public relations value associated.    In short, engaging in 
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operations with a focus on sustainability objectives serves to extract efficiency gains through 
environmental improvements and standardization while protecting valuable brand images 
through the protection of both workers and the natural environment.   If successful, the 
adoption of sustainability practices may place companies at a competitive advantage over 
those who choose not to behave as responsibly and result in improved financial performance 
and increased shareholder value (Hart 1997). 
Parallel to the increasing focus on social responsibility within corporate hierarchies, two 
fundamental shifts have occurred in the global economy, particularly throughout the 1990s.  
First, firms in many industries have shifted the bulk of their production activities to locations 
in developing countries, often in search of the lowest production costs.  Second, there has 
been a dramatic restructuring of the industrial organization of many industries associated 
with the globalization of firms’ operations.  Lead firms in several sectors (most notably 
automotive and electronics) have been “deverticalizing” their operations in order to focus on 
higher value activities, such as design and marketing, which they consider to be their core 
competencies (Kaplinsky 2000; Sturgeon and Florida 2000; Sturgeon 2002).  Implicit in this 
process is a shift to high levels of outsourcing by these firms to independently operating 
“modular” suppliers who are increasingly responsible for activities such as product assembly 
and subassembly, global purchasing and sourcing, and specific elements of product design 
(Barnes and Kaplinsky 2000; Humphrey 2000; Sturgeon and Florida 2000; Humphrey 2003; 
Tewari 2003; Quadros 2003).  Many of these outsourced processes have large environmental 
impacts and suppliers often have little experience with environmental management practices, 
or the labor standards that have evolved over the past century in the industrialized world.   
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Furthermore, because these industrial processes have moved to many countries where 
existing environmental regulations and labor standards are often weak, or not enforced, the 
potential for abuse is strong.  It is often the case in such locations that governments lack 
adequate capacity for enforcement and companies with stated commitments to sustainable 
practices lack substantial oversight of production.  Furthermore, a rise in global brands and a 
heightened level of concentration among lead firms over the past two decades has added a 
dimension of vulnerability and visibility to the business environment.  For this reason, many 
firms have begun to develop mechanisms and policies to address potential hazards posed by 
the behavior of suppliers and business partners in the form of supply chain mandates. 
In requiring their global suppliers to adopt management practices and standardized 
activities that may improve communication and transparency, firms seek to reap efficiency 
gains that suppliers may achieve.  Perhaps more importantly, however, businesses seek to 
limit risk and protect their valuable brand image from bad behavior on the part of contractors 
(e.g. preventing “Nike” events).   Companies that extend such programs to their supply base 
seek to mitigate damage to their reputations in two specific ways.  First, by taking the proper 
steps, be it through better management of environmental processes or becoming better 
informed about the practices of business partners, firms hope to prevent incidents and 
accidents from occurring in the first place.  Second, if an environmental accident or violation 
of labor codes should still occur, firms may be able to demonstrate to consumers, 
shareholders, and perhaps regulators, that they have at the very least demonstrated due 
diligence in an attempt to prevent such events from happening (Andrews, Hutson and 
Edwards 2005). 
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Environmental supply chain mandates find their conceptual genesis in voluntary 
environmental self-regulation programs.  Conceptually, voluntary environmental regulations 
seek to offer greater flexibility to participating firms than traditional “command and control” 
approaches, which critics claim are far too costly in terms of monitoring, enforcement, and 
compliance costs (Jaffe et al. 1995; Coglianese and Nash 2001).  Where traditional 
environmental regulations stipulate specific environmental performance outcomes or 
prescribe the adoption of particular pollution control technologies, voluntary programs take a 
more “management-based” approach to solving environmental problems.  Since the internal 
characteristics of firms vary greatly both within and among industrial sectors, voluntary 
approaches replace uniform regulations and incentives with a formal planning process that 
accounts for the inherent heterogeneity that exists (Coglianese and Nash 2001; Coglianese 
and Lazar 2003).   Because regulatory agencies face constraints that limit their ability to 
create and enforce environmental regulations appropriate to individual firms and 
manufacturing sites, procedural rules and standards are developed and implemented by firms 
themselves in order to achieve public goals (Andrews 1998; Orts 1995).  Such goals 
generally include meeting existing regulatory requirements, but also establishing methods for 
finding additional improvements beyond what is required by law.  If successfully adopted, 
voluntary programs may lead to “beyond compliance” improvements, where firms perform 
better than what is required of them by existing regulations, and find ways to improve 
behaviors in areas that are not regulated by the state.  Voluntary management-based 
programs are, by nature, self-enforced initiatives with little oversight or interference from 
government agencies or external stakeholders– though some, like the ISO 14001 EMS 
standard, require verification by paid third-party auditors.  Firms choosing to participate in 
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voluntary environmental programs generally find it in their best interest (or “enlightened self-
interest”) to do so, to either proactively develop internal efficiencies, or to improve 
relationships with customers, regulators or the community.  For their part, government 
agencies and the public may benefit from establishing voluntary approaches by promises of 
beyond compliance performance without the burden of additional monitoring and 
enforcement.   
Despite this apparent “win-win” on the part of businesses and the public, there are 
fundamental questions posed by voluntary programs which draw skepticism on the part of 
both regulators and civil society.  Primarily, can firms be trusted to implement changes that 
result in improved environmental behaviors without enforcement and oversight on the part of 
the government?  Genuine problems with respect to transparency, accountability and 
credibility of voluntary programs exist in the eyes of the public precisely because they are 
voluntary and are subject to weak enforcement mechanisms (Haufler 2001; Krut and 
Gleckman 1998; Morrison et al 2000).  In other words, the strength of such approaches can 
also be a potentially fatal weakness.   
This weakness may be exacerbated when it comes to supply chain mandates that extend 
from management-based approaches.  As stated above, the primary strength and motivating 
factor for participation in voluntary programs is that they are indeed voluntary and up to 
firms themselves to establish and control.  However, when such programs are externally 
imposed, enthusiasm for the implementation and maintenance required may quickly 
evaporate, as firms subject to them may not view it in their self- interest to do so, or see the 
potential benefits.  While the same flexibility exists with respect to a firm establishing its 
own environmental performance goals and means to achieve them, motivation to establish 
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and meet appropriate objectives may simply not exist.  Supplier firms may simply see these 
programs as another of a long list of requirements from customers and regulators that must 
be fulfilled, without incorporating the spirit necessary for them to deliver improvements.  If 
the voluntary nature is removed from voluntary programs, the likelihood of effectiveness in 
achieving public environmental goals becomes dubious – if firms are not motivated by 
enlightened self- interest to adopt and thoroughly implement voluntary initiatives and they are 
not subject to substantial oversight, there is little to suggest that such programs will have 
their intended effect. 
In some ways, then, to be effective, self-regulation in the context of supply chain 
mandates must mimic the structure of traditional regulation – strong institutions for 
monitoring and enforcement on the part of companies issuing the mandates are therefore 
needed in order to ensure compliance with the policies.  In practice, when deciding on 
whether or not to comply with regulation, rational actors weigh both the benefits and costs, 
and extent of both the probability and the consequence of compliance (see Becker 1968).  
Firms make choices regarding compliance with environmental requirements by weighing the 
severity of potential consequences and the probability of getting caught. A firm may opt not 
to comply with a given policy even when faced with substantial consequences if the 
likelihood of getting caught is sufficiently low. Likewise, if there is little risk of getting 
caught or the consequences are marginal, a rational firm will have little incentive to comply 
with external pressures to adopt a specific set of behaviors.  If supply chain mandates are to 
have any benefit, organizations issuing the mandates must play the role traditionally 
occupied by regulators: creating institutions that effectively monitor behaviors, and 
consistently punishing non-compliance.   
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In investigating these issues, this study contributes to the broader topic of a “public role 
for the private sector” as explored by Virginia Haufler (2001) and others in discussions 
surrounding the rise of private authority.  Following Haufler, the analyses in the following 
chapters investigate the role of self-regulatory regimes as a new form of global governance 
and how they may achieve public goals, particularly in developing countries.  It also explores 
how effective such initiatives may be, given the weak mechanisms for enforcement and 
compliance in light of other more pressing corporate objectives, namely the profit-making 
imperative, and how these functions may be intertwined.   The promotion of environmental 
policies by automotive manufacturers may in some ways be promoting an “upwards 
harmonization” of environmental standards to industrializing societies, where companies in 
effect export stricter standards and environmental best practices to locations where they do 
business (see Vogel 1995; Garcia-Johnson 2001).  Corporate governance structures and 
production networks therefore may become a conduit for the promotion of behaviors that 
produce public benefits. 
Such benefits may be particularly welcome in Mexico, where the administrative capacity 
to cope with environmental burdens associated with a burgeoning economy is relatively low.  
While liberalized trade in the post-NAFTA years has not led to the catastrophic 
environmental degradation from industrial activities that many critics of the trade agreement 
predicted, the country still faces substantial environmental challenges alongside diminished 
government capacity to address them.  High levels of pollution are of considerable cost to the 
Mexican economy; from 1993 to 1999 environmental degradation and resource depletion 
equaled an average of 10.9 percent of GDP (Salazar and Carlsen 2001).  At the same time 
plant- level environmental inspections in the maquiladora region decreased by over half in 
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2002, as compared with averages from 1994-2000 (Stromberg 2002), and in real terms 
overall environmental spending decreased by 45% in the period 1993-1999, making Mexico 
the lowest spending of the OECD nations on environmental policy (Gallagher 2004).  Indeed, 
traditional regulatory tools have not been available or appropriate to address issues 
surrounding industrial development and the natural environment.  Understanding private firm 
initiatives may provide an alternate means of dealing with the byproducts of economic 
growth.   
The dissertation is organized into seven chapters.  Chapter two explores the extant 
literature and primary bodies of theory that help to explain EMS adoption and diffusion.  It 
specifically covers the literatures from corporate strategy and public policy that investigate 
why firms adopt environmental management strategies themselves and why they promote 
them through their production networks.  It also looks at the adoption of environmental 
standards as a byproduct of increased value chain governance resulting from fundamental 
shifts in global industrial organization that have occurred over the past two decades.  Finally, 
the chapter reviews the literature pertaining to the international diffusion of standards and 
rise in private authority that occurs among firms and across borders. 
Chapter three discusses the methods for data collection used in the three primary analyses 
of the dissertation.  It details structured interviews with representatives from the largest North 
American automotive suppliers and the automakers themselves used in chapter four.  It also 
details the survey methods used to collect data from automotive supplier plants in Mexico, 
including the survey instrument design and pretest, population sampling, survey 
implementation, and error structure.   
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Chapter four explores the specifics of adoption and implementation of the automakers’ 
policies for EMS adoption by their first-tier suppliers.  It presents results from structured 
interviews with corporate environmental officers at large automotive supplier firms and large 
automakers to explore three main questions.  First, how have the mandates been interpreted 
and adopted by the largest automotive suppliers, and what variance exists among the 
approaches each has taken? Second, how are the policies monitored and enforced by the 
automakers and to what degree have they been effective in their aims? Third, have the first-
tier suppliers replicated these requirements for their own suppliers, and what hindrances exist 
to doing so?  The chapter finds the threat of losing future business has been enough to 
convince companies to dedicate the necessary resources to environmental management 
efforts and comply with the requirements, though firms have used different strategies to 
adopt the policies on a company-wide basis.  It also finds a lack of widespread replication of 
the EMS mandates by suppliers in the first tier, and no intention of monitoring or enforcing 
compliance by companies that have formally announced them.  
Chapter five explores the effectiveness of supply chain mandates in leading to the 
adoption of EMSs by automotive suppliers in Mexico.  It uses generalized ordered logistic 
regression to explore three questions.  First, how effective are supply chain mandates in 
motivating the adoption of advanced environmental management practices in manufacturing 
facilities in an industrializing society?  Second, what other considerations related to global 
industrial organization may facilitate such adoption?  Third, what other demographic 
features, such as country of ownership and position in the value chain, may lead to higher 
levels of environmental management?  Specifically, is there evidence that global 
manufacturers may indeed be “exporting environmentalism” through their vast 
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manufacturing networks?  Overall, the analyses in this chapter find that there is a great 
discrepancy between those facilities subject to supply chain mandates and those who actually 
adopt EMSs.  While the mere presence of supply chain mandates does not appear to be an 
effective means for assuring compliance with a customer’s wishes, the perceived importance 
of customer requirements does lead to the adoption of formal environmental management 
systems.  The findings also indicate that the degree of technological complexity of products, 
the overall capabilities of suppliers, and US ownership affect management outcomes.   
Chapter six addresses two primary research questions aimed at understanding the role 
EMSs have on the level of commitment to specific environmental goals, including regulatory 
compliance, pollution prevention, eco-efficiency and product stewardship, and the specific 
impacts of supply chain mandates have on their prioritization.  The chapter uses regression 
analyses (including ordinary least squares and two-stage treatment models) to address these 
questions.  First, does the adoption of a formal EMS affect the priority a facility places on 
each one of these potential objectives? Second, do customer and corporate mandates affect a 
facility’s commitment to these four objectives?  Results indicate tha t the adoption of an EMS 
does appear to influence these businesses’ prioritization in three of four environmental 
objectives categories.   The findings also indicate that the strength of customer and corporate 
mandates to adopt formal EMS has very little influence on how facilities shape their 
environmental strategies, and in some cases the influence is negative.   Taken together, these 
findings suggest that while mandates themselves may not lead to increased commitments, 
they may lead indirectly to improvements by influencing adoption, which then affects the 
commitment to environmental goals, including those that go beyond compliance.  Finally, 
chapter seven reviews the findings from the analyses in preceding chapters and provides a 
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synthesis of issues raised.  It places particular emphasis on how they address the theoretical 
issues and specific research questions posed by the dissertation as a whole.   
The restructuring of global industry that has occurred alongside economic globalization 
has fundamentally changed cross-border business relationships.  The trend of 
deverticalization in many sectors has allowed lead firms to reap the benefits of higher value 
activities by focusing on their core competencies.  It has also released from their control a 
multitude of potentially high risk activities associated with the manufacturing process at a 
time when consumers are becoming increasingly concerned about social and environmental 
problems.  Understanding how business relationships, different constellations of management 
capabilities, resources and institutional pressures may lead to improved environmental 
outcomes is an important step in addressing the negative environmental externalities 
associated with industrial development.  It is my hope that this dissertation contributes not 
only to the discussion about the role of private mechanisms in improving environmental 
conditions, but also to the larger debate surrounding environmental protection and industrial 
development. 
  
CHAPTER 2: Related Literature & Theory  
 
In considering the primary research questions of this study and the overarching issues it 
addresses, several bodies of theory need to be considered to better understand how initiatives 
on the part of private industry may produce public environmental benefits.  This section 
highlights three areas that inform the understanding of why environmental practices may be 
diffused by businesses through the value chain, and the mechanisms that facilitate this 
process.  First is the question of why firms choose to adopt advanced environmental 
management activities in the context of voluntary management-based approaches, and why 
they extend these policies to include their major suppliers. The second concerns how firms 
coordinate the functions of their value chains through governance of the production network.  
The third area discusses how environmental standards diffuse across borders and between 
firms and the rise in private authority that makes this diffusion necessary and possible. 
 
Why Firms Adopt and Mandate Environmental Practices 
Research into the environmental actions of businesses has demonstrated that policies to 
standardize environmental behaviors have been driven by abstract environmental values, but 
also by broader strategic goals.  Initiatives developed to address environmental aspects of a 
firm’s operation have been driven by both internal efficiency considerations and external 
threats that pose reputational risks.  Specific actions taken to decrease a firm’s environmental 
footprint can result in significant efficiency gains and may ultimately lead to improvements 
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in the bottom line.  The potential to achieve such gains may not be immediately apparent to 
plant managers and corporate leaders, however, who have traditionally viewed environmental 
management and regulation as externally imposed costs, rather than sources of savings and 
competitive advantage. 
Broadly defined, voluntary environmental programs grew out of this view that 
environmental laws, however effective at reducing industrial emissions, were not designed 
with the best interests of businesses in mind.  Many believed that pejoratively named 
“command and control” regulations, where specific environmental performance outcomes or 
particular pollution control technologies are prescribed, did not take into consideration the 
needs and capabilities of individual businesses and therefore imposed unnecessary costs and 
burdensome reporting requirements.   After efforts by the Reagan administration to 
systematically dismantle environmental regulations failed in the 1980s, industry officials and 
thinkers from the new right began to devise and propose new “market-based” methods for 
controlling pollution that used different sets of incentives to provide greater flexibility to 
firms attempting to meet targets and achieve environmental improvements (Andrews 1998).  
One strain of this thinking evolved into the innovative “cap and trade” programs, such as the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the other evolved into the voluntary self-regulatory 
programs with a management-based approach.  So-called management-based approaches 
represent a new generation of policy tools that provide a more flexible and less costly way to 
achieve environmental protection that is more palatable to industry (Coglianese and Nash 
2001; Andrews et al. 2001; OECD 2000; Andrews 1998).  
Where traditional environmental regulations stipulate specific environmental 
performance outcomes or prescribe the adoption of particular pollution control technologies, 
 20 
voluntary management-based programs seek to use a structured process to address the 
environmental impacts of individual firms using their own constellations of capabilities.  
Because the internal operations of firms vary greatly, voluntary approaches replace uniform 
regulations and performance requirements with a process standard that takes advantage of a 
firm’s own resources to account for the heterogeneity that exists (Coglianese and Nash 2001; 
Coglianese and Lazar 2003).   Because regulatory agencies also face constraints that limit 
their ability to create and enforce environmental regulations appropriate to individual firms 
and manufacturing sites, these procedural rules and standards are developed and 
implemented by firms themselves in order to more efficiently and suitably achieve public 
goals (Andrews 1998; Orts 1995; Gallagher 2002; Teubner 1983).  These goals may include 
meeting existing regulatory requirements, but also frequently include finding additional 
improvements beyond what the law requires.  If successfully adopted, voluntary programs 
may lead to “beyond compliance” improvements, where firms perform better than what is 
required of them by existing regulations, and find ways to improve behaviors in areas that are 
not regulated by the state.  Voluntary management-based programs are, by nature, self-
enforced initiatives with little oversight or interference from government agencies or external 
stakeholders– though some, like the ISO 14001 EMS standard, require verification by paid 
third-party auditors. Under these schemes, firms are forced to regularly examine their 
environmental operations, engage employees in environmental issues, monitor, document, 
and review their performance, which ultimately leads to more thorough knowledge about 
their internal operations (Darnall & Edwards 2006; Darnall 2006; Hart 1995).   These actions 
may lead not only to improved environmental performance, but better overall management of 
a firm’s operations.   
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Skeptics contend that voluntary approaches, while potentially valuable tools for firms to 
improve performance, are not adequate replacements for regulatory oversight and 
enforcement.  At the core of such criticisms is the belief that firms cannot always be trusted 
to implement changes resulting in improved environmental behaviors on their own.  Genuine 
problems with respect to transparency, accountability and credibility exist in the eyes of the 
public precisely because they are voluntary and are subject to weak enforcement mechanisms 
(Haufler 2001; Krut and Gleckman 1998; Morrison et al 2000).   
Irrespective of these criticisms, nearly 107,000 firms around the globe have implemented 
voluntary management-based approaches consistent with either the ISO 14001 or European 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme by June 2006.2  Several studies have addressed the 
question of why firms choose to adopt formal environmental management and have reported 
a diverse range of reasons.  Some motivations include the pursuit of improved environmental 
performance in manufacturing operations (Nash et al 2000; Florida and Davison 2001; 
Hutson 2001), enhanced management of environmental documentation (del Brio et al 2001; 
Hutson 2001; Morrow and Rondinelli 2002), improved public relations and company image 
(Nash et al 2000; Florida and Davison 2001; Hutson 2001; Morrow and Rondinelli 2002), the 
attainment of greater management efficiency through improved business processes (Hutson 
2001; Morrow and Rondinelli 2002), the ability to integrate environmental management with 
existing quality management systems (Hutson 2001; Morrow and Rondinelli 2002), 
improved regulatory compliance (Nash and Ehrenfeld 2001; del Brio et al 2001; Morrow and 
Rondinelli 2002), and desire to achieve greater competitive advantage (Hutson 2001; 
Morrow and Rondinelli 2002).  In a study of manufacturing facilities in the state of 
Pennsylvania, firms ranked motivations for EMS adoption in the following order of 
                                                 
2 Please see http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm for current figures.   
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importance: the achievement of corporate goals, commitment to environmental improvement, 
state regulatory climate, business performance, and improved community relations (Florida 
and Davison 2001). More recently, Darnall (2006) has argued that firms mandate the 
adoption of formal EMS in their own facilities due to a combination of external pressures and 
the presence of complementary capabilities.   
A host of empirical studies have reported that environmental management efforts do in 
fact lead to positive environmental benefits (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996; Melnyk et al 
1999; Berry and Rondinelli 2000; Mohammed 2000; Rondinelli and Vastag 2000; Florida 
and Davison 2001, Anton Deltas and Khanna 2004; Andrews et al 2003; Potoski and Prakash 
2005a, 2005b).  However, simple environmental benefits may not be enough to motivate 
businesses to adopt formal EMSs; they must contribute to the bottom line as well.  
Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b) frame the “green and profitable” argument by 
suggesting that enhanced resource productivity, achieved through activities such as pollution 
prevention and production, recycling, and reduced energy and materials consumption, leads 
to improved financial performance and makes firms more competitive.  Central to this belief 
is that pollution and waste are indicative of inefficiencies, and inefficiencies are expensive.  
When companies go green they reduce those inefficiencies, thus saving money for 
themselves and their customers, and ultimately become more competitive.   
Hart and Ahuja (1996) found that emissions reductions enhanced operating performance 
through lower raw material, compliance, disposal and liability costs and through more 
efficient use of assets.  However, they also found that the operating and financial 
performance was enhanced more for firms with higher emissions levels than those with lower 
emissions levels.  In cases where firms are already low-emitters, further pollution prevent ion 
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activities may make little financial sense.   Studies have also found that proactive 
environmental responsiveness strategies taken by firms contribute to the emergence of 
competitive benefits (Sharma and Vredenburg 1998), and that “win-win” scenarios, though 
not inevitable, can be greatly enhanced by available resources and capabilities (Hart 1995; 
Christmann 2000, Darnall 2002). However, it is not enough simply to make a blanket 
statement that “environmental management and standards matter.”  More specifically, the 
type of management activities may be what counts.  As King and Lenox (2001) have found, 
the benefits of waste reduction and prevention alone may be responsible for the positive 
relationship between emissions reduction and improved financial performance.   Generally 
cited as the exception to these findings, Walley and Whitehead (1994) have argued that gains 
from eco-efficiency and pollution prevention are vastly overstated.  These gains are more 
often than not overshadowed by costs associated with implementing green strategies.  Such 
strategies can be dangerous to the bottom line and potentially irresponsible to shareholders 
and employees if efficiency gains do not pay off as hoped.  Instead, they propose a “trade-off 
zone” where prospective environmental benefits are weighed against potential value 
destruction.   
In addition to environmental and financial performance improvements, several studies 
point to increased operational efficiencies associated with environmental management 
activities (Melnyk et al 1999; Nash et al 2000; del brio et al 2001; Hutson 2001; Morrow and 
Rondinelli 2002; Andrews et al 2003).  Such efficiencies include better record keeping, 
scheduling of environmental tests, and equipment calibration (Rondinelli and Vastag 2000).  
Additionally, preventative environmental approaches and sound internal waste management 
allowed companies to improve cost control and poorly executed management functions 
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(Corbett and Cutler 2000). In many ways a variety of firms have found that “enlightened self-
interest” is best served by optimizing a “triple bottom line”, which includes social, 
environmental and economic considerations, rather than a single one (Elkington 1998, Hart 
and Milstein 1999, van Heel et al 2001).   
While such arguments for firms to adopt environmental management in their own 
operations may be obvious to both corporate and facility level managers, the rationale behind 
requiring similar actions of suppliers may be less apparent.  Why would firms bother 
interfering with the internal management practices of others?  The answer to this question 
may be two-fold.  First, many firms are eager to protect their reputations and brand images 
against risks brought about by actions of their business partners, particularly in sensitive 
areas such as labor and the natural environment.  Second, standardizing environmental 
management throughout the value chain may result in additional management efficiencies 
(see also Andrews, Hutson and Edwards 2006). In short, the optimization of this triple 
bottom line includes extending such principles, and along with them any related efficiencies, 
to their networks of global suppliers. 
The recent protests against Nike, and the broader movement against the use of 
“sweatshop labor” by apparel manufacturers, have demonstrated that major corporations, 
particularly those with publicly visible brands, are being held accountable for the actions of 
their less visible business partners and contractors (Klein 2000).  Companies such as Nike, 
The Gap, and the Sean Jean clothing label, that have been found to outsource production to 
overseas contractors who engage in unfair or inhumane labor practices, have found 
themselves in the crosshairs of consumer groups and the targets of product boycotts.  
Consumer activism has forced such firms to make substantial changes in their business 
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practices, but has also tarnished their valuable brand images in the process.  Firms in other 
industries have learned from the Nike experience and taken proactive steps to avoid 
becoming the next target for human rights and environmental activist groups as a result of the 
way they source their goods.  For example, Starbucks has begun to purchase fair-trade (above 
market price for poor growers) and shade-grown varieties of coffee, DeBeers has begun 
sourcing diamonds from Canada in an effort to avoid the stigma of “blood diamonds” (where 
profits from the diamond trade in countries such as Sierra Leone are used to finance violent 
conflict), and fast food chains including McDonald’s and KFC have begun to make demands 
on suppliers regarding animal welfare and the use of antibiotics in livestock.   
In response to criticism and allegations of negligence, Nike and other apparel companies 
have instituted programs and codes of conduct for contractors to better guide and monitor the 
behavior of firms to which they have outsourced production (O’Rourke 2003).  Likewise, 
firms in various industries have begun to participate in certification institutions and codes of 
conduct, which to varying degrees establish minimum labor or environmental standards, 
codify processes, and assure that such standards and processes are met by firms and their 
global suppliers (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser 2001).   
Firms which adopt certification institutions and codes of conduct seek to mitigate damage 
to their reputations in two ways.  First, by taking the proper steps, be it through better 
management of environmental processes or becoming better informed about the practices of 
business partners, firm seek to limit risk and protect their valuable brand image from bad 
behavior on the part of contractors (e.g. preventing “Nike” events), in essence, firms hope to 
prevent incidents and accidents from occurring in the first place.  Second, if even after taking 
the proper steps a negative event, such as an environmental accident or violation of labor 
 26 
codes should still occur, firms may be able to demonstrate to consumers, and perhaps 
regulators, that they have at the very least demonstrated due diligence in an attempt to 
prevent such events from happening (Andrews, Hutson and Edwards 2006). 
Indeed, one of the first and most widespread environmental certification institutions was 
created in an attempt to protect industry reputation.  The Chemical Manufacturer’s 
Association (now the American Chemistry Council) created Responsible Care© in an effort to 
prevent future environmental disasters, such as occurred in Bhopal, India and Institute, West 
Virginia in the 1980s, which substantially harmed the reputation of member firms (Hoffman 
1999). 
Similarly, the evolution of environmental management systems and ISO 14001 in 
particular, can be explained in part by corporations searching for systems to effectively 
manage their environmental impacts, and signal to others that they take corporate 
responsibility seriously. 3  By incorporating independent third-party verification, firms that 
certify to the ISO 14001 system standard are in effect communicating that they abide by 
industry best practices for environmental management.  By requiring suppliers to certify to 
ISO 14001, lead firms gain a greater degree of confidence that those from whom they source 
are minimizing their environmental risks.   
In addition to risk minimization and corporate responsibility, firms require suppliers to 
adopt environmental management in order to reap efficiency gains from better management 
and standardization (Rondinelli and Berry 1998; Geffen and Rothenberg 2000; Corbett 
2002).  Efficiency gains achieved through better environmental management may very well 
lead to positive financial benefits at the supplier level that can then be passed on to customers 
                                                 
3 However, ISO 14001 and other EMSs are process standards with no environmental performance requirements.  
Facilities that are registered are not necessarily cleaner or “green” facilities per se, but rather those which have 
simply adopted the procedural guidelines of the system. 
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in the form of lower prices.  Such benefits may be even greater when suppliers in developing 
countries are included.  As most benefits from environmental management may be gained 
early in the adoption process by taking care of the most costly problems first (harvesting 
“low-hanging fruit” so to speak), facilities in developing countries with little environmental 
management experience may achieve better relative gains.  Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) 
have shown that multinational corporations which employ stringent global environmental 
standards have significantly higher market values than firms which default to host country 
standards, which are often less stringent or poorly enforced.   
Standardized EMSs also allow for greater communication and coordination between 
firms by codifying business processes and creating a common language for specific 
management functions.   Managers at both Ford and General Motors have claimed such 
features as major benefits, and even drivers, of their global ISO 14001 implementation 
process (Hutson 2001).  Greater standardization of business processes in general, of which 
environment may only be one part, reduces transaction costs and makes the coordination of 
global manufacturing networks less problematic.  This idea of management as part of a 
search for greater coordination of business functions will be more deeply explored in the 
following discussion of global value chain governance. 
In short, by requiring global suppliers to adopt management practices and standardized 
activities that may improve communication and transparency, firms seek to reap efficiency 
gains that these suppliers may achieve.  If successful, the adoption of such practices may also 
place companies at a competitive advantage over those who choose not to behave as 
responsibly and result in improved financial performance and increased shareholder value 
(Hart 1997). 
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Most studies to date have failed to examine the role of extending policies that encourage 
or require the adoption of management-based approaches to environmental protection, and 
instead have focused solely on the internal operations of firms themselves.  Studies that have 
examined the role of corporate influence on the actions of supplier behavior and the 
institutions that have emerged to do so have focused on issues pertaining to labor and human 
rights, mostly in the apparel and footwear sectors (Wetterberg forthcoming; Gordon and 
Miyake 2000; OECD 2001; Elliot and Freeman 2001; Esbenshade 2004; Fung, O’Rourke 
and Sable 2001; Harvey, Collingsworth, and Athreya 2002; ILO 2002; O’Rourke 2003).  
And while these studies have shed substantial light on internal motivations and potential 
effectiveness of supply chain mandates, a cons iderable gap still exists in understanding 
environmental examples themselves.    To understand these examples, however, it is also 
important to examine the industrial organization of global manufacturing and how value 
chain structures and relationships among firms and their suppliers impact social and 
environmental outcomes. 
 
The Role of Global Value Chain Governance 
Parallel to the increasing focus on social responsibility in businesses, two fundamental shifts 
have occurred in the global economy, particularly throughout the 1990s.  First, firms in many 
industries have shifted the bulk of their production activities to locations in developing 
countries, often in search of the lowest production costs.  Second, there has been a dramatic 
restructuring of the industrial organization of many industries associated with the 
globalization of firms’ operations.  Lead firms in several sectors (most notably automotive 
and electronics) have been “deverticalizing” their operations in order to focus on higher 
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value activities, such as design and marketing, which they consider to be their core 
competencies (Kaplinsky 2000; Sturgeon and Florida 2000; Sturgeon 2002).  Implicit in this 
process is a shift to high levels of outsourcing by these firms to independently operating 
“modular” suppliers who are increasingly responsible for activities such as product assembly 
and subassembly, global purchasing and sourcing, and specific elements of product design 
(Barnes and Kaplinsky 2000; Humphrey 2000; Sturgeon and Florida 2000; Humphrey 2003; 
Tewari 2003; Quadros 2003).  Many of these outsourced processes have large environmental 
impacts, and suppliers often have little experience with environmental management practices, 
or even with the labor standards that have evolved over the past century in the industrialized 
world.   
Economic globalization has substantially increased both industrial and geographic 
fragmentation of manufacturing in a wide range of sectors.  Decreased barriers to trade, 
lower transportation and communication costs, and increased access to expansive pools of 
labor have spurred major changes in the industrial organization of many industries.  These 
factors have also allowed for broad geographic dispersion of design centers, manufacturing 
facilities, and the logistics networks that support them.  Once-monolithic multinational 
corporations, well known for their internal hierarchical structures, have in many cases sold, 
spun-off, or completely folded segments of their businesses that deliver less value, and begun 
to outsource to diverse, and often intricate, networks of global suppliers.4  The challenges of 
coordinating the functions of these new arrangements in industrial organization and 
                                                 
4 Recent financial troubles within the industry have caused some re -structuring among automakers and their 
first-tier suppliers.  In September of 2005, Ford announced that it would reacquire 23 plants and about 18,000 
hourly and 5,000 salaried employees in an effort to avert bankruptcy at Visteon and steer both companies back 
to profitability (Kosdrosky 2005).  More reacquisition efforts are expected throughout the industry in coming 
years, demonstrating just how tightly the fortunes of these companies are, regardless of how independently they 
may operate. 
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geography in order to bring a product to market are substantial – and the stakes are high.  A 
firm’s ability to effectively govern and coordinate its network of suppliers is central to its 
survival.  Firms that fail to do so will be driven from the market.  As stated by Sturgeon and 
Florida (2000), “[c]ompetitive pressure (and advantage) has shifted from excellence at the 
point of production (now assumed) to excellence in governing spatially dispersed networks 
of plants, affiliates and suppliers.”   
Global value chain analysis allows researchers to take industrial and geographic 
fragmentation into account and focus on the emerging issues of industrial re-organization, 
coordination, governance, and power in the chain in order to understand not only the 
fragmentation of global industry, but also its consequences (Humphrey and Schmitz 2003; 
Gereffi 2004).  Specifically, global value chain analysis summarizes the economic value 
contained in each step of bringing a good to market (thorough design, manufacture, 
marketing, and logistics) and highlights the value added and economic rent which actors at 
each level of the chain are able to extract (Kaplinsky 2000; Gereffi and Kaplinsky 2001).  In 
these arrangements, lead firms often retain much of the power in setting up and coordinating 
global production and sourcing networks (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994).  The central issue 
is, in part, to understand who controls the high value functions of the production process and 
how they coordinate supplier networks. 
Early work on value chains focused on the dichotomy between buyer-driven and 
producer-driven cha ins (Gereffi 1994, 1996, 2001; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994).  Buyer-
driven chains, typified by apparel and retail outlets, require the coordination of lead firms 
who design and market products and outsource virtually all production to contractors.  
Producer-driven chains on the other hand are often technology- and capital- intensive 
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processes which require tighter relationships between firms and coordination efforts 
throughout the chain.  Chains in the automotive industry are typically producer-driven, where 
lead firms and direct suppliers have responsibility for coordinating the manufacturing 
process, including assembly and procurement functions. While such a distinction was useful, 
it failed to describe nuances between firms and industries and what may be causing different 
types of chains to arise.  To augment these original descriptions, Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon (2003) have presented an updated typology of value chains which highlights the 
particular arrangement by which firms govern their supplier networks.  According to the 
authors, particular relationship structures arise based on three factors: the complexity of 
information and knowledge transfer needed with respect to product and process specification; 
the extent to which information and knowledge can be codified and transmitted without 
transaction specific investment between parties; and the capabilities of available suppliers to 
produce goods to required specifications.   
The authors construct a typology of industry relationships that result due to varying 
permutations of these three factors.  These categories of relationships range from market (or 
“arms length”) relationships, where transactions occur with little process specification and 
monitoring, to hierarchies in the form of traditional vertically integrated corporations who 
conduct most processes in-house.   
In between these extremes, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon propose three additional 
types of relationships that may influence the degree of governance necessary. Captive value 
chains arise when both the complexity of transactions and the ability to codify transactions 
are high, and the capabilities of the supply base are low.  Accordingly, the costs of switching 
suppliers are high and dependence of small firms on larger buyers is substantial.  In modular 
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and relational value chains, the complexity of transactions and supplier capabilities are both 
high, but the ability to codify transactions differs.  Modular chains arise when product 
specifications are standardized, asset specificity is low, and firms have little need for direct 
monitoring or control over suppliers.  These relationships generally result in a higher degree 
of supplier independence and lower need for interaction with lead firms. Relational chains 
arise when interactions between buyers and sellers are complex and mutual dependence and 
asset specificity are therefore high.   
This typology of value chain categories is a useful heuristic for understanding what 
factors determine the kinds of relationships that arise, but should be considered as an 
inventory of ideal types rather than a census of concrete categories.  As the authors concede, 
value chain governance patterns are not static or strictly associated with industries, but rather 
“depend on the details of how interactions between value chain actors are managed, and how 
technologies are applied.”  What the model provides, however, is an insight into how 
different kinds of relationships arise and how coordination functions may differ based on 
products and firm capabilities.    
In general, the need for chain governance decreases when products are standardized and 
buyers are “design takers” who have the ability to reliably source products from suppliers 
who take responsibility for production (Humphrey and Schmitz 2003).  Such suppliers have 
complementary competencies with lead firms and cooperate with them within specific 
network relationships (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000).  Though relationships vary greatly 
between the types of chains, what is common among the three types (excluding markets 
where virtually no coordination is need, and hierarchies where coordination occurs in-house) 
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is that some level of coordination is needed in order to maximize efficiency and a firm’s 
ability to be competitive. 
The supplier networks for lead automotive firms center on large multinational direct 
suppliers who are given greater responsibility for many core functions of production 
previously held by the lead firms themselves.  While not as interchangeable or modular as 
other sectors (such as electronics), first tier automotive suppliers are increasingly in charge of 
numerous functions of vehicle production, including some elements of design, component 
sourcing, and module sub-assembly (Barnes and Kaplinsky 2000; Humphrey 2000; Sturgeon 
and Florida 2000; Humphrey 2003; Tewari 2003; Quadros 2003).  Lead firms are free to 
focus almost exclusively on their core competencies of product design and marketing, where 
the barriers to entry and value added are the greatest (Kaplinsky 2000).  Therefore, the 
existing value chain structures have created a thickening of linkages between lead firms and 
their major suppliers over the past decade, and a thinning of linkages between lead firms and 
material and component suppliers – in effect creating an environment of more control with 
respect to behavior of those in the first tier, and a lower degree of control over component 
suppliers. 
These conditions, however, are merely a useful lens for understanding value chain 
governance within industries.  The actual structures that exist within sectors are far more 
complex than such explanations suggest.   Multiple types of governance can occur 
simultaneously with a particular producer’s production network, depending on how much 
communication and cooperation is needed.  Highly complex products and specialized 
components may require very tight-knit relationships between lead firms and their first-tier 
suppliers that can be classified as modular or relational, while increased commoditization of 
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highly standardized components in recent years has led to largely market-driven relationships 
within value chains regardless of tier level.  Such a shift has therefore decreased the degree 
of coordination necessary for some components and products, while other processes and 
components require a thickening of ties.  This situation is certainly true within the 
automotive industry, where lead firms maintain very tight coordination of design and 
manufacture with a handful of large first tier suppliers, while also sourcing from thousands of 
individual component suppliers on a purely market-based level.  It is also important to note 
that the tier structure of the industry is not cut and dry, where firms may have first-tier 
relationships with some automakers, and second-tier relationships with others.  There are also 
situations where automakers themselves become, in essence, tier-2 suppliers by providing 
parts from their stamping plants to first-tier manufacturers.5  One must keep the complexities 
of these relationships in mind when considering overall coordination and governance within 
any sector.  
Lead firms and first tier suppliers in these sectors adopt specific strategies in order to 
reduce the complexity of transactions between themselves and component suppliers in lower 
tiers.  One central way firms reduce such complexity is through the development of technical 
and process standards.  Such standards emerge in the form of public and private institutions 
that define grades and standards for products and processes and ensure compliance with them 
(Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2003).  Standards may include just- in-time logistics, total 
quality management systems such as ISO 9000, or even SA 8000 and ISO 14001, dedicated 
to compliance with labor and environmental standards, respectively.  With respect to 
developing countries, customers will often help contractors and others in their networks to 
                                                 
5 Indeed, when a manager from a large first-tier was asked whether she could draw a schematic of even the 
basic relationships within the automotive industry she replied, “I don’t think there is a piece of paper large 
enough.” 
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upgrade processes to meet requirements and specifications, particularly when standards and 
specifications are complex (Keesing and Lall 1992).  Value chains, in essence, become 
conduits for diffusing practices and values – be they dedicated to improved quality, 
technological processes, or expectations regarding social and environmental behaviors. 
For export-oriented industries such as the Mexican automotive sector, the role of value 
chain relationships for learning and standards acquisition are augmented by participation in 
local industrial clusters, where collective efforts by local firms encourage efficiency gains 
and improve capabilities and competitiveness (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000; Nadvi and 
Schmitz 1999; Rabelloti 1997).  These advances include the ability to operate in accordance 
with the growing number of international standards expected by global manufacturers.  A 
major reason inter- firm cooperation and industrial clustering aid in the successful adoption of 
international standards is that the sharing of resources allows local firms to take small steps 
towards upgrading with lower levels of individual risk, which eventually allows for the 
accumulation of capital, knowledge and skills (Nadvi and Schmitz 1999; Knorringa 1999; 
Tewari 1999; Nadvi 1999; Rabellotti 1999; Schmitz 1995, 1999).   Local firms may share 
capital resources, jointly purchase inputs, and jointly engage in employee training, among 
other activities, in order to extract additional efficiencies and learn from one another.   These 
firms may also work closely with customers or clients in their value chains in joint product 
development and marketing or capital purchases for similar reasons. In short, both internal 
factors specific to relationships within local economies (so-called horizontal cooperation) 
and relationships with external economies through value chains (vertical cooperation), affect 
firms’ abilities to upgrade capabilities and allow for the successful adoption of international 
standards – including those pertaining to environmental outcomes.   
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Diffusion of Environmental Standards: Between Firms and Across Borders  
To date, the literature pertaining to the diffusion of standards has mainly focused on national 
regulations addressing labor and the environment.  The majority of these studies have 
concluded that increased trade between nations tends to lead to the strengthening of national 
regulatory standards (see Vogel & Kagan 2002 for summary).  One of the strongest 
arguments along this vein is made by Vogel (1995) and his postulation of a “California” or 
“ratchet effect,” wherein firms forced to work in regulatory environments with strict 
standards find it in their economic interest to push for similar standards wherever they 
operate in order to gain a competitive advantage.  
Institutional theory suggests that similar organizations and entities tend to adopt similar 
structures and practices over time (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Strang and Meyer 1993).  Organizations often adopt these similar behaviors largely for 
ceremonial reasons and institutionalize them, even if they sharply conflict with efficiency 
criteria, in order to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of world business, political or civil 
society.  Actors who adopt formal structures and practices (or rationalized elements) that are 
considered acceptable “maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival 
capabilities” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  In other words, in order to earn permission to play 
the game (whatever that game may be) actors must conform to socially defined expectations.  
From standard accounting procedures to quality management systems, standard practices are 
used as external assessment criteria to “demonstrate socially the fitness of an organization” 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  Additionally, the presence of standard practices and 
organizations are expected to be more pervasive within more “modern” societies (Strang and 
Meyer, 1993; Meyer and Rowan 1977).  As such, standard international structures and 
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practices, including environmental behaviors, may signal the modernity of a firm and 
increase as a society develops institutionally. 
This process of organizations becoming more similar over time is often referred to as 
institutional isomorphism.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outlined three major types of 
pressures that facilitate these isomorphic changes: coercive, mimetic and normative.  
Coercive pressures are associated with a direct consequence for action or inaction and may 
be crudely characterized as “do it or else” pressures.  Mimetic pressures are associated with 
unknown consequences for action or inaction regarding a particular issue and may be 
described as “I don’t know what will happen, so I’d better” pressures.  Normative pressures 
are those associated with the professionalization of a particular field, including the adoption 
of standards of practice and ethics. 
In practice, Christmann (2004) has found increased standardization of companies’ 
environmental policies in response to a variety of pressures, including those from customers, 
governments, and industry generally. Along this vein, Garcia-Johnson (2000) posited that 
multinational chemical companies may be “exporting environmentalism” to the 
industrializing world by transplanting many of the environmental standards in place in their 
home country to their operations overseas.  By using similar environmental standards in 
industrializing countries these firms were in fact introducing more stringent practices than 
had been previously present or required by local regulations.  Industry leaders were raising 
the environmental bar, so to speak, and forcing others in the sector to either raise their 
standards as well or fall to a competitive disadvantage.  Indeed, Wheeler (2000) has noted 
that large TNCs generally adhere to their home country standards when establishing their 
operations in areas where environmental regulations may be more lax.  Going further, other 
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scholars have found cases where TNCs were actually more innovative in their approaches in 
developing countries than in comparable U.S. facilities (Rappaport and Flahery 1992; Fowler 
1995).  In an empirical study of Chinese firms, Christmann and Taylor (2001) found that 
TNC ownership, having TNCs as customers and exporting products to developed countries 
increase self-regulation and environmental performance. On the macro- level, Prakash and 
Potoski (2006) found that high levels of ISO 14001 adoption in importing countries 
encourage firms in exporting countries to adopt the standard as well.  This has proven to be a 
challenge for many firms in developing countries (Chang-Xing 1999), but can lead to 
improved performance and result in “win-win” scenarios when successful (UNCTAD 2000; 
Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000). 
While Garcia-Johnson suggests in her work that those forced to change their behaviors 
included domestic chemical firms and, perhaps by extension, those who supply them, little 
has been done to measure how those behavioral changes are influenced by business 
relationships, or how they are being adopted at the facility level.  In a study of Mexican 
automotive suppliers, Hutson (2001) found that 65% of suppliers to Ford, General Motors, 
and others did not have a formal EMS in place prior to the automotive industry mandates for 
first-tier suppliers to adopt ISO 14001.  These studies suggest that increased interactions with 
multinational firms based in the industrialized world are motivating facilities in Mexico to 
improve their environmental capabilities.  However, such studies have been limited in what 
they can tell us about the specific details of facility adoption and about broader trends of 
industry-wide diffusion of environmental management.  This study aims to address this 
lacuna in the literature. 
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These works must all be considered in light of the rise of private authority and the role it 
plays in an increasingly globalized world.  Hall and Biersteker (2001) discuss the rise of 
private governance institutions in roles that challenge or replace the traditional roles of state 
and intergovernmental institutions.  These authors suggest that the transference of authority 
from the state to private actors in areas such as the establishment of norms and standards 
stems from the state’s conviction that doing so will lead to efficiency gains in the execution 
of state and market functions. Inherent in this shift is the notion that select private actors are 
trustworthy agents that have the moral authority to work in the public interest.  In other 
words, the state willingly transfers power to private economic actors because they are able to 
perform state functions in a more efficient way while maintaining essential public trust.   
Cutler, Haufler and Porter (1999), on the other hand, avoid wholesale acceptance that the 
transference of authority is a conscious rational choice on the part of the state.  While the 
authors do concede that states often cede authority to private institutions as part of a shift to 
neo- liberal notions of private sector efficiency, private authority rises in response to gaps in 
existing state authority where governments are unwilling or unable to provide the governance 
structures necessary for market efficiency. 
Going further, Haufler (2001) discusses how the private sector is engaging in the practice 
of private authority in areas that may provide public benefits – such as environmental 
protection and the promotion of human rights.  They do not do so merely for reasons of 
philanthropy or even a larger sense of moral obligation.  Rather, firms engage in self-
regulation in order to protect themselves from political and economic risks, guard valuable 
firm reputations, and shield themselves from future state-based regulation that may arise in 
response to emerging problems.   Private initiatives often rise due to transnational activist 
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pressures which seek to limit economic activities of firms engaged in controversial 
behaviors. or punish them for malfeasance.  In some cases firms work in conjunction with 
activist groups to craft norms and standards that foster public goals and improve social and 
environmental conditions associated with economic activity – and perhaps raise barriers to 
entry in the process.  Lipschutz and Fogel (2001) examine these initiatives and determine that 
while a number of non-governmental groups have been successful in using their moral 
authority to improve the behaviors of firms and craft more stringent environmental standards, 
private governance has not become an adequate substitute for the authority of the state, and 
supranational structures are needed to protect the public good in a globalized world (see also 
Andrews 1998). 
Considered together, the literature and theory covered in this chapter inform the primary 
research questions of this study by providing an understanding of how private initiatives 
arise, function, and may produce public environmental benefits under the right conditions.  
The analyses in the coming chapters apply these ideas to the specific case of EMS adoption 
in Mexican manufactur ing facilities and the particular institutional regime promoted by lead 
firms in the global automotive industry.      
  
CHAPTER 3: Data Collection 
As arguably one of the most wide-reaching and organizationally complex global sectors, the 
automotive industry has been at the forefront of developing methods to govern their spatially 
dispersed networks of suppliers through directives aimed at ensuring quality, delivery time, 
and cost savings (Sturgeon and Florida 2000).  Environmental considerations stemming from 
the production processes along the value chain have been no exception to this development, 
as most automakers, in one form or another, have created expectations for the behaviors of 
their suppliers and the adoption of industry best practices.   
Beginning in late 1990s, major automotive manufacturers, led by Ford and General 
Motors, began to require their direct suppliers to adopt formal environmental management 
systems consistent with the ISO 14001 EMS standard as an expansion of ISO adoption in 
their own facilities world-wide.  These same firms have encouraged their suppliers to extend 
the requirement along the value chain to companies in lower tiers.  The elaboration of these 
policies represents not only an extension of broader efforts to more effectively coordinate 
increasingly intricate and diverse supply networks in a hyper-competitive global market, but 
also a foray into promoting behaviors with outcomes that may provide public environmental 
benefits.  If successful, this incursion could stand as an example of how private industrial 
actors may use economic leverage to influence the actions of business partners in pursuit of 
public goals where the reach of government has been ineffective. 
This study explores the emergence of environmental supply chain mandates in the North 
American automotive industry, examines how widely mandates to adopt ISO 14001 are 
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diffused through production networks and how thoroughly the specific requirements are 
adopted by autoparts manufacturers in Mexico.  Three principal research questions 
surrounding these issues and the supply chain mandate policies of the automotive 
manufacturers are addressed.  First, how are supply chain mandates to adopt ISO 14001 
interpreted and implemented by suppliers along the value chains of major automotive 
manufactures in Mexico, and how effective are they mandates in driving adoption?  Second, 
are the systems that are adopted by plants in Mexico geared towards achieving a range of 
environmental goals and higher-order environmental objectives, or are they simply “paper 
systems” that meet minimum requirements of the standard?  Finally, have these policies been 
replicated and passed along the value chain to lower tiers of suppliers, or has penetration 
been limited to the first tier?   
In investigating these questions, several fundamental areas need to be examined.  First, 
how supplier firms interpreted the environmental requirements of their customers and the 
internal processes they used to implement the practices must be explored, in order to gain a 
better understanding of the impact of the mandates.  Second, the degree to which supplier 
firms pass along the requirements through their own networks need to be explored in order to 
understand the extent to diffusion within the industry.  Third, the specific environmental 
practices in place at supplier facilities adopted in response to these mandates, as well as the 
particular performance objectives set by these firms need to be detailed.  Additionally, as the 
ability to successfully adopt environmental practices may depend on several factors not 
expressly related the presence of mandates, or the environmental philosophies in place, 
existing management and technical capabilities in practices need to be considered, as well as 
relationships with other firms within local industrial clusters and external markets.   
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To this end, this study uses two primary methods for gathering data pertaining to these 
areas: structured interviews to gather qualitative data, and a survey instrument for 
quantitative data.  This chapter details the methods used for the collection of both.  It begins 
with an overview of the structure and content of interviews with representatives from six of 
the top ten largest automotive suppliers in North America, as identified by the Automotive 
News’ Top 150 North American Suppliers annual ranking for 2004 and two major 
automakers.  The chapter also details the process for collecting survey data from automotive 
supply manufacturing facilities in Mexico, including a detailed description of the survey 
type, the instrument design and pretest phase, population sampling, survey implementation, 
and the error structure.   
 
Structured Interviews  
 A series of structured interviews were held with corporate environmental officers from six of 
the ten largest automotive suppliers in North America, as identified by the Automotive 
News’ Top 150 North American Suppliers annual ranking for 2004.  Interviews were also 
held with corporate managers from the automakers (also referred to as Original Equipment 
Manufacturers or OEMs) Ford Motor Company and General Motors.  Interviews were held at 
corporate headquarters in the metro Detroit area, or by phone, from September 2005 to 
February 2006 and averaged 45 minutes in length.  Interviews with suppliers focused on 
three main areas: the interpretation of the requirements from customers, the implementation 
process, and the replication of the mandates to their own suppliers (please see Appendix A).   
Interviews with OEMs focused on how expectations are communicated to suppliers, how the 
policy is monitored and enforced, and plans to extend the policy to lower tiers.  Interview 
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responses were transcribed and coded.   Follow-up conversations were also held with 
individual ISO 14001 registrars via e-email to better understand the auditing process. 
Because the automotive supply base is so large, even at the first-tier level, efforts were 
concentrated on obtaining interviews from the largest suppliers.  In many ways, these firms 
can be considered ideal types of multinational automotive suppliers: those with the greatest 
knowledge and capital resources and scope of operations that are, in many cases, on par with 
their major customers.  Though they all have a global presence and manufacture wide ranges 
of sub-assembly units and components, they are diverse in ownership and management 
structure, creating a degree of variation in the sample.6   
Because the interviews were aimed at large first-tier suppliers, in order to better 
understand the response to the formal requirements and any efforts to replicate it, the external 
validity of the study is limited.  That is, interview responses may not apply to smaller firms 
who are subject to the same requirements, but possess lower degrees of management 
expertise or financial resources and capital.  Differences in how smaller companies may 
respond to these same pressures are discussed in the implications section, however, with 
special attention to how lack of such resources may affect outcomes.  
Of the major global automotive manufacturers, only General Motors and Ford Motor 
Company agreed to be interviewed for this project.  DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, and 
Nissan all either directly declined, or did not respond to multiple requests for meetings.  As a 
result, I emphasize the policies from the Ford and GM interviews, while adding the same 
details of the others’ policies from supplier interviews.   
 
                                                 
6 Because suppliers were promised anonymity, I have chosen not to report demographic features and 
manufacturing specializations.  Doing so would make them easily identifiable due to the small sample size.   
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Survey Methods  
Survey Type 
The survey was administered via HostedWare’s HostedSurvey web-based survey application.  
An internet-based instrument was chosen due to logistical considerations and budget 
constraints.   A mail-based survey was not seriously considered due to potential problems 
with Mexican post and in-country resources to administer it.  Face-to-face interviews, which 
would yield the best results and response rate, were also ruled out due to lack of resources to 
hire and train in-country interviewers and the geographic dispersion of manufacturing sites, 
spanning virtually all of Mexico.  Help with English to Spanish translations came from 
content experts (academics and professionals) who are native Spanish speakers and experts in 
the field of environmental management in Mexican and North American industry. 
 
Instrument Design and Pre-test 
The main objective of the survey was to gain a better understanding of the environmental 
management practices in place in the manufacturing facilities of automotive suppliers, the 
specific motivations for adopting such practices, and the associated resources and capabilities 
that may contribute to environmental behaviors.  The questionnaire was aimed at obtaining 
information from four main areas: (i) the environmental management activities currently in 
place at the manufacturing facility; (ii) the specific objectives of those activities; (iii) 
technical assistance and cooperation with other local firms, customers and suppliers; and (iv) 
demographic information about the firm and its business organization (please see Appendix 
B).  
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The survey was designed to take approximately 20 - 25 minutes to complete and each 
respondent was given an individual access code to return to the survey at their convenience.  
A previous version of this survey was pretested, evaluated by experts, and implemented at 
manufacturing facilities in four industries in the United States.  This survey was subject to 
review and pretesting by industry experts in Mexico and Latin America before being sent to 
respondents.   
 
Sampling and Survey Implementation 
The sampling frame for this study was provided by the Industria Nacional de Autopartes’ 
2005 directory of members.  The members of INA represent various subsectors involved in 
the manufacture of automobiles – ranging from the production of tires and batteries, to metal 
fabrication, windshields and components.  From this directory I was able to obtain email 
addresses and contact information for over 858 facilities.   
The survey was conducted from October 4 – November 15, 2005 and was done in 
accordance with Dillman’s Tailored Design Method (TDM) for mail and internet surveys. 
The target respondents for the survey were plant managers, environmental managers, or 
managers designated by plant managers with knowledge of a facility’s environmental 
management practices.  Members of the association were sent advance notice from INA 
during the last week of September, alerting them that they would receive an invitation to join 
the study in the coming week.  This notice was followed one week later by an email from me 
explaining the study (in cover letter form) with an individualized link to the HostedSurvey 
website.  As incentive to participate in the survey, respondents were offered an entry into a 
lottery to win an Apple iPod Nano.  A reminder email with the individualized link was sent 
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one week later, a reminder email and invitation two weeks later and a final invitation with a 
link was sent four weeks after the initial invitation.  In line with TDM, recipients were sent a 
total of five contacts over the course of data collection.  Potential respondents were notified 
that their cooperation was voluntary, informed of their rights as research participants and that 
the study had been approved by the Academic Affairs Institutional Review Board (AA-IRB) 
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  After accounting for incorrect email 
address, ineligible and incomplete responses, the survey yielded an overall response rate of 
26.14%.  This response is slightly above average for surveys of business establishments in 
the United States (Dillman 2000).   
 
Error Structure 
This section details the factors that could introduce biases or errors to the representativeness 
and quality of the data.  
First, despite the advantages for this particular study, there are several problems inherent 
in using a web-based method.  First, the technology and methodology are relatively new, 
leading researchers to face greater unknowns than is the case with more tried and true 
methods of mail, telephone and face-to-face interviews.  Potential coverage errors that may 
exist based on this mode of implementation.  For example, many smaller and lower-tier 
manufacturing facilities may not have the same quality of internet connections as larger 
operations (e.g. dial-up vs. DSL), which may lead to higher instances of abandoning the 
survey in process, or not attempting it in the first place. 
Additionally, the use of this mode may lead to a high number of bad and inappropriate 
contacts, as e-mail addresses and personnel change frequently, or messages may be filtered 
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due to e-mail security features.  Indeed, a very large number of invitations (nearly 25% of the 
sampling frame) were never delivered to intended respondents and were returned.  Many of 
these “bounced” emails may have been due to spam filters not allowing emails containing 
web links or coming from unrecognized sources, or the addresses were simply outdated or 
incorrect.   Additionally, many of the contacts listed in the directory were for sales 
representatives and not plant managers (many more may also have been for sales 
representatives, but not as clearly marked).  As a result, many plant managers may never 
have received the invitation to participate in the survey, despite a request to forward the 
invitation if it was sent to an inappropriate contact.  It is unclear to what extent these 
directions were followed. 
Fourth, some locations in the sampling frame were not manufacturing sites and were 
therefore not eligible to participate in the survey.  Some contacts were for corporate offices 
and not listed as such.  Others no longer have manufacturing operations in Mexico 
themselves but still engage in purchasing functions within the value chain.   Several 
respondents sent reply emails indicating that their operations had either moved to Asia, or 
that they served as intermediaries between Asian firms and multinational corporations for 
component sourcing.  While those who responded were taken into account, invitations to 
similar firms may have been ignored.  In order to test for any resulting bias that may have 
been introduced due to these potential problems, several tests for simple effects bias were run 
using interaction terms with demographic variables and variables of interest in the regression 
analyses.  None of the tests indicated the presence of significant bias in the survey responses.   
  
CHAPTER 4: Policy Adoption and Diffusion by Major Suppliers  
 
This chapter explores three major questions associated with the OEM policies for EMS 
adoption by their first-tier suppliers.  First, how have the mandates been interpreted and 
adopted by the largest automotive suppliers and what variance exists in the approaches each 
has taken?  Second, how are the policies monitored and enforced by the OEMs and to what 
degree have they been effective in their aims?  Third, have the first-tier suppliers replicated 
these requirements for their own suppliers and what hindrances exist to doing so? 
In the following sections, I outline the EMS policies of the OEMs and their methods for 
monitoring and enforcement, examine the extent to which the policies have been replicated, 
and discuss the implications of these results.  The findings suggest that while all firms in the 
sample interpreted the EMS policies as strict mandates without room for interpretation, there 
has been some variation in the approaches taken to implement and register their EMSs.  
However, it also finds inconsistencies in how the policies are monitored and important 
exceptions that exist.  Despite these apparent inconsistencies, suppliers still interpret the 
requirements as firm and many would not have implemented EMSs in conformance with ISO 
14001, nor gone through the process of external verification, in its absence.  It should be 
stated at the outset, however, that the actions to comply with the policies of the OEMs refers 
only to the process of acquiring registration to ISO 14001 and does not guarantee that the 
systems are complete or that the content of the EMS will lead to environmental performance 
improvements.   Accordingly, this chapter presents a more proactive approach by automakers 
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to ensure more effective adoption of EMSs – both in terms of structure and content – and 
adherence to their policies.  Finally, this chapter explains how requirements to adopt formal 
EMSs are not being replicated by tier one suppliers in any systematic way – and why they are 
not enforced in the few cases where companies have instituted such policies.   
During the 1990s, most major automakers undertook major global initiatives to certify 
their manufacturing facilities to the ISO 14001 environmental management standard.  By the 
end of the decade most had successfully completed this process and had recognized the 
operational, managerial and environmental benefits associated with standardizing their 
environmental efforts.  As a result, some moved to require that direct (tier-one) suppliers to 
their manufacturing facilities also certify to the ISO 14001 standard as well. 
The importance of supplier networks to the automotive value chain helps provide context 
to this decision.  Many of these same firms had been experiencing considerable changes to 
their organizational structures over the same period.  The most significant of these changes 
involved the automakers (also called Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs) divesting 
themselves of key manufacturing and design functions and outsourcing them to production 
networks operating across the globe.  In a few cases automakers spun-off entire business 
units to form independently operating supplier firms with whom they maintained strong 
cultural and economic ties.  Delphi and Visteon, among the largest multinational automotive 
suppliers, were created as General Motors and Ford moved to streamline their operations and 
focus on core design and assembly competencies.   
Because of the increased fragmentation of their production networks, and increased 
global span of operations more generally, automakers began to employ a host of initiatives to 
increase standardization and efficiency on a worldwide basis to facilitate these changes.  
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Such strategies included global integration of operations and previously independent 
geographic business units, upgrading of information technologies and communication 
channels, and centralizing decision-making to serve a global market.  Ed Hagenlocker, 
President of Ford Automotive Operations in the mid-1990s, stated, “by centralizing decision 
making, we can take the broadest possible view of market opportunities, and we can develop 
products that serve multiple markets, vastly increasing the return on every product 
development dollar” (Financial Times 1995).  Other executives referred to such strategies to 
integrate global operations as “a wrecking ball” to knock down all the bureaucratic and 
geographic barriers that complicate international operations (Financial Times 1995).   
A desire to improve standardization and efficiency partly drove the decision to include 
suppliers into their environmental management strategies for global operations, as did a need 
for  protection against reputational risks and more abstract goals to foster corporate social 
responsibility (Hutson 2001; Hutson, Andrews, and Edwards 2006).  Additionally, the OEMs 
issuing the mandates had hoped that first-tier suppliers would also recognize the benefits of 
EMS adoption and replicate the requirement for their own suppliers in lower tiers, creating a 
“cascade effect” throughout the entire value chain (Hutson 2001).   
 
The OEM Policies7 
While policies of the automakers requiring ISO 14001 adoption are essentially the same, 
there are slight differences among them that deserve attention.  This section briefly details 
the policies themselves, the differences among them – namely General Motors’ option for a 
                                                 
7 An earlier version of this section can be found in Hutson 2001.  Updates have been made to this section since 
its initial writing. 
 52 
“self-declaration” option that some suppliers may choose – and the methods for monitoring 
and enforcement by the companies.   
In April of 1995, the General Motors Vauxhall assembly plant in the United Kingdom 
gained certification to the British environmental management standard BS 7750 and soon 
after was certified to the ISO 14001 standard (McCulley 1999).  In February of 1996, GM 
held an Environmental Strategy Focus Forum to think about ways to better incorporate 
environmental issues facing their firm into the business planning process (GM 1996).  Out of 
this meeting came the decision to adopt a uniform environmental management systems 
standard for their entire global manufacturing operations.  Subsequent internal discussions 
and meetings with their “SEA Team” (Supplier Environmental Advisory) led to the 1999 
announcement that all of its own manufacturing facilities would be ISO 14001 certified by 
December 2001 and that it would require all of its direct suppliers to have an EMS in place 
for “all manufacturing facilities supplying product to GM by the end of 2002” (GM 
Purchasing memo to suppliers 2000). 
In March 1996, the Ford Halewood Assembly and Transmission Plant in Liverpool, 
England received ISO 14001 certification and was followed closely by plants in Germany 
and Taiwan.  Soon after, Ford set the ambitious goal to have all of its manufacturing sites 
obtain ISO certification by the end of 1998 (Ford 1998). By December of 1997 all of Ford’s 
Australian facilities were certified to ISO 14001.  Ford was able to meet its 1998 goal and 
become the first automaker to have all its existing plants certified to ISO 14001.  In 1999, 
Ford also issued a mandate to its suppliers: all manufacturing sites shipping products to Ford 
must be ISO 14001 certified by July 1, 2003 (Ford 1999).   In 2000, DaimlerChrysler too 
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announced that it would require all supplier manufacturing sites be registered to the ISO 
14001 standard by January 1, 2003 (IES Update 2000).   
While they are minor, slight differences do exist in the policies regarding ISO 14001 
certification for suppliers.  Ford requires all direct materials suppliers be registered to ISO 
14001, as well as all non-manufacturing service providers with “significant environmental 
risks” (e.g. facility painting, machine servicing and cleaning) (Monique Oxender, Ford Motor 
Company, personal interview, September 2005).  According to the Ford policy, there is no 
room for negotiation and no exemptions are offered with respect to the requirement. 
Monitoring of the standard is enforced by the engineering division within purchasing, which 
is responsible for monitoring overall quality and assigning a supplier’s quality rating.  EMS 
certification is attached to Ford’s top quality rating, or “Q1” status, which enables suppliers 
to bid on and receive preference for contracts, is reviewed upon bidding for new contracts 
and is frequently re-evaluated based on specific product specifications and components.  If a 
firm loses Q1 status, it is virtually guaranteed that they will not be awarded any future 
sourcing contracts unless they are able to regain it by meeting all required certifications and 
passing all relevant inspections.  As of September 2005, 99.5% of Q1 suppliers were certified 
to ISO 14001.  According to Ford, the remaining half percent are not exceptions to the 
policy, but rather new business relationships or facilities that have contractually agreed to 
obtain certification within a defined period of time (Monique Oxender, Ford Motor 
Company, personal interview, September 2005). 
General Motors has defined their policy in slightly different terms for suppliers.  It has 
required all direct suppliers of parts for GM products to have an environmental management 
system in place since the end of 2002, but has some flexibility in how that EMS is verified.  
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Instead of a sole reliance on certification to ISO 14001, direct suppliers must have a system 
in place that is in conformance with ISO 14001.  Worldwide Purchasing, the division of GM 
leading the charge for supplier implementation of EMSs, has stated that it will also accept 
registration to the European Union Eco-Audit and Management Scheme (EMAS) as a 
demonstration of EMS implementation or the more controversial alternative option of self-
certification.  GM has stated that while “(t)hird party confirmation is strongly preferred, it 
also will accept written declaration by a responsible executive that a site is operating under 
an EMS that is in conformance with ISO 14001” (GM, press release 1999). The responsible 
executive is defined by the policy as the head manager of a supplier facility. 
Suppliers taking advantage of the self-certification option do have additional 
requirements under the official policy.  First, they must re-submit EMS documentation to 
General Motors every three years (those who opt for third-party have no such requirement 
unless their registration is revoked).  Second, while GM considers this option equivalent to 
third-party verification, “suppliers utilizing the self-declaration process should be prepared 
upon request, and/or audit, to demonstrate conformance” (GM 2000).  Self-declarers must 
also perform yearly internal audits, take appropriate steps to correct deficiencies found in 
those audits, have top management review the results of such audits on a yearly basis and be 
prepared to provide Worldwide Purchasing with documentation supporting their 
environmental objectives, targets, and environmental programs upon request.  This policy 
was established in order to facilitate the process for suppliers who may already participate in 
programs such as the American Chemistry Council’s (ACC) Responsible Care program or 
other codes of practice or EMSs.  Such long established programs are seen as useful 
frameworks for achieving environmental goals and are therefore acceptable to General 
 55 
Motors – as long as participants self-declare (Lee Hachigian, General Motors Corporation, 
personal interview, December 2000; e-mail correspondence 2006).  However, very few 
suppliers use this option: most appear to prefer the more conventional route of external 
verification and ISO registration. 
Similar to the Ford process, GM’s global purchasing division is responsible for tracking 
and managing ISO 14001 registrations when the bidding process for new contracts begin and 
when quality ratings are reviewed.  There are no yearly or scheduled check-ups, and plants 
verify status by sending an electronic copy of their registration to the purchasing division.  
Similar temporal exemptions also exist, where suppliers without ISO 14001 at the time of 
contract bidding may agree to do so within a defined period of time specified in the contract 
(Lee Hachigian and Pat Beattie, General Motors Corporation, personal interview, September 
2005).  While representatives from DaimlerChrysler refused participation in this project, 
suppliers to DaimlerChrysler indicated that the monitoring and enforcement policy is 
comparable, with electronic submission of certificates of registration required at the time of 
contract bidding.   Suppliers also reported that while other companies, such as Toyota and 
Honda, fell short of directly mandating ISO 14001 adoption, several of them “strongly 
encourage” it but do not threaten a supplier’s quality rating or other measures if they fail to 
achieve certification.  One supplier suspected a free-riding component, where some firms use 
resources to create a public good and enforce the standard, while other companies invest little 
and reap potential benefits from a shared supply base. That is, most suppliers do not work on 
an exclusive basis with any single automaker.  If one automaker requires ISO 14001 and 
expends resources, however limited, to communicate and enforce the policy while another 
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does not, they both share equally in whatever reputational or managerial benefits the standard 
produces.   
Unlike in the area of quality, where OEMs will occasionally audit a supplier’s plant 
themselves if they have experienced problems with quality or suspect a potential problem, 
the automakers do not audit environmental systems themselves, though GM does reserve this 
right in cases where suppliers choose to self-certify.  Instead, OEMs depend on independent 
third-party ISO 14001 registrars, hired by suppliers themselves, who award certificates based 
on the results of the audit process.  Despite the potential pitfalls in accuracy of relying on 
external monitors paid by supplier firms, OEMs prefer this method over conducting such 
audits themselves for two main reasons.  First, the corporate infrastructure and resources 
necessary to engage in such audits would be extraordinary, as the production networks of the 
OEMs exceed 3000 plants located around the globe.  The direct benefits derived from such 
audits – namely, more accurate assessments of supplier behaviors – would be dwarfed by the 
massive costs of deploying teams of auditors to all supplier plants worldwide.  Second, and 
perhaps as importantly, engaging in such audits would expose the automakers to increased 
liability and risk.  By actively engaging in the environmental management efforts of their 
suppliers, they would be taking a degree of ownership over the processes in place, and 
exposing themselves to greater reputational and financial risks in the event of an accident or 
adverse environmental incident. 
Unlike quality issues, where a faulty component directly affects an automaker’s end 
products and OEMs therefore frequently conduct internal audits when a problem is 
suspected, environmental issues remain outside the scope of what are considered primary 
business functions.  Maintaining a policy of requiring an externally monitored EMS, rather 
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than direct involvement, demonstrates due diligence if such an event should occur while 
divorcing them from any direct responsibility.  As a result, there are no plans for any of the 
automakers to actively monitor the environmental activities within supplier plants.   
 
 
How Mandates have been Adopted and Implemented 
 
While all firms interviewed for this study interpreted the requirements from the automakers 
as strict mandates without room for interpretation, there has been some variation in the 
approaches taken to implement it in terms of centralization of the process and choice of 
registrars (Table 4-1).   And while all firms state that they would have adopted some form of 
environmental management in the absence of a formal requirement, the choice of some 
automakers to make the adoption of ISO 14001 mandatory, rather than communicating it as a 
softer “expectation,” was an important driver for most firms to implement a more stringent 
standard.  The OEM policies motivated upper management in supplier firms to devote the 
necessary resources to formal adoption and third party monitoring, when many would have 
otherwise been satisfied with less stringent internal efforts. 
All suppliers interviewed stated that there was absolutely no confusion regarding what 
was expected from them with respect to the OEM mandates, as vice presidents in each 
company’s purchasing department sent letters to suppliers detailing precisely what needed to 
be done and giving deadlines for implementation.  Absent these deadlines and explicit 
instructions, most supplier firms stated that they would not have responded with third party 
auditing of their EMSs, or the adoption of ISO 14001 equivalent systems.  Of the firms 
interviewed, two had already undertaken the ISO 14001 adoption process on a firm-wide 
basis prior to it becoming a contractual requirement with OEMS, three others were in the 
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process of adopting EMSs using the ISO 14001 template as a guide, and one would not have 
adopted a formal EMS at all and instead would have continued to focus on a “compliance-
based” approach to environmental management at all of its sites.  Of these firms, however, 
only the two with ISO 14001 in place prior to the OEM mandates would have had their 
EMSs externally verified and undergone the certification process without the explicit 
requirement from the OEMs.  The rationales for the other three firms pursuing EMSs to not 
seek third-party certification, and the fourth to not implement an EMS in conformance with 
the ISO standard in the absence of the mandates, hinged on the same factor: upper 
management at these companies would not have invested the resources necessary absent 
explicit external pressure from the OEMs.   
 
Table 4-1         
  Supplier A Supplier B Supplier C Supplier D Supplier E Supplier F 
How mandate was interpreted Strict Strict Strict  Strict  Strict Strict 
Adopted EMS based on ISO 14001 w/o 
mandate? 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
3rd party audits w/o mandate? Yes No No Yes No No 
Centralized v. decentralized corporate 
structure for environmental management 
Decentralized Centralized Centralized Centralized Centralized Decentralized 
Single or multiple firms used to audit and 
register global sites? 
Single* Single Single Single Single  Multiple 
Faced punitive action for non-compliance? No No No No No  Yes 
Replicate mandates to own suppliers? No Yes Yes  No Limited No 
Plans to enforce supplier mandates? --- No No --- Limited --- 
  *90% of global plants use the same company to audit and register their systems 
  
Even though corporate environmental officers within supplier firms had been actively 
pushing for company-wide adoption of ISO 14001, their requests for the resources to do so 
often fell on deaf ears.  Not seeing the potential financial and management values first-hand, 
as environmental managers often do, the leadership of companies viewed environmental 
activities as an expense, rather than a potential source of savings and competitive advantage 
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(Hart 1997).  In some cases, company leaders were unwilling to budget for registrations 
when some plants had already undergone the bulk of the work required to gain certification.  
As one corporate environmental officer stated, “We even had sites that were ready to certify 
due to our internal efforts, but the company brass found it to be an unnecessary expense, so 
we didn’t” (Supplier F, personal interview, September 2005).   According to another 
environmental manager, “we would never have gotten the support of upper management [to 
adopt ISO 14001 company-wide] without the OE’s [sic] insistence – certainly not the third-
party aspect of it – going with third-party would have required extra costs that management 
would not have been keen to take on” (Supplier C, personal interview, September 2005).   
The dedication of resources became an issue of market imperative to business leaders – it 
had to become very clear to keepers of corporate purse-strings that adopting and certifying to 
ISO 14001 was a rigid business requirement.  “I t was clearly seen as a condition of doing 
business, that is what made leadership take it on - absent the consequences we would have 
instead done a ‘compliance’ process if the customers would have come out softer on it” 
(Supplier B, personal interview, September 2005).  Even stronger, “the threat of losing 
business and the threat that they would not get to bid on new business was the biggest driver 
for adoption – had the mandate not been in place [company leadership] would not have gone 
for certification” (Supplier F, personal interview, September 2005). 
The question of upper management buy-in and dedication of necessary resources also 
raises questions regarding the quality of the EMSs that would have resulted under this 
counterfactual, without external pressure from customers for certification.  EMS adoption, 
even the process of self-certification, often requires the dedication of large amounts of 
financial and human resources in order to implement effectively (Andrews et al 2001).  They 
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can be expensive and time-consuming endeavors, particularly if the company itself does not 
possess internal competencies and experience with environmental management.  Without the 
commitment of resources and rigor which auditors sometimes offer8, self-certified systems 
may have been of lesser quality and thoroughness.  In the words of one corporate manager, 
“the external requirement from customers made it faster to adopt and probably higher quality 
– third-party auditors drive the discipline we need sometimes” (Supplier B, personal 
interview, November 2005).  Additionally, internal corporate mandates for environmental 
action may not be taken as seriously by all plant managers as external threats from customers 
with genuine consequences for current and future business.  “Since the expectation was put 
out by OEM management – you will certify and you will have it done by X date – that‘s why 
they [individual plant managers] complied.  Had that pressure not been there, I don’t think 
management at all facilities would have done so” (Supplier B, personal interview, November 
2005).  In short, the OEM mandates not only drove adoption, but forced the issue of 
environmental management to become a larger priority for suppliers and forced companies to 
allow for expenditures where they otherwise would not have dedicated the resources.   
The OEMs gave no specific instructions regarding how direct suppliers must adopt ISO 
14001 in their plants – only that they must do so by a specific date.  Accordingly, each 
company has had the flexibility to implement the standards in ways that align with their 
corporate structure and individual management styles.  Companies that allow their plants and 
business units to operate with greater autonomy more generally are also more inclined to 
assign more independence to plants with regard to EMS adoption.  The firms in this study 
used methods for implementation and maintenance of their systems that fall into two broad 
                                                 
8 The quality of auditors can often vary in terms of expertise and thoroughness, as reported by three of the 
suppliers interviewed. See also NAPA 2001 for a detailed assessment of the ISO auditing process.  This point 
will be discussed further below.  
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categories – decentralized or centralized coordination of their EMS processes.  Decentralized 
approaches assume a low degree of coordination and oversight from corporate headquarters 
and generally rely upon plant managers, or managers from geographic clusters of plants, to 
design EMSs and conduct internal audits prior to third-party verification.  Centralized 
approaches imply a greater degree of coordination and oversight by corporate environmental 
officers and departments, who often provide “off the shelf” EMS templates for plants to 
follow, provide technical assistance with implementation, and conduct internal audits prior to 
visits from registrars.  Two of the six firms interviewed used decentralized methods for EMS 
implementation and maintenance, while four took a more centralized approach.   
Supplier A and Supplier F both relied on plants themselves, and clusters of plants with 
geographic proximity, for their internal corporate efforts to implement and maintain their 
systems.  Supplier A’s process involved using managers from clusters of plants to internally 
audit one another’s EMSs, and provide technical assistance and feedback when necessary, 
before each plant submitted to external auditing by registrars. “Stand alone” plants, not 
located within a reasonable proximity of others, generally relied on outside consultants for 
technical assistance and help with internal audits prior to the external registration process.9  
Supplier F’s process functioned in a similar way, with plants within certain regions providing 
technical assistance where necessary, but were not as far-reaching with respect to joint 
internal auditing of one another’s facilities.  While plants did report to corporate headquarters 
and environmental officers in charge with respect to these measures, they were given a great 
deal of autonomy in the process, provided they maintained their certification status.   
                                                 
9 Outside consultants providing technical assistance are not the same companies that conduct the registration 
audits, which is prohibited under the ISO 14001 standard. 
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The other four companies were more centralized in their approaches, often providing “off 
the shelf” templates for ISO 14001 adoption (Suppliers B and E) , conducting internal audits 
on a company-wide basis (Suppliers C, D, E) and in some cases registering several plants on 
one “multi-site” certification (suppliers B and C).  Each of these companies maintained an 
environmental officer and department at corporate headquarters to oversee global operations 
and review audits and non-conformances (problems) that might be uncovered in the process.    
Several functional differences did exist, however.  Supplier B maintained a very small 
environmental staff with one person responsible at headquarters for coordinating and 
reviewing all environmental work, which was often outsourced to consultants with particular 
areas of expertise in specific regions, while Supplier D conducted all plant audits with 
internal corporate experts on a yearly basis in order to incorporate company-specific 
knowledge for each of its business units that they did not believe was possible from outside 
consultants.  Similarly, Supplier E used one standardized process to prepare for ISO 14001 
and TS 16949, an automotive industry specific quality standard, for all global locations.    
Virtually irrespective of how centralized or decentralized the process of EMS adoption 
and maintenance has been for each supplier firm, nearly all firms used a single global 
registrar to certify the EMSs in place at their plants – with five of the six suppliers 
interviewed using this method.10  Supplier firms used one global registrar primarily to 
remove discretion from individual plant managers and receive more objective and reliable 
audits, which they believed were valuable tools for ensuring validity of their initiatives.  
Removing discretion from plant managers is an important step to prevent “shopping” for 
                                                 
10 I use the term “virtually irrespective” because it difficult to conclusively determine the relationship between 
these factors with such a small sample of firms.  It is true that one of the more decentralized firms does not use a 
single registrar for all its plants and the other uses one for 90%, revealing the possibility that degree of 
centralization of corporate management may indeed have some impact on this choice. 
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auditors.  That is, if plant managers are given the power to hire specific auditors to register 
their EMSs to ISO 14001, they may simply choose an auditor who will conduct uncritical 
audits and award certification without revealing shortcomings a manufacturing facility may 
have.  With the threat of losing business on the line, plant managers will often choose the 
easiest path to obtaining certification given the option, particularly if environmental 
management does not rank high on their lists of personal priorities.   
Corporate offices, on the other hand, will often want a genuine return on their investment 
from resources dedicated to environmental management rather than a simple “rubber stamp” 
from auditors.  As one corporate environmental officer commented, 
If you spend the time and money to put together an EMS, you need to be sure it is done 
properly.  It would be stupid to put a system in place that doesn’t mean anything, even 
though some companies do…Our company risk rates each plant according to non-
conformances they receive.  If there are a lot of non-conformances, we know there is 
something else wrong at the plant (Supplier C, personal interview, September 2005).   
 
In other words, environmental audits are not only good tools to assess the environmental 
behaviors of a plant, but also as an indicator of overall management quality.  If audits are 
rubber-stamped by lax auditors hired by uninterested managers, such objective assessments 
are not possible and the full value of the system is not realized.  Expending resources without 
reaping the potential benefits makes little sense to corporate managers. Without objective 
assessments, supplier firms may expend valuable resources on obtaining certification without 
assurance that the system will provide management benefits that theoretically arise if 
implemented properly.  From the perspective of these large supplier firms, obtaining 
certifications in order to continue relationships with their customers are of primary 
importance, but running clean and efficient operations are also essential in sectors as highly 
competitive as the automotive industry.   
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Firms also benefit from additional efficiencies that may be extracted from using one 
global auditor for all their facilities, as it makes both financial and managerial sense to 
streamline the process and centralize the registration information for each plant.  Supplier E 
used a much less centralized process before the OEM mandates, employing eighteen 
different auditing firms in Europe and eight in Asia.  As its North American operations began 
to standardize the process in response to the mandates, other regions were folded into the 
process, which presently uses one auditing firm in conjunction with an internally 
standardized process.  Other firms (Suppliers B and D) have taken advantage of single 
auditors to incorporate their multi-site registrations. Prior to creating a common process, 
Supplier B had 72 separate EMSs.  Incorporating an umbrella certification for their sites 
based on their different business units has created much greater efficiencies and streamlining 
of processes.   
A potential criticism of using a single registrar globally is that it may encourage “rubber-
stamping” or “shopping” for certifications on a larger scale, where multinational auditing 
firms provide lax audits in exchange for exclusive contracts.  However, managers here 
suggest two reasons why such a scenario is unlikely.  First, as stated above, supplier firms 
seek objective assessments of their plants – environmental audits done by qualified external 
auditors provide such assessments.  Second, large auditing firms risk sullying their own 
valuable reputations if they are caught or accused of lax performance.  Many of the largest 
companies that provide these registrations, such as Det Norsk Veritas, SGS, Bureau Veritas, 
and BSI, have their own set of internal qualification requirements, incentives and disciplinary 
measures to limit embarrassing outcomes during registration audits.  These actions are in 
addition to disciplinary measures that may be imposed by national accreditation boards for 
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poor performance.11   As one registrar stated in response to this issue, “[t]hese are big 
multinational firms that do all kinds of certifications/registrations (not just quality and 
environmental management systems).  Their worst fear is to certify a company to ISO 14001 
only to have the company experience an environmental disaster shortly thereafter in which 
criminal culpability is involved” (Foster Knight, The Lexington Group, e-mail 
correspondence, February 2006).   As the practices of these large firms stretch far beyond a 
single client’s desires, at least on the surface most registrars for these companies seek to 
conform to the highest professiona l standards in order to protect their own reputations.12 
The one company that does not use a single global registrar for all of its facilities, 
Supplier F, still removes discretion from individual plant managers and obtains more 
objective assessments of its plants EMS, by hiring one registrar for geographic clusters of 
facilities.  For example, one company is used for all plants in the United States, another for 
all of Mexico and another for Brazil and South America.  This registrar is selected by a 
corporate environmental officer not located on-site at any individual plant.  The rationale 
given for this decision is slightly at odds with environmental officers from other companies.  
“Could I save money for my region if I had a single supplier for 14000?  Yes, I could and 
could look like a hero, but sole sourcing on a regional or global scale is just too risky.  If one 
plant, say, a tiny little one in Uruguay fails an audit it could place my certification at risk and 
thus my business relationship with Ford” (Supplier F, e-mail correspondence, March 2006).   
                                                 
11 It is unclear to what extent a registrar has ever been punished by the accreditation bodies for poor 
performance, if ever.  In any case, it is an extraordinarily infrequent occurrence. 
12 This is not to suggest all registrars operate under these incentives, as many smaller firms have larger 
incentives to rubber-stamp to attract business.  The intention here is to point out how larger MNCs that operate 
as single registrars for these suppliers may adhere to stricter standards.  However, short of criminal actions or 
environmental disasters, even the large firms face very little incentive to be tough on their clients, particularly 
with respect to marginal violations or non-conformances. 
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Since the announcement of the mandates seven years ago, all suppliers interviewed 
believe they have extracted value from their systems and improved their performance over 
time.  Over the course of the discussions, and not in response to any pointed questions 
regarding the benefits that have emerged, company managers referred to several areas where 
they have seen improvement.  The most frequent comment was with respect to improved 
streamlining of global operations that emerged over time (Suppliers B, D, E, and F).  This 
improved streamlining has led to improved communication and better documentation of 
processes and saving money.  Two firms (Suppliers A and C) mentioned the importance of 
continual improvement that that has causes “peaks and plateaus” in their environmental 
performance over time – first harvesting the “low hanging fruit” and then finding new areas 
to pursue.  One supplier mentioned the effect that implementing EMS has had on other firm 
competencies, including related environmental initiatives in the industry, such as the End of 
Life Vehicle (ELV) directive from the European Union13, and in quality management.  
Finally, Supplier F strongly suggested the greatest benefit has been to increase the profile of 
environmental activities in overall operations in the eyes of management.  “We 
[environmental management personnel] still don’t get to drive as nice of company cars [sic], 
but we’re getting more of the resources we need” (Supplier F, personal interview, September 
2005). 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The End of Life Vehicle (ELV) directive from the European Union entails a series of requirements for the 
disposal or motor vehicles sold in member countries, including the restriction of heavy metals and the recovery 
of 85% of the vehicle before disposal.  In response, the automotive industry has introduced the Integrated 
Management Database System (IMDS) to track the components of vehicle parts throughout the supply chain, 
and eliminate restricted substances on a global scale.   
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Monitoring and Enforcement 
Though the OEMs’ policies are clearly communicated to suppliers and the methods for 
verifying ISO 14001 certification status are straightforward, there exist some exceptions and 
inconsistencies in monitoring and enforcement.  All suppliers stated that there is indeed a 
consistent and systematic process for reporting their ISO 14001 certification status to the 
OEMs, in accordance with the OEM policies described above, but there has not been 
consistent enforcement and monitoring of the status of individual plants executed by the 
OEMs.   Inconsistencies stem from two major areas – dependence upon verification at the 
time of contract bidding14, rather than continuous and random monitoring, and exceptions 
made for new plants, new relationships and important contracts.  Despite such 
inconsistencies, large supplier firms appear to have gotten the message that obtaining 
certification is an important factor in their relationships with the OEMs that require it.  
Nevertheless, some problems with relying on third-party registrars do exist, and could be 
mitigated by OEM efforts to extend selective quality monitoring to environmental areas as 
well, particularly in cases where they suspect problems.   
As stated above, inconsistencies in monitoring and enforcement stem from two primary 
factors.  First, because monitoring is generally done by purchasing departments at the time of 
contract bidding and registrations are not monitored in a consistent way throughout the life of 
a contract for all companies, registrations may lapse and dedication to the tenets of the 
system way wane without customer knowledge or resulting penalty.  One supplier stated, 
“No company [OEM] takes annual stock of who is up to date with certifications – the process 
is pretty hit or miss regarding monitoring” (Supplier E, personal interview, September 2005).  
                                                 
14 Ford’s Q1 process may be an exception.  Though there is no fixed schedule for quality monitoring, it is a 
“continual process with certain cycles for some commodities” (Ford, personal interview). 
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According to another supplier, “it really depends on the OEM, some check, some don’t” 
(Supplier B, personal interview, November 2005).   
Second, automakers may make temporary exemptions for newly constructed facilities, 
new contracts and important components.  When locations and contracts are new, OEMs do 
not want to preclude relationships based on the absence of a certification.  In these cases, 
companies generally negotiate an agreement under which suppliers are granted a contract 
with a clause agreeing to implement the ISO 14001 standard within a specified period of 
time.  According to GM, “these are just technical areas where suppliers fall between the gaps 
of the policy for one reason or another, but don’t stray from the spirit of it” (Lee Hachigian 
and Pat Beattie, General Motors Corporation, personal interview, September 2005).  
Similarly, Ford has stated that new plants and contracts are not exceptions, but rather those 
that are still under review for Q1 status (Monique Oxender, Ford Motor Company, personal 
interview, September 2005).  Though Ford and General Motors both stated that such 
facilities are not exempt from the requirement, several suppliers claimed to be aware of 
locations that were operating without ISO certification.  To quote one, “I know of 
competitors that don’t have it in some plants – mostly big companies working in newer 
locations that have been up and running for two or three years now that still haven’t gotten it 
– and they still get business.  That’s not fair to other companies, but it is just a fact of life” 
(Supplier X, personal interview, 2005).15  
Despite these apparent inconsistencies and gaps, large supplier firms have large ly 
received the message that adopting EMSs is an important facet of their operations and an 
imperative when doing business with the Big Three.  Only one supplier (Supplier F) reported 
any action stemming from non-compliance, in which one plant lost its top quality ranking.  
                                                 
15 Supplier identity further hidden by designating as ‘X’ due to the sensitive nature of this comment. 
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Under these conditions, the plant quickly implemented and registered its EMS to regain its 
status.  Throughout the industry, OEMs did report some initial resistance to their policies and 
Ford reports to having revoked Q1 status from “a number” (Ford would not specify how 
many) of suppliers who failed to gain certification of their EMSs.  Many of these suppliers 
quickly acted to rectify the situation.   “The message came through loud and clear – this was 
something we were serious about and would follow through with.  It was not just an empty 
threat” (Monique Oxender, Ford Motor Company, personal interview, September 2005).  
General Motors has not discontinued any relationships for ISO 14001 related issues. 
Even if full compliance with the policies is achieved, the full spirit of the policy – which 
aims for continual improvement in environmental performance and efficiency – may not 
exist with complete reliance upon external auditors for enforcement.  Two shortcomings in 
particular are present.  First, as explained in the next chapter, third party audits may be 
incomplete with respect to the requirements of the system.  That is, auditors may be lax, or 
incomplete, in their assessments and grant ISO 14001 to facilities that may be undeserving.16  
In such cases, OEMs may be accepting the word of unreliable sources that suppliers have met 
their obligations under the ISO 14001 policy.  Second, even if a supplier plant is meeting the 
structural requirements of an EMS, there is no guarantee that the contents of the system, 
which are flexible and intended to meet the needs of individual plants, will lead to 
environmental performance improvements (Krut and Gleckman 1998; Andrews et al 2001; 
NAPA 2001).  EMSs conforming to the ISO 14001 standard ensure tha t a specific process is 
in place, but do not require any specific improvements for certification.  Accordingly, plants 
                                                 
16 This factor, of course, needs to be considered in light of the specific safeguards individual auditing firms have 
in place to discourage or prevent lax performance of individual auditors.  The problem may be more prevalent 
among the lower tiers of accredited auditors than with the more respected global firms.   
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may have systems that are virtually meaningless in terms of performance outcomes, yet meet 
their contractual obligations (Krut and Gleckman 1998). 
With respect to other certifications that suppliers must obtain, particularly in the realm of 
product quality, the OEMs themselves may perform audits if they suspect a potential problem 
with supplier conformance.  Supplier E, for example, has had quality ratings lowered at a few 
facilities, even though they were fully up to date with applicable certifications, after an OEM 
conducted their own audits due to suspected inconsistencies.  OEMs do not, however, 
conduct similar checks with respect to the content or quality of suppliers’ EMSs, even during 
the process of quality audits.  Because certification schemes do not guarantee good 
performance, or even full compliance with their requirements, conducting audits of this kind 
could both ensure the integrity of the certification and improve the contents of the system, 
which may lead to better performance outcomes.   
OEMs have decided not to engage in such action, as neither of the firms interviewed for 
this study intend to conduct environmental audits of supplier plants.   The high financial costs 
that would be related with any such effort and associated liability of becoming closely 
involved with a business partner’s environmental operations are the primary factors barring 
this kind of involvement.  As the number of direct suppliers for each firm numbers in the 
thousands, a coordinated effort to review or audit the environmental systems of each would 
be prohibitive.  Considering the relatively low budgetary status environmental departments 
already rank within the hierarchy of global automotive firms, the additional expenditures 
necessary to staff and conduct such audits are unlikely to be viewed as necessary by 
corporate leaders, particularly while the industry as a whole struggles to maintain 
competitiveness.  The benefits would be difficult to quantify with respect to costs of 
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implementation.  Additionally, few firms are willing to engage in behaviors that directly tie 
them to the environmental behaviors of others.  While reputational risks may always exist 
through such relationships, as discussed in the theory section of this dissertation, direct legal 
liability is easier to avoid by refraining from becoming directly involved with a suppliers’ 
EMS processes.  “[OEMs] don’t come into the plant to check up on you like they would with 
quality – they don’t want to – if you go into a plant and get involved with compliance at a 
facility, you get dragged into the process and associated liability.  Instead, they take the word 
of the registrar and hope the checks and balances work out” (Supplier C, personal interview, 
September 2005).  As explained below, suppliers themselves face similar obstacles for not 
engaging in the monitoring of their own suppliers’ plants. 
 
 
Replication of the Mandates 
 
The question of whether suppliers subject to the ISO 14001 mandates replicate these 
requirements is central to understanding the degree to which such policies are diffused 
throughout the industry.  If suppliers recognize the values of EMSs and require their 
suppliers to also adopt, these private mechanisms may be effective tools for promulgating 
advanced management practices to the small and medium sized enterprises that would most 
benefit from them (Wells and Galbraith 1999; Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000; 
Dasgupta, Lucas and Wheeler 1998).  However, if suppliers do not replicate this requirement 
and instead are permitted to continue with their own strategies for addressing environmental 
aspects of their operations, the diffusion of these standards may be stalled at the upper tiers 
of production networks with firms that already are among the best managed in the industry.   
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The promise of such an environmental “cascade effect” throughout their production 
networks was mentioned by both Ford and General Motors as a key benefit they hoped 
would occur upon issuing their mandates in 1999 (Hutson 2001).  This section investigates 
the policies of the major first-tier automotive suppliers with respect to this question.  Overall, 
it finds that requirements to adopt formal EMSs are not being replicated by tier-one firms in 
any systematic way.  Though some firms are formally requiring an EMS of their suppliers, 
there are no plans to monitor and enforce the policies, or to punish non-compliance.   
Suppliers identified three primary hindrances to implementing such a policy: a fear of 
imposing high EMS adoption costs on smaller suppliers who may not have the managerial 
maturity to fully benefit from them; decentralized corporate structures and procurement 
methods; and the lack of clear direction from OEMs regarding “greening the supply-chain” 
issues.   
Of the six firms interviewed, two are requiring ISO 14001 registration of their suppliers17 
(Suppler B and Supplier C), one has limited the policy to two geographic regions (Supplier 
E), and three do not require ISO 14001 of their suppliers.  All companies stated that they 
formally “encourage” adoption by suppliers in their lower tiers, and one has offered technical 
assistance (Supplier F) should its direct suppliers wish to implement it.  Neither of the two 
suppliers that contractually mandate adoption of ISO 14001, however, have any concrete 
plans to strictly monitor or punish non-compliance with the policy. Supplier B has taken a 
step-wise approach with their suppliers, alerting them that the policy would be coming soon, 
giving them a deadline, and expecting them to comply – though not creating any mechanism 
to ensure this compliance.  In 2002, the company made it part of their contractual terms and 
conditions that ISO 14001 certification would be required for all direct suppliers to not only 
                                                 
17 Supplier B has had the policy since 2002; Supplier C’s policy takes effect December 31, 2006.   
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adopt EMSs in their own facilities, but also pass along the requirement to all suppliers in 
lower tiers as well.  They have not, however, enforced this policy but instead continue to 
emphasize its importance for business relations and efficiency.  In 2005, Supplier B began to 
assess compliance with a survey asking suppliers to send in a copy of their ISO 14001 
certificates, with little success.  They have found that suppliers in lower tiers are not 
responding to the survey or have not yet achieved certification.  Though not actively 
enforcing their policy, the company maintains the position that ISO 14001 certification is 
technically required and any company that fails to meet this mandate is in breach of contract 
and subject to loss of current and future business.  Environmental managers hope that 
compliance with the policy will improve over time, much as they believe it has in the first-
tier.   
Similarly, Supplier C currently requires that all suppliers must have “an effective 
environmental management program” in place (Supplier C, Global Supplier Requirement 
Manuel 2005) and should be ISO 14001 certified by the end of 2006.  The company has no 
plans to enforce this policy, however.  Instead, Supplier C has attached the adopting of an 
ISO EMS to its quality rating system, though the absence of one hardly affects a supplier’s 
overall quality score.  Of all the factors considered, environment only receives five percent of 
the total points, meaning that even without a certified EMS, suppliers may still achieve the 
highest possible quality rating.  Supplier C’s corporate environmental officer stated however, 
“[g]enerally, all good suppliers will have [a certified EMS], those who don’t will probably 
have quality or management problems that become apparent” (Supplier C, personal 
interview, September 2005).  In other words, the company sees it as an indicator of overall 
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management health – it may not matter if they don’t have an EMS, if they don’t take care of 
their environmental aspects, they may lose business on other grounds.   
First-tier suppliers have given several reasons for not requiring EMS of their own 
suppliers or for not enforcing the policies they have put into place.  Chief among these 
reasons are the resources and effort it would require to ensure compliance, with five of the 
six firms interviewed citing such difficulties. Suppliers maintain very complex and varied 
supply chains, often working with 4000 – 5000 different companies, many of whom 
manufacture the same commoditized part which they purchase in primarily buyer-driven 
relationships with little need to govern the specific practices in place.  Tier-one firms 
generally view attempting to keep up with the certifications of their thousands of suppliers as 
difficult at best, quixotic at worst.  Suppliers are particularly hesitant to conduct audits 
themselves for reasons similar to the OEMs reluctance to audit tier-one supplier operations: 
resources and potential liability.    
We just don’t have the resources to follow up with them to ensure compliance.  We’re 
working really hard just to get these guys up to speed on quality; adding environmental 
would be very difficult… If they are smart, they will go through the process themselves 
to find out where their cost savings and efficiencies could come from.  We don’t have the 
time to make them smart in a hyper-competitive environment.  We’ve just got the time to 
focus on quality (Supplier E, personal interview).   
 
With respect to potential legal liability, both Supplier A and Supplier C mentioned this as a 
factor for not entering supplier sites for environmental inspections – “we dare not” – stated 
Suppler C.   
Suppliers are also concerned that such efforts to force companies to adopt EMSs would 
put additional strain on their supply base and not yield significant environmental 
improvements or increases in efficiency.  Supplier A, Supplier E and Supplier F all cited 
reasons of inadequate resources and capabilities in the supply base as hindrances to effective 
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policy diffusion.  Indeed, effective use of EMSs may greatly depend on the resources and 
capabilities of a firm (Hart 1995; Christmann 2000, Darnall 2002).  Suppliers located in the 
second and third tiers are often small and medium enterprises, or “mom and pop operations” 
(in the words of Supplier F) without the necessary resources or capabilities to effectively 
employ and take advantage of formal EMSs.   
We know what our company went through in terms of expense and transition of adopting 
these standards, so we’re very sensitive to how additional requirements would affect our 
own supply base…it might force them out of business or hurt them in other ways that 
affect [our company].  These suppliers may not have the money to spend on outside 
expertise or auditors and it may not pay off for them in terms of increased efficiencies.  In 
other words, the economic benefits may not justify the costs to them – which in turn may 
drive up our costs (Supplier A, personal interview, September 2005). 
 
Similarly, Supplier E believes that the value in formal EMSs may not pay off for smaller 
operations with fewer resources and lower levels of experience. 
There isn’t much value in that a lot of the suppliers don’t have the maturity to really 
understand what the ISO process is supposed to do – they don’t have the capabilities to 
implement the systems and gain anything from them.  It would be very superficial and not 
worthwhile.  How much can we really afford to push on this as opposed to other 
competing priorities?  That is, the market prices are only going down, and supplier 
givebacks are only going up.  So how can we add on something that gives them something 
to throw back at us?  (Suppler E, personal interview, September 2005). 
 
The rationale for not establishing an all- inclusive policy in which suppliers adopt ISO 14001 
may also stem from issues relating to corporate structure, rather than on grounds of resources 
and capabilities.  The complex and decentralized organizational structure of Supplier A, also 
responsible for a dispersed internal strategy for company-wide EMS adoption, is the primary 
reason it has not replicated the ISO 14001 requirement.  There is no central environmental, 
health and safety (EH&S) department or purchasing division within the company.  Rather, 
each plant makes its own purchasing decisions and negotiates its own contracts, making it 
much more difficult to make centralized management decisions.  Doing so would require 
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buy- in from every plant within a region (e.g. North America or Asia-Pacific), or across the 
globe.  Such limitations make the policy difficult and unlikely.  
Indeed, Supplier E’s limited policy to require ISO 14001 of suppliers in specific 
geographic regions stems from corporate structure and the preference of a single purchasing 
manager.  Similar to Supplier A, Supplier E’s purchasing process is not centralized.18  
Instead, each purchasing manager has the authority to make sourcing decisions and set 
policies for each line that he or she controls.  One purchasing manager employed an ISO 
14001 policy for a specific product line in Europe, then was reassigned to the Asia-Pacific 
region, where he replicated the mandate based on what he viewed as previous successes with 
the program.  His successor in Europe continued to maintain the policy, keeping it in place in 
two regions for the company.  There are no plans to make the program company-wide and it 
remains the discretion of individual managers to decide.   
Finally, two of the suppliers (Suppliers A and C) point to the lack of direction from the 
OEMs to “green the supply chain” as hindrances to action.  These companies believe that 
even though the OEMs have expressed vague interest in cascading the policies, they have not 
been explicit enough in their directives, as they have been with regards to quality 
management and associated certifications.  As for the OEMs themselves, neither Ford nor 
GM has pursued a formal policy of requiring EMSs throughout the entire supply chain.  Ford 
has included language in contracts with first-tier suppliers to “encourage” ISO 14001 
adoption in the sub-tiers, but has not formally pursued more explicit requirements. “How 
would we enforce [such a policy]? You have to keep your scope manageable and it is barely 
manageable with our tier-ones…the networks are so varied, so complex and there are just too 
                                                 
18 The purchasing processes and EMS implementation processes are organizationally separate.  So while the 
EMS process may be centralized, it does not mean that the purchasing process is.   
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many suppliers” (Monique Oxender, Ford Motor Company, personal interview, September 
2005).  Instead, OEMs are focusing on initiatives such as the Suppliers Partnership for the 
Environment and the Ford Sustainability Forum to share best practices with the entire 
supplier network, rather than becoming directly involved in the process of requiring and 
verifying EMS certification throughout the lower tiers of suppliers.   
Though some first-tier suppliers do have policies in place, it is unclear whether they will 
make any difference in environmental outcomes, or will even be effectively adopted by 
suppliers in lower tiers, due to lack of enforcement.  As was stated by the first-tier companies 
themselves, compliance is largely dependent upon threat of action and possibility of being 
caught not complying (see Becker 1968).  If no such threats of enforcement exist and the 
probabilities of being caught are low, then there is no reason to expect compliance with the 
policies.  Whether or not tier-one suppliers decide to become stricter is yet to be seen, but for 
the time being there is no reason to expect widespread adoption in the lower tiers as a result 
of these policies.   
 
Chapter Conclusions  
Several key insights regarding the automotive industry’s ISO 14001 policies can be drawn 
from the interviews with first-tier suppliers and the automakers themselves, particularly with 
respect to how the policies have been interpreted and implemented by direct suppliers, how 
they are monitored and enforced, and to what degree they have been replicated and diffused 
to lower tiers of the value chain.  Overall, the OEM policies appear to be effective in their 
aims to motivate the adoption of EMSs, at least among large first-tier suppliers who have 
undertaken large efforts to implement them on a company-wide basis.  Two key factors have 
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contributed to this success.  First, the mandatory nature of the mandates themselves, with 
explicit deadlines for adoption and threats of losing current or future contracts, clearly 
communicated the seriousness of the OEMs intentions and prompted the upper management 
of supplier firms to dedicate resources necessary for successful compliance.  Second, the 
existing wealth of resources and capabilities of these firms facilitated the adoption 
throughout their global operations with few obstacles.  However, additional steps could be 
taken to ensure more effective and thorough diffusion of the standard throughout the value 
chain.  
The interviews also revealed some inconsistencies in how the policies are monitored by 
the OEMs.  These inconsistencies, however, do not appear to contribute to any widespread 
shirking of the policies, at least not among the major first-tier companies.  Even those who 
were initially reluctant to adopt the policy eventually did so to avoid of losing current 
business or the ability to procure future contracts.  It appears that the threat of action has been 
enough to convince these companies to dedicate the necessary resources to environmental 
management efforts and to comply with the requirements.  It should be stated, however, that 
“compliance” simply refers to acquiring registration to ISO 14001.  It does not guarantee that 
said systems are complete, or that the content of the EMS will lead to environmental 
performance improvements.    
The lack of widespread replication of the policies by suppliers in the first-tier, and no 
observed intention of monitoring or enforcing them where they do technically exist, may 
hinder the diffusion of environmental management through the value chain.  Firms 
interviewed for this chapter are among the largest, best managed and most resource-rich in 
the industry (both in terms of knowledge and financial capital, as well as management 
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capabilities).  Many in this echelon were reluctant to adopt and certify EMSs until the 
policies of the OEMs became strictly mandated and clearly communicated.  Without this 
impetus, the effort to adopt an EMS, and the resources devoted to it, would not have been as 
extensive.   
The high costs associated with monitoring and enforcing such a policy on the part of the 
first-tier suppliers, however, remains among the largest obstacles to diffusion of the standard.  
Like their primary customers, tier-one suppliers already require a host of quality and other 
types of certifications of their own suppliers.  With additional effort, environmental 
management requirements could be added to the list.  Compliance may not be full and 
implementation may not be as complete or effective, but the communication of the 
expectation as essential, with enforceable consequences for non-conformance, would be an 
important first step.  It is likely that firms in lower tiers of the value chain will not adopt 
EMSs with equal vigor in the absence genuine external motivation to do so.  As 
demonstrated by even the largest firms in the first-tier, mimetic pressures are insufficient 
motivators for EMS adoption within the automotive industry.  Something must be explicitly 
required, preferably with unequivocal deadlines, to be taken seriously. 
For their part, OEMs could be more forceful about demanding the cascading of 
environmental standards, as they have for quality and other requirements.  Though such 
initiatives may be a difficult sell to direct suppliers already experiencing financial problems 
due to persistent cost reductions, and who increasingly wield greater power and influence in 
the value chain, little action will be taken across the industry in a uniform manner without 
their explicit guidance and instruction.  However, even if such steps are taken it is unknown 
how smaller firms with lower levels of capabilities and management experience will respond.  
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SMEs often do not possess the management capabilities or the financial resources necessary 
to fully implement EMSs on their own, even though they may benefit more from them than 
larger firms that are generally better managed operations (Wells and Galbraith 1999; 
Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000; Dasgupta, Lucas and Wheeler 1998).  Indeed, several 
managers at supplier firms pointed to this issue when explaining why they hadn’t mandated 
EMSs of their own suppliers – they believed that their suppliers had neither the management 
maturity nor the necessary resources to adequately adopt an EMS in accordance with the ISO 
14001 template.   
This chapter has described the OEM environmental supply chain mandates and explained 
how they been interpreted and adopted by the largest automotive suppliers, the variance that 
exists in the approaches taken by them, and how the policies are monitored and enforced by 
the automakers themselves.  It has also explained the extent to which first-tier suppliers have 
replicated these requirements, and pointed out potential shortcomings of the policy and 
existing hindrances to achieving more thorough diffusion throughout the value chain. The 
following chapters investigate how effectively EMSs have been adopted, as a result of these 
policies, in Mexican manufacturing operations. Additionally, Chapter 6 explores the specific 
environmental goals set by these facilities and the impact EMSs, and mandates to adopt 
them, have on the dedication that individual plants have for these goals.   
 
  
CHAPTER 5: Evaluating Supply Chain Mandates 
 
This chapter examines the adoption of formal environmental management practices by 
automotive parts suppliers in Mexico, in response to supply chain mandates from major 
automotive manufacturers.  It aims to better understand how well these suppliers have 
responded to industry mandates to standardize and improve their environmental behaviors, 
and to identify other factors that may influence the decision to adopt more thorough levels of 
environmental management practices.  The chapter addresses three primary research 
questions.  First, how effective are supply chain mandates in leading to the adoption of 
advanced environmental management practices in manufacturing facilities in an 
industrializing society?  Second, what technical considerations related to global industrial 
organization may facilitate such adoption?  Third, what other demographic features, such as 
country of ownership and position in the value chain, may lead to higher levels of 
environmental management?  Specifically, is there evidence that global manufacturers may 
indeed be “exporting environmentalism” through their vast manufacturing networks?   
In pursuit of these questions, the chapter examines the apparent discrepancy that exists 
between manufacturing facilities that are required to adopt formal environmental 
management systems (EMSs) by customers and corporate parents, and those tha t actually do 
so. It uses a generalized ordinal logistic model to investigate how other factors, including 
product complexity, influence of regulators, and technological complexity, may also be 
strong predictors of the thoroughness of environmental management practices in place.  It 
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finds a large discrepancy between those facilities subject to supply chain mandates and those 
who actually adopt EMSs.  However, several drivers, including the perceived importance of 
mandates, degree of technological complexity, and US ownership may affect management 
outcomes.   
 
Methods  
Variable Descriptions 
This chapter uses three primary groups of independent variables – drivers for EMS adoption, 
technical considerations, and demographic characteristics of firms – and assesses their impact 
on the degree of environmental management system adoption.  This section details each of 
these independent variables and discusses how the dependent variable for each EMS category 
is constructed.   
 
 Dependent Variable 
The primary dependent variable in this study is the extent to which a manufacturing facility 
has adopted an environmental management system.  While self-assessment and reliance upon 
databases of ISO 14001 certification may be the prominent methods for measuring a plant’s 
EMS status, such measures may not be a true reflection of the environmental behavior of its 
facilities.19  Instead of relying upon such self-assessments by managers or international 
databases of certified facilities, respondents to the study were assigned to one of three 
categories of EMS adoption based on specific environmental practices that they reported 
                                                 
19 As will be discussed in the Results section, a substantial gap may exist between firms who believe they have 
an EMS in place and those who actually meet the requirements based on actual practices.  Further, third-part 
registrars may grant undeserving plants ISO 14001 certification, making databases of such facilities an 
imprecise measure. 
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having in place.   These activities are based on the requirements of the ISO 14001 EMS 
standard.   Accordingly, facilities that engage in all practices were assigned “ISO Equivalent 
EMS” status.  Plants that fell short of this benchmark, but whose practices met the minimum 
criteria established in previous work by the National Database on Environmental 
Management Systems (NDEMS) to be considered a formal EMS, were assigned “Formal 
EMS” status (see Hutson, Andrews & Edwards 2005).  All other respondents were classified 
as “no EMS.”  These requirements for each category are presented in Table 5-1.   
 
These categories, while functionally similar, differ in a few fundamental ways.  Chief 
amongst these differences is the requirement of external third-party auditing of the system for 
the ISO equivalent category.  External verification of a system’s structure, goals and 
principles – including the assessment of continual improvement – is viewed as elemental for 
system efficacy and particularly for public policy implications.  Systems that are not 
externally verified lack transparency (even the restricted transparency offered by private 
Table 5-1: Formalization of Environmental Management EMS Category 
Environmental Activity 
Facility... 
Formal 
EMS 
ISO 
Equivalent 
EMS 
Has adopted a written statement of environmental policy goals. X X 
has set specific environmental performance objectives.  X X 
has planned specific, measurable steps to meet environmental performance objectives.   X X 
has a single manager who has primary responsibility for environmental management activities.  X 
trains employees in specific activities related to environmental aspects of their jobs. X X 
has a procedure in place for identifying legal requirements. X X 
regularly tracks and manages environmental compliance indicators.  X X 
regularly tracks and manages environmental indicators other than compliance.  X 
makes some environmental performance data available to the public.  X 
makes results of environmental performance available to employees.  X X 
has a formal procedure for documenting environmental management practices.  X X 
has procedures in place for responding to environmental spills or accidents. X X 
periodically conducts t op management reviews of environmental performance.  X X 
has procedures in place for taking corrective action based on outcomes of audits. X X 
conducts regular internal audits of environmental procedures X X 
conducts regular external audits of environmental procedures  X 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.934 0.939 
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registrars) and offer limited evidence of plant commitment to environmental improvement 
(Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 2001).  Further, externally audited systems may be more 
thorough, even if results are not publicly disclosed, as pressures to meet societal norms of 
good behavior may positively influence system processes and outcomes (Prakash 2000).  
However, external auditors who are paid by the firms being audited may not be effective 
verifiers of system effectiveness, as conflicts of interest may prevent accurate and objective 
assessments of internal processes (O’Rourke 2000). 
 
Independent Variables 
In the first category, independent variables are classified as drivers for EMS adoption: 
specific pressures or motivations that lead a plant to seek and implement formal 
environmental management systems.   I have used eight such drivers in this study: customer 
requirements to adopt an EMS, corporate requirements to adopt an EMS, shareholder 
pressure to adopt an EMS, the adoption of an EMS as a means to avoid a potential problem 
with legal compliance, EMS adoption as part of a negotiated settlement with local, state or 
federal regulators, the adoption of EMS for insurance purposes, the involvement of external 
stakeholders and the consideration of future generations.  Each of these variables is scaled 
from 0-4, corresponding to the manager’s perception of how strongly each driver influenced 
the decision to adopt a formal EMS (regardless of whether the plant actually possesses an 
EMS).  A response of zero indicates that the factor was not present or did not apply, while 
responses from 1-4 represent a scale ranging from low to high priority.   
Of these eight drivers, customer and corporate mandates serve as important indicators for 
the effectiveness of so-called supply chain mandates.  As explained earlier, several corporate 
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initiatives to green the supply chain through ISO 14001 requirements exist within the global 
automotive industry.  Virtually all the global automotive manufacturers, including Ford, GM, 
DaimlerChrysler, Nissan, Toyota and Honda, have communicated it as an expectation to first 
tier suppliers, while Ford, GM and DaimlerChrysler have made it a requirement, part of their 
quality ranking systems, and a condition of continued business.  Some tier-1 suppliers have 
also begun to communicate an ISO 14001 expectation from their own suppliers, though few 
plans exist for making it a strict requirement.  In addition to these customer mandates, several 
companies have embarked on internal corporate initiatives to implement EMSs at all their 
facilities in North America, and in some cases, worldwide.  Many of these initiatives include 
ISO registration with third-party audits, while others have opted for self-certification and a 
process of internal audits. 
The second category of independent variables includes those classified as technical 
considerations.  Such variables are factors related to a firm’s production operations that may 
not be related to environmental activities per se (with the obvious exception of the 
PROFEPA “Clean Industry” program), but may influence a plant’s environmental 
management outcomes.   
Cooperation with other firms, both local and global, is often an important factor for 
industrial upgrading.  For the purposes of this report, “upgrading” may be defined as the 
ability for a firm to increase the value-added of its production activities and extract greater 
rent from the value chain (Humphrey and Schmitz 2003, Porter 1990) and may come in the 
form of process upgrading (more efficient transformation of inputs into outputs), product 
upgrading (the manufacture of more sophisticated product lines), or functional upgrading 
(moving to more profitable segments of the value chain) (Lall 2000; Gereffi 1999).   From 
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increased cooperation with other local firms, business partners, suppliers, and customers, 
firms may extract greater resource and management efficiencies and, in many cases, improve 
competitiveness through knowledge and information sharing (Keesing and Lall 2000; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2000; Nadvi and Schmitz 1999; Rabelloti 1997).  Such 
improvements may not only increase the competitiveness of individual businesses, but the 
overall competitiveness of local manufacturing clusters and regional economies (Nadvi and 
Schmitz 1999; Knorringa 1999; Tewari 1999; Nadvi 1999; Rabellotti 1999; Schmitz 1995, 
1999).  From such cooperation firms may face an increase in institutional pressures leading 
to changes in internal processes and routines (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowen 
1977; Aldrich 1999) and may affect internal capabilities related to the environment (Hart 
1995; Russo and Fouts 1997; Rugman and Verbeke 1998; Sharma and Vrendenburg 1998; 
Christmann 2000).   
This analysis includes two measures of inter-firm cooperation: cooperation with other 
local firms (so-called “horizontal” cooperation within clusters) and with customers 
(“forward” cooperation).  These measures of cooperation are based on the concept of 
collective efficiency, first proposed by Schmitz (1995) and further defined by Nadvi and 
Schmitz (1999) as competitive advantage derived from external economies and joint action.  
In other words, collective efficiency can be thought of as business activities jointly pursued 
by firms within value chains and clusters to maximize the productivity of such actions.  The 
specific activities to operationalize this concept of cooperation for each type of cooperation 
were adapted from Giuliani, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti (2005) and are listed in Table 5-2.  
The variables are coded into categories from 1 to 4.  
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Consistent with the discussion of the typology of value chain relationships, the 
complexity of product specifications and the degree to which such specifications can be 
codified may influence the degree of EMS adoption.  While the automotive industry can be 
classified as a “medium tech” industry overall (Lall 2000), there is a great deal of variance in 
the technological complexity required in the systems and subsystems that comprise a finished 
automobile.  For example, the electronics integrated into most modern autos require a much 
greater degree of technical competence than do traditional metal-bending operations that are 
still an integral part of automotive manufacturing.  Products with complex technical 
specifications require exceptionally high degrees of technical competence and strict 
management to produce high-quality products with low numbers of defects.  The processes 
required to manufacture products in this manner may produce “spillover” effects to 
environmental management, where several varieties of quality management systems, and the 
rigorousness with which they are employed, may lead to improved environmental 
management as well.  
Table 5-2: Cooperation with Local Firms and Customers  
Horizontal Cooperation 
(with other local firms) 
Forward Cooperation 
(with customers) 
Exchange of information and 
experiences  
Sharing orders  
Joint product development 
Lending machinery 
Joint marketing of products  
Joint employee training 
Joint purchasing of inputs  
Exchange of information and 
experiences  
Negotiation of payment and delivery 
conditions  
Joint product development 
Improving quality 
Improving delivery time 
Employee training 
Setting of product specifications  
Technological upgrading 
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The type of value chain relationship in which a plant is engaged with its customers may 
depend highly upon the ability to codify product specifications (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon 2003).  That is, the ease with which the information detailing precise product 
specifications is transmitted between customers and the firms they have contracted to 
produce, it may influence the relationship that exists between firms.  In situations where 
product specifications can be codified, complex information can be exchanged with little 
coordination and oversight on the part of customers.  Where product specifications are 
difficult to codify, more direct oversight by clients is needed and the degree of dependence 
between the two parties is high.  In such circumstances, frequent contact is required for 
accurate and timely manufacturing output.20  Increased interactions among firms may 
increase the institutional pressures that lead to the adoption of environmental practices in 
manufacturing facilities. 
For technological complexity at a plant, the degree of technical skill required of 
employees was used as a proxy – the assumption being that highly skilled workers are 
needed to produce highly technical components.21  The variable was coded on a scale from 
one to five assessing the level of technical skill, on average, required of plant employees.  
The degree to which product information can be codified was measured by the amount of 
consultation needed with customers in order to manufacture goods to precise product 
specifications.  A low degree of consultation needed indicates a high level of codification, a 
high degree of consultation indicates lower ability to codify this information.  The variable 
                                                 
20 Please see Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2003) for a full discussion on how different permutations of 
supplier capabilities, codified information and technical complexity may influence the varieties of value chain 
relationships.   
21 Obvious exceptions exist to this assumption depending on specific processes, as low skilled workers may 
work on the assembly of highly skilled products and some highly skilled workers are needed in medium to low 
tech goods, but the question asked about skill level, on average. 
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was coded on a scale from 0-4, with zero indicating no consultation and four indicating 
“constant” consultation. 
The third technical consideration was previous or current participation in PROFEPA’s 
“Clean Industry” program.  Mexico’s federal environmental enforcement body, 
Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA), administers a voluntary 
environmental audit program administered by third-party (PROFEPA accredited) auditors.  If 
a plant passes the audit, it receives designation as a “Clean Industry” site and is able to utilize 
the Clean Industry logo as a message to consumers and the community that it fulfills its legal 
responsibilities.  If a site does not pass, it is subject to a PROFEPA proscribed “Action Plan” 
to correct problem areas.  While not the same as ISO 14001, the Clean Industry program, and 
the Action Plan in particular, often relies on similar components to achieve its environmental 
goals.  Accordingly, plants with previous experience with this program would be expected to 
have better environmental management in place than those that have not participated.  
The final category of dependent variables includes demographic considerations that may 
influence EMS adoption.  In particular, the location of plant ownership holds great 
importance for the primary research questions of this chapter.  Foreign companies operating 
in industrializing countries may perform better than local firms because they are more 
technologically dynamic due to competitive global pressures, often import state-of-the-art 
pollution technologies, are subject to higher regulatory standards in their home markets, and 
seek to minimize transaction costs and liability risks (Gallagher 2005). Some empirical 
evidence exists to support this claim (Eskeland 1997, Ruud 2002, Gallagher 2004, Rappaport 
and Flahery 1992; Fowler 1995) while other studies, including one specifically addressing 
environmental management in Mexico, found no difference among local and foreign firms 
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(Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000; Hettige et al 1996).  To further test this question, 
dummy variables for Mexican, US, Japanese and European ownership were included.   
Related to the notion of access to complementary resources and capabilities, publicly 
traded firms may also find it easier to adopt advanced environmental strategies than those 
who are not publicly traded (Bowen 2002; Russo and Fouts 1997) and may be able to do so 
at a lower cost than other types of organizations (Darnall and Edwards 2006).  Accordingly, a 
dummy variable is used to test whether publicly owned plants have higher degrees of 
environmental management practices in place than other forms of ownership.   
Because plants at different levels of the value chain may respond differently to mandates 
(due to differing monitoring requirements and reporting regimes22) a dummy variable is used 
to indicate whether a plant is located in the first tier or in a lower tier.  A variable to control 
for plant size based on the number of full- time employees was also included.  Categories 
based on responses were coded on a seven-point scale consistent with the classifications of 
the U.S. Economic Census (1=less than 20, 2=20-99, 3=100-249, 4=250-499, 5=500-999, 
6=1000-2499, 7=more than 2500). 
 
Model Description 
The primary analysis of this chapter uses a generalized ordinal logit/partial proportional odds 
model to estimate the influence of the independent variables on the ordered categories of the 
dependent variable.  In ordinal logistic models generally, ordered categories are compared 
through multiple logistic regressions (M – 1, where M = the number of categories of 
categories of the dependent variable).  For example, if there are three categories of dependent 
                                                 
22 While suppliers in the first tier are often required to submit an electronic copy of their ISO 14001 certification 
when competing for new contracts or undergoing periodic quality assessments, few second tier suppliers face 
similar conditions.   
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variable (e.g. 1, 2 & 3), two separate binary logistic regressions are run: one comparing 
category 1 v. categories 2 and 3 and another comparing category 3 v. categories 1 and 2.   
The comparison categories used in this study are presented in Figure 5-1.  In such models, 
results are presented in one table with the assumption that coefficients for each independent 
variable are equal across models.  However, it is rare that this condition of equal coefficients 
(the “parallel lines” or “proportional odds” assumption) holds across all models, and often 
cause coefficient estimates to be biased and unreliable (Long and Freese 2006). 
 
Ordinal logit model with parallel lines restriction: 
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To correct for this problem, statisticians have proposed the generalized ordered logit (or 
“proportional odds”) model (McCullagh 1980; Fu 1998), which relaxes the assumption of 
equal coefficients across models23.   
 
Generalized ordered logit model (gologit in Stata), with proportional odds (Fu 1998): 
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23 As noted by Williams (2006), equations (1) and (2) are essentially the same, with the exception that the betas 
(though not alphas) are the same for all values of j in the proportional odds model (1).  A more detailed 
description of equations presented here can be found in Williams (2006): 
http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/gologit2/gologit2.pdf. 
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While the standard generalized ordered logit model does correct for violations of the 
proportional odds assumption, it can often present too many parameters and complicate 
model interpretation (as the proportional odds assumption is relaxed for each variable and not 
only in cases where violations occur).  Therefore, Williams (2006) has presented a partial 
proportional odds model to facilitate interpretation and generate more powerful estimates and 
comparisons among categories.   In this model, the proportional odds assumption is assessed 
for each variable and relaxed only in cases where it is violated. 
 
Partial proportional odds model (gologit2 in Stata) (Williams 2006): 
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Diagnostic tests (the Brant test in Stata) indicated that the original ordinal logistic 
regression model used in this chapter violated the proportional odds assumption.  Therefore, I 
have chosen to use William’s gologit2 model for partial proportional odds. 
Because the dependent variable in this analysis has three categories (No EMS, Formal 
EMS, and ISO 14001 Equivalent EMS), the model estimated two binary logistic regressions 
for comparison.  The first compares the No EMS category with the Formal EMS and ISO 
Equivalent EMS categories and the second compares the ISO Equivalent category with the 
Formal EMS and No EMS categories.  In other words, the first model looks at differences 
between those with at least a formal EMS in place with those without, while the second 
compares those with an ISO 14001 equivalent EMS with those who fall short of the ISO 
requirements.  The proportional odds assumption held for all estimates except for “customer 
mandate” coefficients.  Therefore, coefficient estimates presented in the Results section of 
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the chapter are consistent across category comparisons, with the exception of the customer 
mandate variable, which differs between models. 
Finally, to increase the stability of the model, missing values for each covariate were 
replaced with the mean of the observed values.  To ensure that this process did not bias final 
estimates, I constructed a dummy variable equal to 1 for each missing observation and ran 
diagnostic regressions.  In the three cases where the dummy was significant at the .10 level, 
the variables were replaced with the originals that include missing values. 
 
  Figure 5-1: Comparisons within Ordinal Regression Model 
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Results  
Before delving into the regression findings it is important first to examine basic statistics 
regarding EMS adoption by respondent facilities.  Such statistics help paint an overall picture 
of the state of environmental management within the automotive sector in Mexico and help 
put the regression results into perspective.   Based on their responses to the requirements 
listed in Table 5-1, respondents were classified into three EMS categories: no EMS, formal 
EMS, and ISO Equivalent EMS.  More than half of the plants in the sample fell short of the 
formal EMS category, 26% percent met the minimum requirements for an EMS, while only 
16% met the requirements for ISO 14001 equivalency.  As seen in Table 5-3, there was a 
great discrepancy between those plants reporting to have a formal EMS and those that had 
the environmental practices in place to merit this distinction.  In this table, plants did not 
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need to be ISO equivalent to classify as having an EMS, but only the criteria for “Formal 
EMS.”  Of the 114 respondents reporting a formal EMS, only 65 (57%) met the criteria for a 
formal EMS – meaning the other 49 facilities incorrectly assumed EMSs where none exist.   
Though not displayed in the table, nearly 30% of plants claiming ISO registration did not 
meet the minimum requirements for a formal EMS in the most basic sense and overall, only 
16% of plants meet the requirements for ISO 14001 equivalency.   There is no indication that 
respondents purposely misrepresented their experience or attempted to be misleading.  A 
more probable explanation for some plants is that many managers misunderstood the basic 
elements and requirements for an EMS and therefore interpreted any environmental 
management activities as a formal system.  This does not explain, however, those plants 
reporting an ISO registered system where the minimum requirements were not met.  In such 
cases, poor or improper assessment by third-party auditors is a more likely explanation. 
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Table 5-3 displays the discrepancies that existed between those plants subject to supply 
chain mandates and those that had systems in place based on calculation of their management 
activities.  According to the table, 96 facilities (or 72% of those responding) were subject to a 
requirement from a customer, and 85 (64% of respondents) were subject to a corporate 
requirement.  Despite the presence of these requirements, however, a great many plants failed 
to adopt a formal EMS.  Of the plants that reported the presence of a mandate to adopt an 
EMS from a major customer, 40 (nearly 42%) did not have one in place.  Similarly, of the 
plants reportedly subject to a requirement from their corporate headquarters to implement a 
formal EMS, 34 (40%) failed to do so.  Potential explanations for these shortcomings include 
Table 5-3 
Self-Reported v. Calculated EMS 
   Formal EMS Calculated by Activities 
  No EMS EMS Total 
No EMS 31 1 32 
EMS 49 65 114 
 
Self-Reported  
EMS Total 80 66 n =146 
 Pearson ?
2 = 29.198; p = 0.000 
 
Presence of Customer Requirement v. Actual Adoption 
   Formal EMS in Place 
  No EMS EMS Total 
No Requirement  31 6 37 
Requirement 40 56 96 
Customer 
Requirement 
to Adopt EMS Total 71 63 n =133 
 Pearson ?
2 =19.037 ; p = 0.000 
 
 Presence of Corporate Requirement v. Actual Adoption 
   Formal EMS in Place 
  No EMS EMS Total 
No Requirement  36 11 47 
Requirement 34 51 85 
Corporate 
Requirement 
to Adopt EMS Total 70 62 n =132 
 Pearson ?
2 = 16.273 ; p = 0.000 
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poor monitoring and lack of consequence for non-compliance, more detailed discussion of 
these findings will be presented in the final chapter of this study. 
Table 5-4 summarizes the regression model results.  As explained in the Model 
Description section, all independent variables with the exception of one met the proportional 
odds requirement, and had equal coefficients across categories.  The differences between 
categories (customer mandate and the intercept) are presented at the bottom of the table.   
  
Table 5-4: Model Results for Levels of EMS Adoption 
 
 
Independent Variable ß S.E.  Z 95% Confidence Interval Odds Ratio 
Drivers       
Customer Mandate .544   .199     2.73***   .154     .934 1.723 
Corporate Mandate .072   .210     0.34    -.340     .484 1.075 
Stakeholder Involvement .390   .202     1.93*    -.007     .787 1.477 
Consideration of Future Generations .347 .211     1.65*    -.066     .760 1.415 
Shareholder Pressure .382    .197    1.94*    -.004     .769 1.465 
Potential Compliance Problem .293   .186     1.58    -.071     .657 1.340 
Lower Insurance Rates .175 .277     0.63    -.368     .719 1.91 
Part of Regulatory Agreement -.826    .229    -3.60***   -1.276   -.376 .438 
       
Technical Considerations       
Cooperation w/Customers .539    .191      2.82***   .164    .914 1.714 
Cooperation w/ Local Producers -.522  .228    -2.29**   -.969    -.075 .593 
Codification of Product Specifications .389   .170      2.29**    .055     .722 1.476 
Technological Complexity .523  .232     2.26**    .069    .978 1.687 
Participated in PROFEPA “Clean Industry” 
Program 
1.518    .513    2.96***   .513    2.524 4.563 
       
Demographic Considerations       
1st  Tier Supplier -.079    .573    -0.14    -1.201     1.044 .924 
US Ownership 2.175    .706    3.08***   .791    3.560 8.802 
European or Japanese Ownership 1.004   .775      1.30    -.515     2.523 2.729 
Public Ownership -.235    .626   -0.38    -1.462     .991 0.791 
 Plant Size -.043   .154     -0.28    -.345     .259 0.958 
Constant  -6.098   1.377    -4.43***   -8.798    -3.399 0.002 
       
Differences in ISO Equivalent Category 
Customer Mandate .019   .215     0.09    -.403     .440 1.019 
Constant  -7.571   1.564    -4.84    -10.637    -4.505 .001 
***p = 0.01; **p = 0.05; *p = 0.10   LR ?2 = 98.49***   N  =  119; Pseudo R2 =.4023  
Table 5-5: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Independent Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Customer Mandate (1)  1.000                  
Corporate Mandate (2)  0.466   1.000                 
Stakeholder Involvt. (3)  0.260    0.239 1.000                
Consid. of Fut Gens (4)  0.258    0.340    0.485 1.000               
Shareholder Pressure (5)  0.302    0.547    0.325    0.356 1.000              
Compliance Problem (6) 0.361    0.377    0.243    0.352    0.401 1.000             
Lower Insurance (7)  0.185    0.278    0.254    0.234    0.356    0.259 1.000            
Regulatory Agreement (8)  0.119    0.313    0.180    0.277    0.421    0.451    0.394 1.000           
Customer Cooperation (9)  0.215    0.338    0.309    0.325    0.078    0.238    0.087    0.059 1.000          
Local Cooperation (10) 0.144    0.060   0.388    0.217    0.135    0.232    0.155   -0.028   0.330 1.000         
Supplier Capabilities (11) -0.159   -0.122   -0.178   -0.281   -0.111   -0.095   -0.156   -0.146   -0.229 -0.122 1.000        
Tech Complexity (12) -0.013   0.104    0.204    0.304    0.187    0.134    0.151    0.175    0.219 0.1845   -0.268 1.000       
PROFEPA Program (13) 0.343    0.308    0.220    0.339    0.066    0.216    0.036    0.064    0.159 0.0484   0.1804   -0.146 1.000      
1st  Tier Supplier (14)  0.067    0.374    0.074    0.161    0.113    0.015   -0.013   0.123    0.047 -0.021   0.108    0.202    -0.115 1.000     
US Ownership (15) 0.188    0.313    0.041    0.198    0.182    0.176    0.181    0.235    0.205 0.128   -0.141   0.054    0.125   -0.292 1.000    
EU or Japanese Own (16) 0.240    0.238    0.156    0.247    0.082    0.280    0.068    0.185    0.143 0.064   -0.263   0.080    0.240    0.131   -0.029 1.000   
Public Own (17)  0.120    0.409    0.293    0.204    0.183   -0.056   0.212    0.042    0.139 0.025   -0.162   0.066    0.122    0.349   -0.063   0.287 1.000  
 Plant Size (18) 0.331    0.348    0.235    0.298    0.251    0.181    0.051    0.143    0.142  -0.057   -0.209   0.155    0.286    0.255    0.025    0.276    0.306 1.000 
Mean 1.992    2.045   1.911  2.373   1.641   1.863   .600     1.406   2.675   3.133   1.785   2.911   .600     .288     .162     .304    .285    4.120   
Standard Deviation 1.439        1.596       1.487          1.339          1.579        1.558          .864         1.409          1.357 1.118         1.308     1.006         .487         .381         .310        .461          .388        1.586        
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Drivers for EMS Adoption 
Five of the eight drivers measured in this analysis had a significant influence on levels of 
EMSs adopted by manufacturing facilities.  With respect to supply chain mandates, the 
degree of importance of customer requirements reported by plants is an influential factor for 
formal EMS adoption, but not ISO 14001 equivalency.  Managers that viewed customer 
mandates as important were more likely than others to adopt a formal EMS at their plants, 
but there was no difference among groups when compared at the ISO 14001 equivalent level.  
This finding suggests, at least on the surface, that using value chain pressures as leverage 
may lead to better management in some cases.  However, because no difference was found 
when comparing those facilities who had achieved all necessary elements for the successful 
adoption of ISO 14001 with the other two groups, even the strength of customer mandates 
does not automatically lead to compliance with the OEMs’ policies.  The level of importance 
placed on corporate mandates, however, did not appear to affect EMS outcomes, signaling 
some important differences in the types, and the extent, of pressures that may lead to higher 
outcomes.   
Both the degree to which a plant incorporates the views of external stakeholders when 
making decisions regarding environmental behaviors, and the degree to which it considers 
the environmental impact of manufacturing operations on future generations, influence the 
likelihood of EMS adoption.  Facilities that ranked both factors as important were more 
likely to adopt both formal EMSs and ISO equivalent EMSs.   
Shareholder pressure to adopt EMS also led to more thorough management outcomes, 
with those facilities that placed higher degrees of importance on shareholder demands 
meeting higher levels of EMS implementation.    
 99 
The two drivers related to regulatory influence examined in this chapter revealed 
differing, though not necessarily contradictory, outcomes.  Plants adopting EMSs to avoid 
potential compliance problems were more likely to achieve higher levels of adoption, while 
those reporting agreements with regulators as important drivers were actually less likely to 
adopt formal and ISO equivalent systems than other plants in the sample.  Such findings may 
indicate a difference between systems proactively adopted to avoid potential problems, and 
those adopted in response to government pressure.  In cases where plants were self-motivated 
to improve management performance, an EMS may be used as a tool to achieve desired 
outcomes and may therefore be adopted in a more rigorous fashion.  In situations where an 
EMS was externally prescribed, limited care may have been taken in applying the minimum 
components of the system needed to satisfy regulators, resulting in incomplete 
implementation. 
 
Technical Considerations 
Several technical aspects associated with manufacturing operations significantly influenced 
the level of EMS adoption at manufacturing sites.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the degree of 
cooperation with customers in activities such as product development, employee training and 
quality assurance are associated with increased formalization of environmental management 
activities.  The degree of cooperation with other local producers in similar activities, 
however, did not appear to influence these levels of adoption.   The differences between 
these groups may be due to the types of institutional pressures they present and the degree of 
experience with environmental management present in each group.  That is, the pressure to 
conform to environmental behaviors may be stronger with respect to customers who exert 
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economic influence, even if such pressures are not explicitly coercive, than with peer 
facilities.  Additionally, customers’ experience with environmental management may be 
more advanced, particularly if they are multinational entities, making the degree of learning 
possible more pronounced than with other local manufacturers.  One confounding result, 
however, was that facilities with higher degrees of cooperation with other local producers 
made them less likely to adopt formal EMSs.   Such a finding may indicate more insular 
behavior among producers with stronger local ties, as these businesses may rely more on 
each other rather than links with multinationals and the external international market with 
stronger expectations for the adoption of international standards.  
The complexity of product specifications and the degree to which such specifications can 
be codified also influenced higher levels of EMS adoption.  Facilities that manufacture 
technologically complex products were more likely to adopt formal and ISO equivalent 
EMSs than those manufacturing less sophisticated goods, supporting the notion that the strict 
management processes required to produce these types of products may produce spillovers 
that lead to improvements in environmental management.  The ability to codify product 
specifications is also important, but perhaps counterintuitive.  As discussed with respect to 
cooperation with customers, one may expect that more frequent interaction with customers 
may influence EMS adoption.  While this may be true with respect to several facets of 
interaction, a lower degree of interaction with respect to the precise specifications necessary 
for the manufacture of components may instead be indicative of the degree of supplier 
capabilities.  Highly capable suppliers generally require a lower degree of guidance from 
their customers than do their less-proficient peers.  Independence in operations, and resulting 
market success, may stem from better overall management and the existence of related 
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expertise that leads to greater organizational efficiency (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; 
Grant 1991; Roome 1992; Collis and Montgomery 1995; Oliver 1997).  Such management 
expertise may exist in the form of complementary management capabilities that lead to better 
environmental management (Hart 1995; Christmann 2000). 
Finally, plants that either participated in the PROFEPA’s Clean Industry program at the 
time of the survey, or had done so in the past, were more likely to achieve higher levels of 
environmental management than those that had not.  Not only do these results suggest that 
the Action Plans designed by PROFEPA accredited auditors lead to effective adoption of 
formal EMSs (even if the plans themselves are not targeted towards achieving ISO 14001 
registration), but also that cooperative government initiatives, if properly designed, can lead 
to improved management outcomes.   
 
Demographic Considerations 
Of the demographic considerations included in the model, the plant ownership variables 
yielded the most noteworthy results for the purposes of this chapter.  As compared with 
Mexican-owned manufacturing sites, plants with US-based ownership were more likely to 
adopt formal and ISO equivalent EMSs.  Plants with European or Japanese ownership, 
however, did not tend to have significantly different levels of environmental management in 
place.  This finding for European and Japanese firms was unexpected, as these regions are 
among the most proactive in terms of formal EMS adoption (including ISO 14001 and the 
Eco-management and Audit Scheme, or EMAS)24. 
A plant’s position in the value chain may not be as important as the nature of the 
relationships within them, as there were no statistically significant differences between tier-1 
                                                 
24 Current statistics on global EMS adoption can be found at: http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm  
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plants and those located in lower tiers with respect to EMS adoption.  Part of the explanation 
for this finding may be that relationships among tiers may be so complex as to render the 
demographic classifications somewhat meaningless.  Suppliers in the automotive sector can 
simultaneously occupy several tiers, or shift position based on order runs and needs of 
particular customers.  Indeed, there are even instances where auto manufacturers such as 
Ford are considered second tier suppliers when their stamping plants provide inputs to large 
supplier firms such as Lear or Delphi.  Public ownership and plant size did not appear to 
influence the level of EMS adoption.  
 
Chapter Conclusions  
These findings hold important implications for the three primary research questions posed by 
this chapter regarding the efficacy of supply chain mandates, how technical considerations 
related to industrial organization may influence EMS adoption, and to what degree firms may 
be “exporting environmentalism.”   
Overall, there was a great discrepancy between those facilities subject to supply chain 
mandates and those who actually adopted EMSs.  Indeed there was also a large gap between 
those who believed they have an EMS in place (and those claiming ISO 14001 registration) 
and those who met the requirements for one.  Such shortcomings indicate severe flaws in 
relying on methods of this kind to upgrade environmental standards along the value chain.  
While the mere presence of mandates did not appear to be an effective means for assuring 
compliance with a customer’s (or parent company’s) wishes, if properly designed, they may 
play a role in promoting the diffusion of standards along the supply chain.  The perceived 
strength of customer requirements was associated with the adoption of environmental 
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management practices.  Facilities that viewed the mandates as more important were more 
likely to adopt formal EMSs than those believing them to be less important.  This finding 
suggests that if supply chain mandates are to be effective, they must be perceived as having 
“teeth” and effective systems for monitoring and enforcement.  That is, there must be real 
consequences for noncompliance (such as the threat of losing current or future contracts) and 
plant managers have to believe that there is a strong probability that they will be caught if 
they don’t comply.   
While the strength of customer mandates did influence formal EMS adoption, it did not 
appear to affect the successful adoption of an ISO equivalent EMS indicating that even in 
cases where the threat of punitive action exists, many firms simply fail to meet the 
expectations of their customers.   
Further, a great deal of plants claiming to have an ISO EMS in place failed to meet the 
requirements for such a system.  This failure may stem from managers’ misunderstanding of 
what an EMS consistent with ISO 14001 entails, or simply be an indicator that many firms 
have been granted ISO 14001 registration without meeting its requirements.  In either case, 
this finding signals an essential problem in the communication and implementation of the 
policy throughout the industry in Mexico. 
The model also provides practical insight into how the global restructuring of industry 
may present opportunities for improvement.  The upgrading of environmental standards may 
be partially achieved by industrial upgrading more generally, as more highly capable 
suppliers and those involved with more highly complex processes are more likely to achieve 
higher levels of system adoption. Efforts by industry associations, government agencies and 
perhaps major customers aimed at improving supplier capabilities, and not solely focusing on 
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environmental issues per se, may provide important spillovers to the area of environmental 
management. 
The results of the analysis additionally suggest a positive role for government in assisting 
the adoption of environmental management systems.  The PROFEPA program serves as a 
strong example of the potential success that can be achieved through cooperative technical 
assistance on the part of government.  While not identical to the ISO 14001 system, the 
requirements of the Clean Industry program prepared participating plants well for the 
demands of the private market.  While much of this success may be attributed to the nature of 
the auditors themselves, who are accredited by PROFEPA and not beholden to plant 
management, the experience creates a base of expertise that persists beyond program 
participation. 
Finally, U.S. ownership did increase the likelihood that a plant will adopt higher levels of 
environmental management.  Such a finding lends some support to Garcia-Johnson’s (2000) 
argument that firms may be exporting environmentalism as they move their plants to 
industrializing societies.  However, this finding should be taken with some caution, as the 
results for European and Japanese firms indicate that this phenomenon is not universal, as 
there was no statistical difference among firms with Mexican, European and Japanese 
ownership.  The results do suggest that manufacturing facilities in Mexico, even while 
controlling for ownership, were motivated to adopt formal EMSs as a result of supply chain 
mandates from customers regardless of national origin of ownership.   
This chapter investigated the effectiveness of supply chain mandates on implementation 
of formal environmental management systems.  As simple adoption of an EMS may not  lead 
to environmental changes, the following chapter takes the analyses a step further and 
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investigates the influence that EMS adoption, and the mandates to adopt them, have upon the 
prioritization of specific environmental goals.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 6: Determinants of Environmental Objectives 
 
The analyses in the preceding chapter found that although there exists a great discrepancy 
between plants that are subject to supply chain mandates and those that actually adopt them, 
the perceived importance of mandates does influence whether or not facilities adopt formal 
EMSs.  A remaining issue, then, is whether plants that are motivated to adopt by strong 
external pressures use the opportunity to implement robust systems aimed at achieving 
genuine environmental improvements, and construct their EMSs accordingly, or whether 
they simply opt to go through the motions, and adopt the structure of an EMS, in order to 
meet minimum requirements for certification.   This is an important issue, as EMSs based on 
the ISO 14001 standard merely require the selection of “objectives and targets” appropriate 
to the individual needs and desires of each manufacturing facility.  However, the nature and 
stringency of these objectives is left entirely to the discretion of the adopter, without any 
specific prescriptions.  Facilities may therefore choose both which objectives they deem 
important and the degree of focus they place on them.  Consequently, some plants may take a 
very broad scope in terms of the objectives they select, opting for more comprehensive 
systems, while others may focus very narrowly on areas such as regulatory compliance.  In 
other words, EMS adoption may entail little more than superficial alterations to current 
strategies, or it could be fundamental and substantive changes that may produce genuine 
environmental and management improvements.  
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This chapter explores two primary research questions aimed at understanding first the 
associations of EMSs with the level of commitment to specific environmental objectives –  
regulatory compliance, pollution prevention, eco-efficiency and product stewardship – and 
second, the specific impacts of supply chain mandates on these objectives.  Stated more 
clearly: first, does the adoption of a formal EMS affect the level of priority a facility places 
on each one of these potential objectives?  Additionally, do customer and corporate mandates 
affect a facility’s commitment to these four categories of objectives? 
These questions are addressed using two regression techniques (least squares and logistic 
regression) to investigate the impact of several explanatory factors on the level of 
commitment to each objective, and also to determine what factors lead to above-average 
commitment to each.  The analysis finds that the presence of an EMS does indeed influence 
the level of objectives prioritization, and that facilities with an EMS in place are more likely 
to have above-average commitment to most categories of objectives.  It also finds, however, 
that supply chain mandates have little effect on how plants structure their environmental 
strategies and in some cases have a negative influence and produce EMSs with only average 
or below-average commitment to environmental objectives.  Conversely, strong 
environmental attitudes at facilities tend to lead to stronger commitments.  Plant managers 
who are “true believers” in the value of their environmental activities therefore improve the 
content of EMSs and create opportunities to extract value from a plant’s environmental 
operations. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. An explanation of each of the categories of objectives 
is presented, along with related theory about why such categories may be important factors 
for plants to consider as part of their overall environmental strategy.  These issues are then 
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considered in the Mexican context.  Next, the variables and models used in the analyses are 
explained and the results presented.  Finally, conclusions stemming from the findings are 
proposed.   
 
Background and Theory 
Formalized environmental management systems, typically based on the ISO 14001 template, 
require several fundamental procedures upon implementation: identifying environmental 
aspects and impacts, setting goals and objectives, assigning responsibilities, training, 
corrective and preventive actions, and periodic review of the system.  To conform with ISO 
14001, these systems should work towards three overarching objectives for that process: 
compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations, the prevention of pollution, 
and continual improvement of the system.  Though these goals are fixed, the adopter is free 
to choose the specific objectives, priorities, and pace of improvements in order to achieve 
these principles.    
Businesses are thus free to choose among different environmental objectives, such as 
improving regulatory compliance, pollution prevention, eco-efficiency, product stewardship, 
or the adoption of cleaner production technology (Hart 1995, 1997), and to pursue them with 
differing priorities and aggressiveness.  Deborah Gallagher (2002) argues further that a 
manufacturing facility’s environmental objectives move along a continuum from regulatory 
compliance toward environmental sustainability: facilities with less aggressive commitment 
may emphasize merely achieving more consistent regulatory compliance, while more 
enterprising facilities may emphasize objectives that are progressively centered on pollution 
prevention, conservation of raw materials (eco-efficiency), product design (product 
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stewardship), and ultimately consideration of the facility’s impact on environmental quality 
for future generations (ecological modernization and sustainability).  
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) contends that organizations may achieve and 
sustain competitive advantage based on the attributes of their available resources and 
capabilities (Rumelt 1984; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993).  Resources 
may include physical capital resources, including specific technologies, geographic location, 
manufacturing plants and equipment, and access to raw materials; human capital resources, 
such as the experience, training, knowledge and expertise of managers and employees, and; 
organizational resources, such as management systems, formal reporting structures and 
procedures, and planning, coordinating and control systems (Barney 1991).  This perspective 
suggests that organizational decisions are based on rational criteria, consistent with 
transaction cost economics, in which managers make active choices to address institutional 
pressures (Oliver 1991).  Resource allocation, therefore, is determined by rational, or 
“boundedly” rational, choices of firm decision-makers based on the perceived costs and 
benefits of particular capabilities.  Working from the resourced-based view, Hart (1995) 
contends firms may also use natural resources – or environmental considerations – as unique 
resources and capabilities to develop sustained competitive advantage.  By integrating 
strategies such as pollution prevention and product stewardship into strategic management 
more generally, firms may realize both internal efficiencies that lead to competitive 
advantage, and external capabilities that increase social legitimacy, enhance reputation and 
improve market performance.  Hart also predicts that organizations that have previous 
experience with management systems will be able to accumulate the necessary resources for 
pollution prevention, and for other strategic uses of environmental management capabilities, 
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more quickly than firms without such experience.  Gallagher’s continuum can serve then as a 
guidepost for the types of objectives facilities may set as part of their EMS process.  Of the 
five categories along the continuum, I have selected four to explore in this analysis: 
regulatory compliance, pollution prevention, eco-efficiency and product stewardship.25  
While adherence to these specific objectives may not guarantee specific environmental 
performance improvements in manufacturing operations, a deeper prioritization to each of 
them may signal a plant’s commitment to corresponding behaviors and lead to eventual 
improvements.  The following paragraphs outline the four categories of objectives and 
explore the rationale that firms and managers have for placing priority on each. 
 
Regulatory Compliance 
Firms comply with environmental regulations, and seek strategies to achieve legal 
compliance, both for economic reasons and for social legitimacy (Cohen 1998).  And while a 
traditional line of thought has been that stringent environmental regulations hinder the 
competitiveness of firms, little evidence exists to support this claim (Jaffe et al. 1995).  The 
economic rationale for striving to achieve and maintain regulatory compliance includes both 
the avoidance of penalties and potential financial losses due to reputational damage 
stemming from non-compliance, while legal and regulatory penalties are also extremely 
important factors in deterring environmental violations (Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly 2004).  
Even when the likelihood of being caught and the level of sanctions are both low, firms still 
seek to achieve legal compliance in order to avoid being placed in targeted enforcement 
groups based on prior violations (Harrington 1998).  Further, firms often overestimate the 
                                                 
25 Because the concept of sustainability can be elusive and difficult to operationalize in terms of tangible 
actions,   I focus on the first four of these concepts and use adherence to the philosophy of sustainability as an 
explanatory factor instead of an outcome variable.   
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expected penalty for violating environmental regulations and therefore behave as though 
penalties were stricter than they actually are (Cohen 1998; see also Becker 1968; Keeler 
1995). Managers also consider effects on the business’s reputation with regulators, 
shareholders, and consumers, as poor compliance may affect relationships with these 
stakeholders (Downing and Kimball 1982; Cahill and Kane 1994). Finally, many firms seek 
to achieve and maintain legal compliance to avoid confrontational relationships with local 
governments and citizen groups, thus maintaining their “license to operate” (O’Rourke and 
Macey 2003; World Bank 2000; Brooks and Sethi 1997; Hettige, Pargal and Wheeler 1997; 
Arora and Cason 1996; Pargal and Wheeler 1996). In short, the rationale firms use to justify 
compliance with environmental regulations, whether based on social or economic 
considerations, are mostly related to attempts to reduce and avoid penalties, protect firm 
reputation, avoid community conflict, and maintain both a legal and social license to operate.  
Simply attempting to stay in compliance with federal, state and local laws has little to do 
with adding value to plant activities and  businesses that focus their environmental strategies 
solely on compliance fail to adopt additional approaches to environmental management, 
where internal efficiencies may be found.   
Finally, to technically be in compliance with the ISO standard, firms must also adhere to 
“other requirements to which the organization subscribes, that are applicable to the 
environmental aspects of its activities, products or services” (§ 4.3.2, ISO 14001 Standard).  
Conformance with ISO therefore requires compliance with supply chain mandates from 
customers, industry associations and business partners, among others.  While the logic may 
be circular in the particular case of the automakers’ EMS mandates (i.e. one must comply 
with the mandates to be certified to ISO 14001 in order to be certified to ISO 14001), other 
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mandates, such as the phasing out of heavy metals and other toxic substances included in the 
End of Life Vehicle directive, must be followed in order to be registered to the standard.   
 
Pollution Prevention  
Efforts to move beyond compliance often begin with activities that center around the concept 
of pollution prevention (Hart 1997).  Activities to achieve pollution prevention are designed 
to reduce pollution at its origins in production processes, rather than just at the “end of the 
pipe” as often required for regulatory compliance. Examples include modifications to 
equipment or technology, changes in the production process or operating procedures, and 
improvements in housekeeping, maintenance, training, or inventory control. As a first step in 
moving past traditional “end of pipe” thinking, pollution prevention plans have become 
common practice inside many manufacturing plants over the past two decades.  Such 
initiatives can produce competitive advantage by reducing waste and compliance costs and 
thereby increasing a firm’s profitability (Hart 1995, King and Lenox 2000).   Manufacturing 
facilities that have emphasized pollution prevention have done so largely through improving 
existing production technologies, replacing inefficient or obsolete technology, and 
redesigning their production processes to eliminate or reduce environmental impacts.  
Indeed, firms that used pollution prevention strategies to reduce emissions have found these 
activities often lead to positive financial and environmental outcomes (Hart and Ahuja 1996; 
Klassen and Whybark 1999).  
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Eco-efficiency  
Broader and more systematic than pollution prevention activities that are focused mainly on 
technology upgrades and process re-design, eco-efficiency practices seek to reduce the 
environmental impacts of production by increasing the overall efficiency of materials and 
energy use throughout a firm’s operations. Plants targeting eco-efficiency emphasize cost-
effective means of using inputs associated with the process of manufacturing, such as water, 
electricity, toxic chemicals, and the substitution or redesign of other inputs and materials in 
order to both maximize product value and reduce its environmental footprint. Incorporating 
eco-efficiency principles into business operations may include reducing inputs per unit of 
output, recycling materials and reducing waste at each stage of production.  The term “eco-
efficiency” was coined by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) as part of the larger agenda for the Rio de Janeiro “Earth Summit” in 1992. 
 
Product Stewardship 
Unlike pollution prevention and eco-efficiency, which focus on the production process, 
product stewardship also addresses the potential environmental impacts of the product itself. 
While EMSs generally focus on management processes in specific facilities or business units, 
businesses that prioritize product-stewardship objectives may take a broader approach, 
evaluating the environmental impacts of their products not only during the manufacturing 
facility’s production process, but throughout its life cycle from raw materials extraction to 
production, distribution, use, recycling, and end-of- life disposal, and using “design for 
environment” (DfE) principles to minimize these (Hirschhorn and Oldenburg 1991; 
Gallagher 2002; Hart 1997).  Both internal and external business benefits may result: costs 
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may be reduced by efficiencies found in reconfiguring products, reducing liability associated 
with the products by reduction in the use of hazardous materials, reducing transportation and 
distribution costs, and reducing expenses associated with disposal of wastes and hazardous 
materials.  Additionally, firms may benefit from a greener image in the eyes of shareholders, 
customers and regulators, as well as improved operations (Hart 1995).   
 
Environmental Objectives in the Mexican Context 
The Mexican regulatory environment is still heavily dependent upon efforts aimed at 
emission control rather than pollution prevention at the source of production (Vega-López 
and Pacheco-Vega 2000).  Unlike regulatory agencies in the United States (including the 
U.S. EPA, state and local agencies), which have actively engaged industry to focus on 
pollution prevention (Pollution Prevention Act, U.S. Code Title 42 1990)26, Mexico focuses 
mostly on approaches to environmental protection that are heavily reliant on facility 
inspections and the imposition of fines as established in their landmark Federal Law on 
Environmental Protection in 1982 and subsequent passing of the Ley General del Equilibrio 
Ecologico y la Proteccion al Ambiente (LGEEPA) or the General Law of Ecological 
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection, created in 1988.   
In 1996, modifications to the LGEEPA created several additional provisions for specific 
manufacturing processes in the form of the 73 Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs), to 
which facilities in the automotive sector are subject.  These modifications also created 
provisions for revised environmental planning, environmental impact assessments, 
introduction of economic policy instruments, new standards for the production of hazardous 
                                                 
26 This is not to suggest that regulatory agencies in the United States have abandoned technology-based 
approach to environmental protection, as the U.S. system is still overwhelmingly focused on such standards. 
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substances, and strengthened enforcement and prosecution of existing environmental laws 
(Pacheco-Vega et al 2001; NACEC 2004; Azuela et al. 2005).  Another approach was the 
introduction of a Pollutant Release and Transfer Registry (PRTR) in 2000, based on similar 
“right to know” approaches used in the United States’ Toxics Releases Inventory (TRI) and 
Canada’s National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) (Pacheco-Vega 2002).  The program 
began as a voluntary initiative, but reporting of toxic emissions to the Mexican government 
as part of the  Registro de Emisiones y Transferencia de Contaminantes (RETC) program 
became mandatory in 2004. 
Additionally, Article 4 of the Mexican constitution in 1998 inserted language which 
guarantees that "all persons have the right to an environment appropriate for their 
development and well-being" (Gutiérrez Nájera 1999).   While these changes to Mexican law 
set the foundations for government action on pollution prevention activities by broadening 
the scope of acceptable approaches for environmental protection, they did not define 
pollution prevention as the prevention of emissions at the source of generation, or create 
specific provisions for the enactment of sustainable development principles (Pacheco et al. 
2001; NACEC 2004).   
Instead, efforts of both government and industry at “beyond compliance” goals have been 
largely voluntary in nature.  One federal government- led effort is PROFEPA’s “Clean 
Industry” program, described in the preceding chapter, where manufacturing sites submit to 
voluntary audits and prescribed action plans to improve environmental performance.  Smaller 
pilot programs have also been initiated at the state and municipal level in locations such as 
Mexico City, Monterrey, the US-Mexico border states, and others.  Some programs 
supported by industry such as the GEMI initiative and the chemical industry’s Responsible 
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Care program,  and others supported by the United Nations, the World Bank and US AID 
have all aimed to incorporate pollution prevention principles, but have not been widely 
adopted.   
While there exist some efforts to formally introduce pollution prevention initiatives into 
formal environmental law, there are no concrete plans to do so presently.  In short, the 
regulatory environment in Mexico has not yet entered the first stage beyond traditional 
compliance activities, much less higher order objectives such as eco-efficiency and product 
stewardship.  Voluntary efforts have generally been confined to small regional experiments 
or to specific industries and have not been widespread.  As such, plants operating throughout 
Mexico tend to use compliance as their primary environmental benchmark.  
 
Methods  
 
Variable Descriptions 
The models used in this chapter use dependent variables derived from the degree of 
prioritization a facility places on each of the four categories of objectives described in the 
previous section.  The independent variables include EMS status and mandates, as well as 
attitudinal, technical and demographic considerations.  The individual measures are more 
thoroughly described in this section.   
 
Dependent Variables 
In order to operationalize the measures for the four categories of objectives, facilities were 
asked to rate the priority they place on a list of potential activities associated with each goal, 
 117 
as listed in Figure 6-1 and evaluated on a scale from 0-4.  The measures for each category 
were calculated based on the scores reported for each grouping and were used to investigate 
the influence of each of the explanatory factors on a facility’s degree of prioritization.  Each 
dependent variable category was measured on a scale from 0-12, with higher values 
corresponding to deeper commitments to each objective.  Means and standard deviations for 
each are listed in Table 6-2 and histograms for distributions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-1: Cronbach’s Alpha for Categories of Objectives 
Objectives Category Cronbach’s a  
Compliance 0.8520 
Pollution Prevention 0.8985 
Eco-Efficiency 0.8543 
Product Stewardship 0.8568 
Table 6-2: Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables 
Objective Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Compliance 8.411  3.847 0-12 
Pollution Prevention 6.536 3.881 0-12 
Eco-Efficiency 7.712 3.880 0-12 
Product Stewardship 4.167 3.931 0-12 
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Meeting regulatory 
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Reducing energy and raw 
materials per unit of 
production 
Redesigning products 
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environmental impacts 
Extending the useful 
life of products 
Conducting life cycle 
analyses of products 
Evaluating the 
environmental impacts 
of materials used 
 
Figure 6-1: Formalization of Environmental Objectives  
Figure design by Daniel Edwards Jr. 
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Independent Variables 
The ISO 14001 EMS standard, and formal EMSs based on its structure, provide a 
standard template for the process elements of an EMS.  These elements include identifying 
environmental aspects and impacts at a given manufacturing site, setting environmental goals 
and objectives for the plant to achieve, assigning responsibilities, employee training, 
corrective and preventive actions, and periodic management review.  Among the most 
important for resulting outcomes from an EMS is the adoption of explicit objectives for 
performance improvement (Hutson, Edwards, and Andrews 2004).  As previously 
mentioned, EMSs merely provide a template for a system without determining specific 
requirements – the nature and stringency of these objectives is left entirely to the discretion 
of the adopter.  Accordingly, facilities may choose both which objectives they deem 
important and the degree of focus they place on them.   The procedure to adopt an EMS, 
however, may take plants through a useful exercise, wherein managers and employees use 
the process to broaden the scope of their objectives and deepen their commitment to them.  
As a result, the presence of a formal EMS may influence both the choice of objectives and 
the amount of importance a facility places upon them.  As in the preceding chapter, whether 
or not a facility had a formal EMS in place was evaluated based on the specific activities in 
place, and not by using registration to the ISO standard.  Treatment models are used for most 
categories of objectives and the technique for measuring the impact of EMS on objectives 
prioritization is detailed in the model description section below. 
There is little to suggest that supply chain mandates in the automotive industry come with 
specific guidelines as to how plants must implement the systems, and managers are therefore 
free to use their own discretion in choosing what objectives they believe are important.  
 120 
While some corporations do use global benchmarks and guiding philosophies in adopting 
standards and have found that using universally stringent standards may lead to improved 
market value (Dowell, Hart and Yeung, 2000), it is unclear if such guiding philosophies and 
benchmarks lead to different emphases among each of the four categories explored in this 
chapter.  It is even less clear whether similar benchmarks and guiding philosophies of major 
customers lead to greater prioritization on environmental objectives inside supplier plants.  It 
is quite possible that many plants simply use external mandates as drivers to adopt formal 
EMSs with minimal effort, foregoing opportunities to create more robust and comprehensive 
systems. Variables measuring the presence of customer and corporate mandates are scaled 
from 0-4, corresponding to the manager’s perception of how strongly each driver influenced 
the decision to adopt a formal EMS (regardless of whether the plant actually possesses an 
EMS).  A response of zero indicates that the factor was not present or did not apply, while 
responses from 1-4 represent a scale ranging from low to high priority for each. 
Plants may receive technical assistance with the adoption of their environmental activities 
in a variety of forms and from a variety of sources.  In the sample of manufacturing facilities 
in this study, technical assistance activities came in several different forms, including 
workshops (10%), educational materials (6%) and financial aid (a mere 2%), but 
overwhelmingly in the form of consulting services (75%).  Most consulting services came 
from customers and business partners (28%) or from hired private consultants (31%), with an 
additional 12% coming from federal or local governments.    Plants that received technical 
assistance from outside experts may have more thoroughly developed sets of environmental 
objectives in all categories than if they attempted to shape their environmental program on 
their own.  Outside experts presumably bring knowledge and insight regarding environmental 
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management and propose opportunities for improvements that managers may otherwise 
overlook.  Depending on the quality of this insight, facilities that receive technical assistance 
may therefore place a higher priority across the spectrum of environmental objectives.  The 
models use a dummy variable to account for this factor.   
More so than mandates to adopt EMS, collaboration with customers on specific facets of 
production may influence the prioritization of specific environmental objectives.  That is, 
collaboration with customers who may have knowledge regarding product inputs and 
production processes, or that may influence the adoption of state-of-the-art technology, may 
produce spillovers to the prioritization of specific environmental objectives.  For example, 
because pollution prevention measures rely on technological and process changes, suppliers 
who work closely with customers on technology upgrading may be more likely to focus on 
these activities with greater intensity.  Similarly, as eco-efficiency objectives involve altering 
the raw materials used in production (both in content and degree) and product stewardship 
objectives focus on the overall impacts of products and inputs used, the degree to which a 
supplier collaborates on product design may influence its focus on these objectives.   The two 
measures used in this paper measure the degree of collaboration with customers on product 
design and with the upgrading of production technology.  The variables are measured on a 
scale from 0-6, with six indicating a large degree of cooperation and zero indicating no 
collaboration.   
Two “attitudinal variables” have been included to explore how environmental ideals may 
influence the adoption of more thorough sets of environmental objectives at manufacturing 
plants.  The first of these variables is the inclusion of external stakeholder perspectives in the 
development of a plant’s environmental management strategy.  Including external 
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stakeholders in the design and implementation of a firm’s environmental strategy can lend 
social legitimacy to the firm’s operations and result in a variety of operational improvements 
(Fiorino 1990; Berman et al. 1999; Beierle 1999; Carmin, Darnall and Mil-Homens 2003; 
Rondinelli and London 2003).  In addition to such improvements, the degree to which a 
manager engages with external stakeholders may signal a strong level of commitment to 
social and environmental issues that may then be reflected in the priority he or she places on 
the environmental objectives of the facility.   The greater the involvement of external 
stakeholders in a facility’s environmental management activities, the greater the competitive 
advantage a firm is likely to report (Delmas 2001).  As such, a higher degree of stakeholder 
engagement may lead to stronger commitments to all four sets of objectives. Further, the 
adoption of a formal EMS may lead to stronger relationships between some businesses, 
particularly small and medium-sized ones, and local communities (Hillary 1999). 
The second attitudinal variable that may impact the strength of commitment to objectives 
is a facility’s consideration of future generations into the strategic planning of its operations.  
In the view of some authors, internalizing the idea that a business’s enlightened self- interest 
is best served by optimizing a “triple bottom line”, including environmental and social value, 
may lead to improved overall firm performance (Hart 1997; Elkington 1998, Hart and 
Milstein 1999).   While difficult to operationalize concretely, the concept of sustainability is 
widely communicated as considering the needs of future generations when making business 
decisions.   Accordingly, those facilities whose managers more strongly believe that it is 
important to consider the impacts of business operations on future generations may show 
stronger environmental concern more generally, and be more thorough about their 
environmental behaviors, including choice and thoroughness of objectives.  Both variables 
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are measured on a scale from 0-4, with 4 indicating the factors as a “very high priority” for 
the facility. 
Finally, several demographic considerations were included in the analysis, including 
whether the plant is part of a larger business organization, location in Mexico where the plant 
is located, and the size of the facility, based on the number of full-time employees.  
Manufacturing facilities that are parts of larger bus iness organizations may be more thorough 
in their goal selection and have greater opportunities to shape environmental strategies 
around higher-order objectives.  This may be the case as such plants may have greater access 
to resources and capabilities, both in terms of financial and knowledge capital as well as 
experience with corporate greening policies.  A binary variable is used to account for plants 
that are part of a larger business organization. 
There are several reasons to suspect that plants located in the State of Jalisco, where 
Mexico’s self-styled “Silicon Valley” is located, and along the US-Mexico border may 
prioritize environmental objectives differently than those located in other locations around 
Mexico.  Both areas are particularly sensitive to environmental problems.  Guadalajara is 
infamous for its smog due to its topographic features and has been criticized for its relatively 
weak environmental standards (Wells and Galbraith 1999; Gallagher 2005).  Similarly, the 
US-Mexico border states have been the focus of much environmental scrutiny due to its 
delicate topographic features combined with  massive industrial, transportation and 
population growth over the past two decades due to the importance of the maquiladora sector 
(Johnston 1995).  According to the EPA, the concentration of industry and people at the 
border has increased pollution and health problems and led to water shortages in the region 
(EPA 2000).   
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Both locations have been the recipients of a great deal of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
particularly in high-tech sectors and assembly operations that actually tend to be less 
pollution- intensive overall than traditional “smokestack” industries.  Indeed, in Mexico the 
maquiladora sector performs better (in aggregate terms) than the non-maquila industry with 
respect to environmental externalities (Stromberg 2003).  Many of the well-publicized 
environmental problems in these regions may stem from the actions of small firms in the 
informal sector (Blackman et al 2000), from motor vehic les with inadequate pollution control 
or simply due to cumulative emissions in a sensitive landscape, rather than from highly 
polluting individual plants.  However, due to the pressing environmental problems in these 
locations, plants operating there may face increased pressure, from regulators, civil society 
groups and business partners to achieve better performance.  As a result, the plants in Jalisco 
and along the U.S.-Mexico border may have more fully realized sets of environmental 
objectives in place from all categories of objectives.  Dummies were included for the 
performance of each of these regions compared to the rest of Mexico. 
Regarding plant size, generally speaking, larger firms in Mexico tend to have better 
compliance with environmental regulations  than do smaller firms (Hettige et al 1997; 
Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000) and many of these plants are have been influenced by 
pressures to clean up from the international market (Dominguez-Villalobos 2000). In 
addition, larger, more complex facilities may encounter economies of scale from 
formalization of environmental practices (Darnall 2003).  As a result, larger plants may be 
more likely to have more thoroughly prioritized sets of environmental objectives in place. 
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Model Description 
For each of the four categories of objectives, least squares regression models are used to 
investigate the influence of the explanatory variables on the priority scores for each facility.   
The base outcome model for the analyses is displayed in equation (1), where iY   equals the 
degree of commitment to each environmental objective at the ith facility, 1X  is a vector of 
facility specific exogenous variables, and iE is a facility’s formal EMS status, equal to 1 if it 
meets the minimum requirements to have a formal EMS and 0 if it does not.  1b  and a are 
vectors of parameters and 1e  is a normally distributed error term. 
 
IiXY iiii ....1,111 =+E+= eab  (1) 
 
This model is used in the form presented in equation (1) only for the analyses for 
compliance objectives.  I used treatment effects models for the other three categories of 
objectives.  In general, treatment effects techniques are used to discern the differences 
between those that have a higher propensity to self-select into treatment categories and the 
effects of the treatment itself (in this case the choice to adopt a formal EMS).  One classic 
example is the effect of higher education on income – the effect of college education itself 
on income must be parsed from the fact that individuals made the choice to receive the 
treatment (that is, attend university).  In the case of environmental categories of objectives, it 
makes sense to consider compliance objectives as fundamentally different than higher-order 
environmental objectives.  Irrespective of the choice to adopt an environmental management 
system, all manufacturing facilities must consider the relative legal requirements – federal, 
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state or local – to which they are subject.  There may be significant differences in how 
thoroughly plants address these requirements, but plants do not have the ability to choose 
which environmental laws apply to them. The choice of more advanced environmental 
objectives, on the other hand, may be very strongly influenced by the presence of a formal 
EMS, which requires the selection of specific objectives and targets for the system.  
Accordingly, pollution prevention and eco-efficiency objectives, which require some 
fundamental design and process changes, and product stewardship objectives, which require 
substantial design changes, may be very strongly influenced by the EMS adoption process 
and may produce strong treatment effects when attempting to estimate the models.  
Therefore treatment effects models are used to estimate these three categories, but not for 
estimating the models for objectives associated with regulatory compliance. 
Similar treatment effects models are commonly used to estimate the influence of 
participation in voluntary environmental programs on environmental performance (Khanna 
and Damon 1999; King and Lenox 2000; Anton, Deltas and Khanna 2004; Potoski and 
Prakash 2005; see also Hartman 1988 and Barrow et al 1981). 
 
iii X 222ˆ eb +=E  (2) 
 
Following Khanna and Damon (1999) and Potoski and Prakash (2005), I use the net benefit 
at each facility of formal EMS adoption for the selection equation (2).  Where, iEˆ  is the net 
benefit from formal EMS adoption, iX 2  is vector of exogenous variables for the i
th firm, 
some of which are included in 1X , and 2b is vector of parameters.   
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Since the net benefits stemming from EMS adoption are unobserved, I estimate the 
probability of EMS adoption by a facility (Equation 3) using a probit model, where F is the 
cumulative normal distribution.  Probabilities *iE  are then substituted in the re-specified 
treatment effects model for Ei, as shown in equation (4).  To run these models, I choose a 
single nested approach using Stata’s treatreg command, rather than two individual equations, 
separately estimating the probit model. 27 
 
IiXY iiiii ....1,1
*
11 =+E++= eabd  (4) 
 
Selection models, such as the treatment effects equations explained here, are necessary 
because some unobserved characteristics, including the propensity to choose behaviors that 
favor improved environmental outcomes, are likely to be correlated, resulting in the 
correlation of the error terms i1e  and i2e .  A significant correlation of the error terms at the 
5% level, as indicated by a significant rho statistic, is confirmation that the use of a treatment 
model is appropriate for a given analysis.  Indeed, none of the compliance models produced a 
significant rho statistic when diagnostics were run and two of the three models for the other 
                                                 
27 As explained by Potoski and Prakash (2005), single nested models produce more statistically efficient results 
than independently estimated first and second stage equations – though they do produce more similar outcomes 
as N approaches infinity (see footnote 18 in Potoski and Prakash for a fu rther explanation).   For comparison, I 
ran independent models, which produced virtually identical results.  
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categories produced a significant rho statistic at the .05 level.  These test results support the 
choice of models selected for estimating the four categories of objectives.28   
The models use thirteen variables that serve as sources of statistical identification. These 
variables influence the adoption of formal EMSs, but do not influence the prioritization of 
environmental objectives explicitly.  That is not to say that they have no impact upon 
prioritization, but that the impact that they do have is demonstrated through their role in 
influencing the adoption of formal environmental management systems.  These variables 
include shareholder pressure and incentives of lower insurance rates to adopt environmental 
practices, potential compliance problems in place, adoption of environmental practices as 
part of a regulatory agreement, cooperation with customers and local producers, degree of 
technological complexity of products, ability to codify product specifications, country of 
ownership (US, Mexican, European or Japanese), participation in PROFEPA’s Clean 
Industry program, whether or not the facility is publicly owned, and whether or not the 
facility is a first-tier supplier.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 These four categories are not assumed to be mutually exclusive or unrelated.  Indeed, strong relationships 
among these categories should be assumed, as facilities placing a high priority on one category are more likely 
to score highly in others as well.  However, because seemingly unrelated (SU) regression techniques used to 
parse apart these differences are incompatible with  treatment effects models, these four objectives categories 
are modeled as if they are independent from one another and violations of OLS may exist. 
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Results 
This section details the results of regression models for the four categories of objectives, 
which are summarized in Table 6-4.  Because the first-stage equation for the treatment 
effects models was the focus of the preceding chapter on EMS adoption, the specific findings 
are not discussed here.  The regression estimates for the first stage, however, are listed in 
Table 6-3.   
In three of the four categories of objectives, the adoption of formal EMSs led to higher 
prioritization by facilities.  The presence of a formal EMS was associated with stronger than 
average commitment to compliance, pollution prevention, eco-efficiency, suggesting that the 
implementation process for formal EMSs does indeed lead to stronger commitments across 
these categories.  Only in the product stewardship category did EMS adoption not lead to a 
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statistically significant result, perhaps reflecting the fact that features of product stewardship 
are generally related to product design and may be out of the control of individual plants. 
   Table 6-3: First-Stage Regression Results for Nested Models 
Parameter Coefficient   S.E. Z 95% Confidence Interval 
1st  Tier Supplier -.329 .455 -0.72 -1.220 .562 
Customer Mandate .324 .147 2.21** .036 .612 
Corporate Mandate .028 .167 0.17 -.299 .355 
Stakeholder Involvement .328 .152 2.16** .030 .625 
 Consideration of Future Generations .202 .164 1.24 -.1183 .523 
Shareholder Pressure .007 .152 0.04 -.291 .304 
Potential Compliance Problem .213 .155 1.37 -.091 .516 
Lower Insurance Rates -.032 .205 -0.15 -.434 .371 
Part of Regulatory Agreement -.371 .166 -2.24** -.697 -.046 
Cooperation w/Customers .297 .142 2.09** .018 .576 
Cooperation w/ Local Producers -.357 .189 -1.89* -.726 .013 
Technological Complexity .234 .160 1.47 -.079 .547 
Codification of Product Specifications .148 .124 1.19 -.095 .391 
US Ownership 1.200 .559 2.14** .103 2.296 
European or Japanese Ownership .736 .576 1.28 -.394 1.865 
Participation in “Clean Industry” 
Program 
1.076 .390 2.76*** .313 1.840 
Plant Size  .0176 .113 0.876 -.203 .238 
Public Ownership  -.357 .467 -0.76 -1.273 .558 
Constant  -3.071 .838 -3.66*** -4.714 -1.428 
***p = 0.01; **p = 0.05; p = .10   
  
Table 6-4: Second-Stage Regression Results for Objectives Scores 
 Compliance Objectives Pollution Prevention Objectives  Eco-Efficiency Objectives Product Stewardship Objectives 
Coefficient   S.E.  Coefficient   S.E.  Coefficient   S.E.  Coefficient   S.E.   
Parameter No Treatment Effects Treatment Effects Model Treatment Effects Model Treatment Effects Model 
Formal EMS 1.597** .741 2.522*   1.482      2.615*   1.490     1.951   1.454      
Customer EMS Mandate .226 .223 -.561**   .229     .104    .242     .282    .237      
Corporate EMS Mandate -.470** .210 .269    .226      .154    .232      .324    .227      
Technical Assistance 3.324*** .807 .589    .795      .754        .834 .053    .809      
Collaboration on Technology 
Upgrading 
.614** .272 .564**    .277      -.149    .279     .023    .271      
Joint Product Design -.243 .272 .126    .272      .760***    .281      .457*   .272      
Stakeholder Involvement .540** .236 .637*    .248      .940***    .257      1.239***   .251      
 Consideration of Future 
Generations 
.543** .242 .679***    .255 .172    .267      .539**     .261      
Part of Larger Business Organization 1.449 .900 .373    .889      .554     .919      -.679    .891     
US/Mexico Border  -.222 .762 -.556    .770     1.306    .799      .119     .774      
State of Jalisco -.215 .772 -.932    .785     .176    .800      .545    .774     
Plant Size .255 .212 .045    .212      -.312    .221     -.309   .215     
Constant -.038 1.225 -.123   1.246     .941    1.307      -2.112*    1.273     
N = 99 N = 102 N = 105 N = 105 
F = 10.62*** Wald ?2 = 111.23***  Wald ?2 = 103.75***   Wald ?2 = 129.31*** 
***p = 0.01; **p = 0.05; * p = .10 
2
R = 0.5409 ? = -0.063 ? =-0.206** ? = -0.326*** 
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Table 6-5: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics  
Independent Variable EMS (1) IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Formal EMS /EMS IV (1) 1.000 1.00            
Customer Mandate (2) 0.424    0.587 1.000           
Corporate Mandate (3) 0.433    0.606    0.459 1.000          
Technical Assistance (4)  0.194    0.312    0.299    0.397 1.000         
Collab. On Tech Upgd. (5)  0.338    0.395    0.224    0.256    0.275 1.000        
Joint Product Design (6)  0.255    0.275    0.156    0.168    0.172    0.512 1.000       
Stakeholder Involvt. (7)  0.379    0.482    0.275    0.224    0.238    0.295    0.232 1.000      
Consid. of Fut Gens (8)  0.422   0.595    0.257    0.313    0.305    0.240    0.150    0.478 1.000     
Part of Larger Bus Org (9)  0.440    0.527    0.421    0.494    0.240    0.269    0.124    0.244    0.364 1.000    
US/Mexico Border (10)  0.107    0.169    0.165    0.101    0.044   -0.020    0.084   -0.004    0.090 0.306    1.000   
State of Jalisco (11)  -0.034  -0.053    0.033    0.001    0.005    0.078    0.029    0.031    0.007 0.031   -0.387    1.000  
Plant Size (12)  0.382    0.512    0.386    0.384    0.231    0.241    0.118    0.255    0.310 0.552   0.295  -0.036    1.000 
Mean .420 .498   1.992 2.045 .770 3.863 4.214 1.911 2.373 .690 .333 .245 4.120 
Standard Deviation .494 .366 1.439 1.596 .371 1.189 1.087 1.316 1.339 .392 .456 .416 1.586 
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The impact of mandates for EMS adoption on the prioritization of objectives, however, is not 
as consistent.  No discernable pattern of the influence of mandates to adopt formal EMSs on 
the prioritization of environmental objectives emerged from these models.  Only in two 
instances – corporate mandates on compliance objectives, and customer mandates on 
pollution prevention objectives – were the outcomes statistically significant.  In both cases, 
however, the influence of these mandates had a negative effect on prioritization of objectives.  
In fact, the stronger the corporate mandate, the lower the commitment to compliance 
objectives.  Similarly, the stronger the customer mandate, the lower the commitment to 
pollution prevention objectives.  These findings indicate that external motivation for EMS 
adoption may have little influence over the actual content of the systems themselves and 
where there did appear to be some influence, commitment to these objectives was not 
prioritized as strongly.  
Explanatory factors addressing technical considerations may provide more detailed 
insight into how plants may improve commitment to specific objectives in ways that business 
mandates do not.  Technical assistance with the adoption of environmental management did 
appear to influence the priority that plants place on compliance objectives, though it did not 
significantly influence the focus on other types of objectives.  Plants that received assistance 
with their environmental practices increased their level of commitment to compliance 
objectives.  However, technical assistance is the more influential factor for commitment to 
regulatory compliance when compared with EMS adoption. 29  It is very likely that plants 
                                                 
29 When the levels of significance and coefficients are examined in the absence of one another, technical 
assistance remains virtually unchanged if EMS is removed.  Conversely, EMS loses significance if the technical 
assistance variable is taken away. 
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benefit in the area of regulatory compliance because that is where the general focus of 
external assistance is placed.   
As anticipated, collaboration with customers on technology upgrading and product design 
both appear to influence the prioritization of pollution prevention, eco-efficiency and product 
stewardship objectives.  Collaboration on technology upgrading resulted in deeper 
commitments to pollution-prevention goals, while joint product design influenced plants’ 
commitments to product stewardship objectives.  These results imply that collaboration on 
some areas that are not necessarily directly related to environmental objectives may have 
spillovers that affect environmental behaviors.  Improved technology and produc t design may 
lead to deeper commitments to pollution prevention, eco-efficiency and product stewardship 
objectives by simply improving access to improved technology and developing capacity for 
higher value production activities.  These spillovers may span environmental behaviors and 
include not only the adoption of cleaner technology, but actions that promote wise resource 
use and advanced design principles such as life-cycle analyses and the incorporation of 
design-for-environment principles. 
Of all the explanatory factors explored in this analysis, the two attitudinal variables 
appear to be the most consistent predictors of influence on levels of commitment to each 
objective category.  For all four categories of objectives, stakeholder involvement influenced 
the degree of commitment.  In a similar fashion, a plant manager’s perception of the 
importance of future generations influenced higher levels of commitment to all objective 
categories except eco-efficiency.  These findings suggest that guiding philosophies and 
community engagement can indeed translate into increased commitment across the broad 
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spectrum of objectives, from regulatory compliance to higher-order targets that affect both 
production processes and product design in a facility’s operations.30 
As is the case with technical assistance, plants that are units of larger business 
organizations tended to place higher priority on compliance objectives and were far more 
likely to have above-average commitment to these objectives than stand-alone facilities.  
This finding may reflect greater access to knowledge and capital resources of these plants, 
but may also be the outcome of more rigorous global environmental management strategies 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) that often use a single global or regional standard for 
all plants and use a single registrar to avoid plant- level discretion and shirking of 
responsibilities related to environmental management (see Chapter 4).  It should be noted, 
however, that even plants that were units of larger organizations failed to have significantly 
stronger commitment beyond objectives related to achieving regulatory compliance, as this 
status did not influence commitment to any of the higher-order objectives.  With respect to 
plant location, no strong trends emerged indicating any consistent pattern of behavior.   
 
Chapter Conclusions  
The results from this analysis indicate that adopting an EMS does appear to have an 
influence on the prioritization on most categories of objectives, suggesting that the process of 
objectives selection inherent in the implementation of a formal EMS does indeed affect how 
facilities shape their environmental strategies.  The results also indicate that the strength of 
customer and corporate mandates to adopt a formal EMS has very little influence on how 
facilities shape their environmental strategies, and in some cases the influence is negative.  
                                                 
30 An interaction term for these two concepts was also examined in earlier iterations of the model, with no 
significant findings. 
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On their own, both appear to have a negative influence on the degree of prioritization for 
compliance and pollution prevention objectives – in the cases of corporate and customer 
mandates respectively.  Otherwise, the influence of such requirements alone does not appear 
to be associated with stronger commitments across sets of environmental objectives.  One 
may conclude from these results that in cases where plants are externally motivated to adopt 
environmental management the outcome may be negligible, or even negative, casting doubt 
on the efficacy for such initiatives to produce improved environmental behaviors.   
However, we should be careful here not to overstate this point, as there may actually be 
some positive impact in these results if considered in light of the findings from the previous 
chapter (and first stage regression in these analyses).  Even though mandates have little direct 
influence on the prioritization of environmental goals, the perceived strength of customer 
requirements does have a significant impact on the adoption of a formal EMS, as determined 
in the preceding chapter.  Such adoption, as reported here, leads to increased commitment to 
all four categories ob objectives.  So, while mandates may not lead to increased 
commitments, EMSs do.  On balance, customer mandates may therefore lead indirectly to 
improvements in some areas, even if the level of commitment among their peers with formal 
EMSs is at or below-average. 
Conversely, facilities that have a strong philosophy that guides their environmental 
strategy tend to have stronger prioritization across all four categories of objectives than their 
peers.  Managers who involve external stakeholders in their management approach, and 
perhaps learn from them, and those that tend to internalize the concept of sustainability, not 
only continue to focus on meeting regulatory expectations but also are successful in 
addressing higher-order objectives.  These actions may create opportunities for value creation 
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beyond meeting business and legal commitments and may provide companies a means to 
improve market position in an extraordinarily competitive global environment.  It is 
important to note that the impact of these attitudinal variables can be considered 
independently of EMS adoption, as the influence of EMS adoption was statistically 
significant in three of the four objectives categories even when controlling for these 
attitudinal factors.  This result is important because it suggests that EMSs were found to be 
an important factor in motivating deeper commitments even in facilities that did not 
demonstrate strong environmental attitudes demonstrated through other behaviors and 
beliefs.   
Despite this differentiation, internal motivation still appears to be a very strong driver in 
ensuring that efforts to improve environmental management actually produce systems that 
comprehensively address the spectrum of potential impacts of a plant’s operations.  
Convincing managers that environmental efforts are worthwhile and should focus beyond 
compliance activities, is therefore a challenge that should be undertaken by those interested 
in reaping the benefits of improved management – including customers interested in reaping 
efficiency gains (which may be translated into lower prices) and protecting reputations, and 
regulators interesting in protecting the public good.  Motivation for adoption does matter.  If 
the motivation to adopt is not driven by a strong internal environmental philosophy, then the 
management systems that are adopted may be of less value to the business that mandates 
them or to the public at large. 
Plants receiving technical assistance, and those that are units of larger business 
organizations, are much more likely to have stronger commitments to goals associated with 
compliance activities.  One may suspect that such plants have stronger commitments to these 
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goals, and tend not to extend this dedication to higher-order objectives, because achieving 
compliance is the central focus of the given advice and often the heart of company-wide 
environmental strategies.  The vast majority of resources dedicated to environmental 
activities, EMSs included, are aimed at ensuring compliance and not necessarily 
incorporating more advanced objectives.  While part of this outcome most certainly stems 
from “off the shelf” templates used by corporations and consultants to implement EMSs in a 
standardized and efficient manner for vastly dissimilar manufacturing operations, a very real 
need exists to move past such templates to meet the precise needs of individual plants.  After 
all, flexibility is seen as one of the main advantages of these systems.  Wholesale adoption of 
templates created by corporate parents or consultants without careful consideration of areas 
for improvement within individual plants may result in sub-optimal outcomes.  Broad 
opportunities may be found by incorporating pollution prevention, eco-efficiency, and in 
some cases, product stewardship principles tailored to the specific products and processes of 
each plant.   These same resources and efforts that are dedicated to observing minimum legal 
commitments may be extended to other categories of objectives, where additional 
environmental and financial improvements may be found.  When plants fail to use the 
opportunity to make a serious commitment to their environmental strategies they may be 
missing valuable opportunities to establish and maintain competitive advantage stemming 
from improved internal efficiency and reduced environmental risk and liability.   
While supply chain mandates may influence the adoption of formal environmental 
management systems, there is little to suggest that such requirements have much impact on 
the content of a facility’s EMS.  There is some evidence that suggests that firms who are 
externally motivated to adopt an EMS by either a corporate parent or customer may have a 
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negative influence on compliance and pollution prevention objectives, respectively.  The 
good news is that, overall, the process of implementing an EMS positively influences the 
level of commitment to all categories of objectives evaluated in this chapter.  The next 
chapter considers these findings in light of conclusions from previous analyses and discusses 
the broader implications of supply chain mandates for businesses and their use as a policy 
tool to achieve public goals. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: Conclusions  
 
From the analyses presented in the preceding chapters, this dissertation has sought to shed 
new light on several broad and pressing environmental governance issues associated with the 
globalization of manufacturing.  Chiefly, how private corporate mechanisms for addressing 
the environmental behaviors within their manufacturing operations, and the operations of 
their business partners, may be promoting environmental protection in regions where 
traditional regulatory mechanisms for doing so may be weak or ineffective.  That is, how 
might corporate policies for the adoption of environmental activities throughout their 
production networks mitigate the problem of “governance gaps” – where home country 
regulations do not extend to overseas operations and the capacity or will of governments in 
industrializing societies to address negative environmental externalities associated with 
manufacturing is either low or does not exist – that emerge through increased economic 
activity?   Such gaps have arisen due to a combination of developments in global industrial 
organization.  Most pronounced of these developments are the joint processes of vertical 
disintegration of corporate structures and geographic shifts that have occurred over the past 
few decades of production networks to regions and countries with distinct labor and cost 
advantages, many of which are located in the economically, politically, and institutionally 
developing world. Many corporate environmental initiatives have not been undertaken 
expressly to address such governance gaps, but have instead been part of larger strategies to 
standardize global production, better govern spatially dispersed networks of suppliers, and 
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reap potential efficiency gains.  Nonetheless, it is important to assess the effectiveness of 
these private policies and how they may or may not lead to public environmental benefits. 
With these broader issues in mind, this dissertation has addressed several research questions 
associated with the policies of manufacturers in the automotive industry to require the 
adoption of the ISO 14001 environmental management system standard by their direct 
suppliers, with a particular focus on operations in Mexico.   It has primarily explored three 
major questions.  First, how are supply chain mandates to adopt ISO 14001 interpreted and 
implemented by suppliers in the automotive value chain?  Second, are the mandates effective 
in their aims?  In other words, does the existence of the policies lead to adoption of EMSs in 
accordance with all specific requirements of the standard?  Further, are the systems that are 
adopted by plants in Mexico designed to achieve a variety of environmental performance 
objectives, or are they simply “paper systems” that meet minimum requirements of the 
standard?  Third, have these policies been replicated and passed along the value chain to 
lower tiers of suppliers, or has penetration been limited to the first tier?  What factors have 
contributed to, or hindered, diffusion of these policies? 
In addressing these primary research questions, this dissertation has also explored several 
of the broader theatrical issues associated with environmental governance and private 
business behavior in an increasingly globalized world.  Among these issues are the degree to 
which multinational corporations are indeed “exporting environmentalism” to manufacturing 
locations in industrializing countries, what kinds of institutional isomorphic pressures 
influence the adoption of environmental management practices through value chain 
relationships, how sets of firm characteristics may influence the degree of value chain 
governance, and the extent to which the greening of the supply chain may be an extension of 
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corporate greening initiatives more generally.  This chapter reviews the findings from the 
preceding analyses, with particular emphasis on how they address these specific research 
questions and theoretical issues posed by the dissertation as a whole.  It also examines the 
broader implications of supply chain mandates for achieving public goals.    
 
Primary Research Questions  
As stated in the first chapter, this research project set out to examine the role of private 
institutional mechanisms in achieving public goals, in this case the application of supply 
chain mandates for environmental management.  The first question regarding the process of 
ISO 14001 adoption by global suppliers was primarily addressed in Chapter 4, which used 
structured interviews with environmental officers at the largest North American automotive 
supplier firms, and the automakers (OEMs) themselves.  These interviews revealed that there 
was little confusion among the large first-tier suppliers regarding the expectations of the 
OEMs with respect to the supply chain mandates.  All firms interviewed stated that the 
policies were interpreted as strict requirements, without room for interpretation.    The 
explicit deadlines for adoption and threats of losing current or future contracts clearly 
communicated the seriousness of the OEMs intentions and prompted upper management of 
supplier firms to dedicate the resources necessary for successful compliance.  As a result, all 
suppliers interviewed undertook company-wide efforts to achieve ISO 14001 registration in 
their facilities in accordance with their customers’ wishes.  And though suppliers used 
different internal strategies to do so, the existing wealth of resources and capabilities of these 
firms facilitated the adoption throughout their global operations with few obstacles.  In all 
cases, these corporations removed plant manager discretion in choosing ISO registrars in 
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order to obtain more accurate audits, and in doing so, removed one of the major 
shortcomings of external validation of certification systems of employing paid auditors. 
Overall, it appears that the tough stance taken by the OEMs has been enough to convince 
the larger companies to dedicate the necessary resources and comply with their EMS 
mandates.  It does not guarantee, however, that the EMSs adopted in supplier facilities are 
complete or that the content will lead to environmental improvements – it only signifies that 
they have sincerely moved to achieve ISO 14001 registration on a company-wide basis.   The 
external validity of these findings is also limited to the multinational firms with sizeable 
knowledge and financial resources to effectively undertake these efforts.  They may not be 
generalizable to small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly those operating in 
developing countries that may have greater difficulty in achieving similar levels of 
compliance. 
The degree to which facilities in Mexico are truly able to comply with the requirements 
and the extent to which they are designed to promote actual environmental improvements 
was addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, which addressed the second research question.  Survey 
data and regression results reported in these explained how well facilities comply with 
requirements, and the prospects for genuine environmental improvements stemming from the 
resulting systems.   Most significant among these findings is the discrepancy that exists 
between those facilities subject to supply chain mandates to adopt EMSs and those that 
actually implement them, as a large number of plants required to do so fell short of the 
minimum requirements for a formal system.  However, the perceived strength of customer 
requirements did lead to the adoption of environmental management practices and may be an 
effective means for assuring compliance with customers’ environmental policies.  If suppliers 
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believe that their customers are serious about the requirements and there may be 
consequences for non-compliance, they are motivated to more thoroughly implement 
contractual requirements.   
Facilities that were successful in adopting formal EMSs tended to place a greater degree 
of emphasis on a host of environmental goals, including higher-order objectives that move 
beyond regulatory compliance.  While it is true that mandates (from either customers or 
corporate parents) may have a negative influence upon select categories of environmental 
goals, firms that adopt EMSs tended to have deeper commitments to environmental 
protection through setting performance objectives associated with regulatory compliance, 
pollution prevention and eco-efficiency.  These findings suggest that even though supply 
chain mandates may not automatically lead to the adoption of environmental management 
systems on their own, in cases where they do, facilities deepen their commitment to a broad 
range of environmental goals not limited to regulatory compliance.  And since the perceived 
importance of the mandates influences whether or not facilities adopt EMSs in the first place, 
changing environmental behavior supply chain mandate initiatives must be properly designed 
to give all suppliers the impression that they are indeed important and must be taken 
seriously.   
Finally, interviews with supplier firms outlined in Chapter 4 addressed the third question 
pertaining to the replication of environmental supply chain mandates to lower tiers of 
suppliers.  As reported in Chapter 4, automotive supply firms are not replicating the 
mandates to adopt formal environmental management systems to their own networks of 
suppliers in any systematic way.  Even more, in cases where supply firms have formally 
announced such requirements, no plans are in place to monitor or enforce them, making 
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widespread implementation of EMSs by firms in lower tiers highly unlikely.  As 
representatives from first-tier firms noted, adoption of EMSs consistent with their own 
customers’ wishes was facilitated, and primarily motivated, by the communication of strict 
deadlines and explicit instructions regarding what precisely was expected for compliance.  
Even under these conditions, compliance with the policies has been inconsistent at best 
among manufacturing facilities facing uneven monitoring of their EMSs, as reported in 
Chapter 5.  It is therefore doubtful that weak replication from some businesses in the first-tier 
will produce significant adoption across the supply base. 
Overall, the most significant finding comes from considering these findings together: 
while supply chain mandates themselves may not lead to increased commitments to 
environmental performance objectives among automotive suppliers in Mexico, having an 
EMS in place leads firms to develop greater priority not only among compliance objectives, 
but in pollution prevention and eco-efficiency as well.  That is, it is not the mandates, per se, 
that are leading to more advanced practices at manufacturing facilities, but rather the 
adoption of an EMS.   So, in cases where the mandates are successful in motivating the 
adoption of formal EMSs, one can expect to find an upgrading of practices among suppliers.  
The trick, then, is to ensure compliance with supply chain mandates by communicating 
strong expectations that suppliers take seriously, as the perceived strength of customer 
requirements did have a significant impact on the adoption of a formal EMS.   This question 
of motivating compliance among supplier firms is discussed below in greater detail.  
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Related Theoretical Issues 
This study also explored several theoretical issues associated with supply chain mandates and 
the role of private authority in influencing environmental behaviors.  One of the most hotly 
debated topics related to globalization and the natural environment over the past two decades 
has been the “pollution-haven hypothesis.” Critics contend that decreased barriers to trade 
have led to increased movement of capital production to nations with lax environmental 
regulations expressly to skirt strict regulations of advanced industrialized states (Korten 
1995; Salazar and Carlsen 2001; Cavanaugh and Anderson 2002).  Proponents of trade 
liberalization argue that increased trade will lead to greater affluence, and with it, increased 
societal demand and improved capacity for environmental improvements within 
industrializing nations (Stigson 1992; Bhagwati 2004).  And though empirical support for 
pollution havens is weak (Eskeland 1997, Ruud 2002, Gallagher 2004, Rappaport and 
Flahery 1992; Fowler 1995; Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000; Hettige et al. 1996), the 
influence of business and industry in developing countries is still an open question.  Garcia-
Johnson (2000) suggests that capacity within developing countries may be strengthened by 
multinational firms who “export environmentalism” through the incorporation of advanced 
environmental standards in manufacturing facilities.   
The analyses in the preceding chapters suggest that the automotive industry is indeed 
exporting environmentalism to some extent.  While limitations in the cross-sectional data do 
not allow for the examination of the specific effect of the ISO 14001 requirement on 
adoption by Mexican firms, manufacturing plants with U.S. ownership were more likely to 
have formal systems in place than Mexican-owned facilities.  Such findings suggest that not 
only are U.S. firms not locating south of the border to engage in poor environmental 
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behavior, but that they are holding themselves to more stringent operating procedures than 
their local counterparts.  These results are not only consistent with the vast majority of the 
extent literature disputing the pollution haven hypothesis (please see Gallagher 2005 for 
summary), but also lend support to Garcia-Johnson’s primary argument: improved 
environmental standards may be promoted through industry initiatives.  Interestingly, despite 
the proactive stance of the European Union with regards to promoting environmental 
standards and ISO 14001 adoption, and pronounced ISO14001 adoption by firms operating 
in Japan, similar results were not present for European or Japanese firms operating in 
Mexico.31  Prakash and Potoski (2006) found similar results, or lack of an “EU effect” or 
“Japan effect” when looking at international adoption of ISO 14001.  Data do suggest that 
manufacturing facilities in Mexico, even while controlling for ownership, were motivated to 
adopt formal EMSs as a result of supply chain mandates from customers regardless of 
national origin.   
These findings therefore add to our understanding of how isomorphic pressures influence 
institutional change among firms in the automotive industry.  Specifically, it appears that 
coercive isomorphic pressures are the primary conduit for diffusion of environmental 
standards through the value chain to businesses operating in industrializing nations.  At the 
same time, there is little to suggest that mimetic isomorphic pressures hold the same weight 
in managers’ decisions to implement formal EMSs at manufacturing sites.  As several 
corporate environmental officers from supplier firms stated in the interviews presented in 
Chapter 4, the primary motivation for corporate implementation of ISO 14001, and the factor 
that made resources available for them to do so, was the explicit nature of the mandates from 
                                                 
31 The European Union has been so active in recent years with the promotion of environmental standards that 
David Vogel, who coined the term “California Effect” recently commented that the phenomenon should be 
renamed the “EU effect” (public lecture 2004).   
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the automakers, with precise requirements and specific deadlines.  Softer mimetic 
expectations from companies such as Honda and Toyota have not had a similar effect in the 
industry and have served merely as guidelines, rather than motivating factors, to spur EMS 
implementation.  Likewise, regression results from Chapter 5 indicate that the perceived 
strength of the mandates (or the degree of coercion, in the parlance of isomorphism) is what 
motivated action among Mexican manufacturers, rather than plain existence of them.  Such a 
finding is important to keep in mind when considering that extensions of this, and similar 
policies using business pressures to induce behaviors with a public goods component, need to 
contain an explicitly coercive element if they are to be taken seriously by supplier firms. 
Regression results in Chapter 5 also inform the growing literature on value chain 
governance and industrial upgrading.  Manufacturing sites with more advanced capabilities 
and the ability to produce highly technologically complex components are also more likely to 
employ more thorough sets of environmental practices.  The relationships among these 
factors suggest that higher degrees of standardization may contribute to increased modularity 
and independence of suppliers within production networks.  Facilities that manufacture 
technologically complex products are more likely to adopt formal and ISO equivalent EMSs 
than those manufacturing less sophisticated goods.  Additionally, highly capable suppliers 
generally require a lower degree of guidance from their customers than do their less-
proficient peers.  Such factors decrease the need for tight governance on the part of lead 
firms, which may then focus on their areas of core competency and value creation rather than 
maintenance and supervision of their production networks.  The degree of cooperation 
between supplier firms and their customers also contributes to the development of these 
capabilities, as cooperation in areas such as technology upgrading, employee training, and 
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just- in-time product delivery influenced the successful adoption of formal EMSs.  The 
interplay among these factors also informs the potential for how industrial upgrading more 
generally may influence the capabilities for improved environmental management and lead to 
environmental spillovers.  Indeed, industrial advancement may serve to strengthen 
environmental capabilities in developing countries, rather than weaken efforts to protect the 
natural environment. 
 
Implications and Conclusions  
The analyses in this study point to several conclusions regarding the role of private 
institutional mechanisms for achieving public goals, and the value of environmental 
management systems specifically, in improving environmental capabilities at manufacturing 
operations in industrializing nations.  First, private mechanisms may indeed provide public 
benefits, but suffer the same shortcomings of traditional regulation for achieving these ends: 
a real threat of action for non-compliance must exist as well as a reasonable probability of 
being caught.  These factors lead to a situation where industry self- regulation begins to 
resemble traditional government regulation, where firms make choices regarding compliance 
with environmental requirements by weighing the severity of potential consequences and the 
probability of getting caught (see Becker 1968).  In other words, if there is little risk of 
getting caught or the consequences are marginal, a rational firm will have little incentive to 
comply with external pressures to adopt a specific set of behaviors.  In the strictest sense of 
Becker’s model for crime and punishment, a high probability for getting caught, hefty 
consequences, or both, are necessary for rational actors to comply with a law.  In practice, 
rational actors weigh both the benefits and costs, and extent of both the probability and the 
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consequence, when coming to a decision regarding compliance.  A firm may opt not to 
comply with a given policy even when faced with substantial consequences if the likelihood 
of getting caught is sufficiently low.  For a policy to be effective, therefore, both conditions 
should be met. 
 In the case of supply chain mandates in the automotive sector, the large first-tier 
suppliers interviewed work under both conditions, while smaller and independently operating 
companies do not.   As discussed in Chapter 4, several large supplier firms have implemented 
the policies by removing discretion of the choice of registrars from individual plant 
managers, with the intent of receiving more objective and accurate plant audits.  The actual 
registration status that is then reported to OEMs through each company’s reporting procedure 
(however flawed it may be) may therefore be a more trustworthy assessment of facility 
behavior than where plant managers may choose to hire and fire specific auditors: plants who 
are not meeting their obligations under the ISO 14001 regime are not very likely to be 
granted certification under these conditions.  Conversely, independently operating plants may 
have a lower probability of being reported for non-compliance with the mandates if they are 
able to effectively “shop” for registrars who will grant certification, even if all elements of 
the standard are not met, leading to “fox in the henhouse” tensions, where blatant conflicts of 
interest may arise (Garcia-Johnson 2001).  Regimes where individual plant managers are 
responsible for the selection of auditors are fundamentally ineffective at achieving desired 
outcomes because under such arrangement it is plant management that pays to verify its 
processes to a customer, rather than the customer paying to ensure compliance with its 
policies.   Under this scenario it is in the auditors’ interest to provide a favorable outcome, or 
potentially lose future business.  Even if such strategies are not explicitly pursued, the nature 
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of the monitoring regime provides tacit incentive to seek and give positive results by 
whatever means available.   In short, the transparency of a program and the independence of 
monitors can greatly affect the outcomes of audits (O’Rourke 2003). 
 Even given the threat of loss of future business for failure to adopt formal EMSs, a very 
large percentage of businesses subject to the mandates may have superficially adopted the 
systems, and some have even acquired certification, but did not meet all the necessary 
requirements.  The lack of any real oversight from OEMs has surely contributed to this 
outcome.  For there to be wider compliance, the mandates must be therefore be perceived as 
having “teeth” on the part of OEMs and improved institutions for assuring accuracy of the 
inspection process.  That is, there must be real consequences for noncompliance (such as the 
threat of losing current or future contracts) and plant managers have to believe that there is a 
strong probability that they will be caught if they don’t comply.  While some companies in 
the automotive sector do present such threats by tying ISO 14001 certification to a supplier’s 
quality rating and requiring a copy of the ISO certificate as part of the purchasing process, 
most customers do not and none of them press for deeper knowledge of suppliers’ systems.   
The problem of full compliance may be compounded if there exists a tacit understanding 
among parties that the intention of the policy is not directly aimed at achieving public goals, 
but instead for internal reasons of improved efficiency and standardization – or even the 
demonstration of due diligence in the event of an accident.  In other words, OEMs issuing 
requirements to their networks of suppliers may be more interested in coordinating the 
functions of their production networks by improving communication and creating standard 
operating procedures that improve the overall operating efficiency of business partners rather 
than attempts to reduce environmental impacts.  Additionally, these firms may wish to reduce 
 152 
their own liability – either in strict legal sense or in the court of public opinion – that they are 
conscientious about their suppliers’ environmental impacts without becoming directly 
involved by requiring the adoption of EMSs.  Overall, OEMs may be less concerned about 
full compliance with environmental mandates than they are with other supplier requirements, 
most notably quality management and timely delivery of products.  If suppliers are able to 
implement most of the elements of an EMS, and marginally improve in areas often 
considered to be ancillary to profit creation, OEMs may be satisfied.32   In areas where strict 
adherence to standards is needed, as in the case of quality, automakers have demonstrated 
that they are willing to more forcefully engage with suppliers and even conduc t their own 
audits and levy strict penalties.  They have shown little interest in doing the same in the 
environmental arena.  As a result, full compliance and genuine environmental improvements 
may be nice byproducts of the initiatives, should they occur, but are not the central goals and 
therefore may not garner the attention and resources necessary to achieve public benefits. 
Second, even if the intention to comply with private mechanisms exists, it must be 
accompanied by an adequate knowledge base in order to be effective.  In the case of Mexican 
suppliers, a very large number of facilities that believed they had a formal EMS in place 
actually fell short of the necessary elements.  These shortcomings may be due more to 
inexperience than and a lack of technical understanding of what an EMS entails.  Many 
consultants operating in Mexico, even those among large auditing firms, have backgrounds in 
the field of quality management systems, which are structurally similar to EMSs, but do not 
have specific experience in environmental protection.   Without proper technical assistance 
or education, there is little chance managers at such plants would be able to fully comply 
                                                 
32 A key exception may be where successful EMS adoption is viewed by OEMs and first tier suppliers as an 
indicator of overall supplier competence. 
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with requirements on their own.  And given that acquiring the knowledge to properly 
implement a working EMS is an expensive prospect for firms, particularly small and 
medium-sized enterprises, it is no surprise that many fail to adopt adequate systems.  Even if 
all structural elements of an EMS are met with the help of outside consultants, such efforts 
may not lead to environmental improvements.  While corporate environmental managers in 
the US indicate this situation is improving with time in Mexico, the immediate environmental 
outcomes may be limited. 
Large rates of non-compliance with mandates tha t did occur among surveyed facilities 
may also lie with an inadequate auditing process rather than malfeasance and shirking on the 
part of suppliers.  If suppliers without substantial environmental experience, and exposure to 
management systems more generally, are registered by auditors without adequate technical 
competence or strict codes of ethics, they may fail to employ the basic requirements of the 
system – let alone achieve continual improvement or beyond compliance behaviors – while 
still achieving ISO certification.   
If OEMs are interested in improving compliance, they should not only monitor 
certification, but also conduct selective audits at supplier facilities.  By doing so, OEMs 
could both avoid potential pitfalls of relying on third-party monitors and ensure more 
effective EMSs are in place.   As the automotive industry continues to follow a model where 
OEMs assume less of a direct manufacturing role, they may find it valuable to better 
coordinate their supply chain activities, including the incorporating improved oversight of 
CSR activities.  Such steps are unlikely anytime soon, however, as additional costs and 
potential liability associated are considered too great and the benefits too small.  
Nevertheless, by selectively reviewing the content of supplier EMSs where they suspect a 
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problem or non-compliance with the mandates, OEMs could more confidently and accurately 
assess supplier behavior at a fraction of the cost of a comprehensive program.   While these 
firms may want to avoid any intrusion into supplier facilities, they may be motivated to do so 
if the reputational threats posed by business partners become large enough to warrant it – 
much like they have done in the quality realm to correct emerging problems and ensure that 
components are built to proper specifications.  However, the industry will continue to depend 
on third-party registrars to issue certification for the foreseeable future.  Though reliance 
upon external monitors is problematic in some areas, it remains the most cost effective means 
to ensure compliance from the point of view of the OEMs, who assume virtually none of the 
costs of compliance.   
Assurance of compliance may only extend to the larger suppliers who have removed 
discretion from plants themselves by having a single global registrar or registrars responsible 
for multiple plants within a specific region.  This reliance upon external audits, however, 
does not address the problem of ensuring adherence to the policies by SMEs or stand alone 
firms, the quality of whose systems may be suspect for reasons described above.  SMEs, and 
even larger firms who have little interest in actively pursuing thorough environmental 
management initiatives, may meet only the minimum requirements necessary for 
certification.  
This situation may not be easily remedied, however, as an effective system of monitoring 
and verifying compliance that does not rely on paid auditors would be an extraordinarily 
expensive and resource- intensive endeavor for OEMs already facing difficult financial 
situations.  Even in the electronics industry, where companies like Hewlett-Packard have had 
some success in implementing their own systems for monitoring supplier compliance with 
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social and environmental requirements, companies have found difficulties achieving effective 
penetration beyond direct suppliers due to vast and complex supplier networks.  OEMs could 
press tier-1 suppliers to make EMS mandatory throughout the value chain if greening the 
entire production network is a goal to be achieved, as they have learned from the experience 
with their direct suppliers, firms in lower tiers will not act until it becomes a business 
imperative to do so.  However, firms should also bear in mind that such mandates alone will 
not guarantee the desired outcomes, as suppliers without adequate experience or resources 
may have a more difficult time adopting EMSs than larger firms with greater capabilities and 
access to financial and managerial resources.  Accordingly, targeted technical assistance may 
aid in this process.  While supplier forums, such as Supplier Partnership for the Environment 
the Ford Sustainability Forum may assist such smaller firms, participation has to this date 
been dominated by large suppliers and a handful of smaller firms, and certainly has not 
permeated much beyond the first-tier and certainly not in industrializing countries.   
Collaboration between firms in value chain relationships may provide additional evidence 
that industrial upgrading, both through capital expenditures and through knowledge-based 
activities, create positive environmental externalities from development and modernization of 
the industrial base.  Efforts by industry associations, government agencies and major 
customers aimed addressing the general competitiveness of the sector and improving supplier 
capabilities may provide important spillovers to the area of environmental management.  
Individuals and institutions interested in economic development should be mindful that 
strategic investments in industrial advancements can coincide with environmental benefits 
and are not fundamentally at odds. Such improvements may however prove difficult for the 
industry, as the prevailing trend is for customers to “squeeze” suppliers for cost savings, 
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rather than help them boost capabilities.  The relatively low degree of standardization and 
codification that exists throughout the industry may also slow the pace of meeting of a host 
of new global environmental standards (including recent initiatives banning hazardous 
substances coming out of the European Union) despite costly internal efforts by automotive 
firms to comply33.  However, increasing consolidation throughout the supplier sector may 
result in a culling of less competent suppliers, and an increase in overall capabilities.   
Even so, the move towards widespread adoption of EMSs, even if not complete, has 
positive implications for environmental improvements in Mexico.  Previous studies have 
demonstrated that the adoption of ISO 14001 improves environmental performance along a 
variety of measures in the U.S., Europe and Mexico (Potoski and Prakash 2005; Dahlstrom, 
Howes, Leinster and Skea 2003; Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000; Russo 2001).  Even 
more, the specific environmental goals chosen by manufacturing sites determines the 
particular areas in which it will improve its performance (Hutson, Edwards, and Andrews 
2006).  This study has determined that the adoption of formal EMSs leads to stronger 
prioritization across an array of environmental goals.  If similar conditions apply, analogous 
environmental improvements may be seen in Mexican manufacturing where plants have 
successfully complied with the mandates. 
The two seemingly disparate findings from the analyses in Chapter 6 – that mandates did 
not affect the prioritization of environmental objectives, but EMS positively affecting it – 
may be reconciled by a shift in guiding environmental ideology, as those plants that have a 
strong positive attitude towards environmental behaviors tend to place a stronger priority on 
                                                 
33 While the degree of codification varies by product and supplier, the industry maintains low ability to codify 
product specifications.  Please see p. 32 of “Environmental Management in the Mexican Automotive Supply 
Sector” <http://www.unc.edu/~hutson/supplier_report(16jan06).pdf> for a deeper discussion of product 
codification in the industry.   
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all four categories of objectives.  It is largely up to customers, corporate parents, and hired 
consultants with greater levels of experience to facilitate this shift and convince suppliers of 
the value of adopting other approaches to environmental management.  For this solution to be 
widely adopted, however, corporations and customers must be convinced of the value of 
moving beyond compliance themselves, but it is yet unclear if companies are willing to do 
more than pay lip service to this notion. 
The degree to which firms in general have moved beyond a focus on compliance 
activities and basic greening as the primary components of their environmental strategies is 
also unclear.  Most firms have not yet internalized the potential value in adopting higher-
order objectives, particularly in a traditional industry such as automotive, where patterns of 
behavior are more entrenched and modifications are difficult to implement without radical 
disruptive change.  Many consultants and registrars, with industry specific knowledge, may 
also lack the innovative perspective to guide their clients towards more achieving advanced 
objectives.  However, companies that fail to improve the capabilities of their suppliers and 
increase the efficiency in their global operations are missing valuable opportunities.  
Consultants who fail to help their clients take advantage of these opportunities are doing their 
customers a disservice and registrars to ISO 14001 who fail to evaluate facilities based on 
significant continual improvements, are not meeting their obligations under the standard.   
This is not to say that all actions aimed at achieving more advanced environmental objectives 
will result in greater efficiencies or even guarantee environmental performance 
improvements.  However, increased attention on the environmental aspects of a plant’s 
operations, and improved management of them, greatly enhance the opportunities to find 
areas for improved environmental and financial performance.  
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The prospect of improvements, with or without such corrections, however, should not 
preclude the role of the public sector in continuing to enforce environmental regulations, 
punish violators, and where possible, cooperate with plants to promote best practices.    
However strained such agencies may be in developing countries, the continued threat of 
action and presence of inspection regimes serve as substantial motivation for plants to 
comply with their legal obligations.  Further, in cases where the Mexican government has 
cooperated with plants on environmental protection measures, as in the case of the 
PROFEPA audit program, plants have improved their capabilities and facilitated the adoption 
of complete EMSs.  Again, one should bear in mind, though, that even given these factors the 
adoption of an EMS does not guarantee improvements, even if it increases the likelihood that 
they may occur.  For even as such initiatives have the potential to serve as effective measures 
to address governance gaps that emerge as globalization deepens, they should not be 
considered replacements for the traditional duties of the public sector. 
As stated in the introductory chapter, environmental supply chain mandates find their 
conceptual genesis in voluntary environmental self- regulation programs that seek to offer 
greater flexibility to participating firms than traditional regulatory approaches by applying 
“management-based” approaches to environmental problems.  However, they also face 
similar limitations.  Such approaches lack adequate transparency, accountability and 
credibility in the eyes of critics precisely because they are voluntary and are subject to weak 
enforcement mechanisms (Haufler 2001; Krut and Gleckman 1998; Morrison et al 2000).   
Such weaknesses do not have to be fatal, however, and private sector mandates may be used 
for public benefit if these problems are correctly addressed.  The mandatory (or involuntary) 
nature of supply chain mandates need not cancel out the positive aspects of management-
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based approaches (i.e. greater flexibility in addressing specific problems and the quest for 
continual improvement).  With proper oversight, encouragement, and guidance from 
customers and regulators, suppliers may take advantage of the overriding strengths of these 
approaches and appropriately use business requirements as motivating factors that may lead 
to positive public benefits.  This potential for supply chain mandates to serve as an effective 
policy tool, however, hinges upon the ability of companies to ensure compliance and spur 
genuine changes in supplier behavior and management.  Until institutional corrections are 
made which address these shortcomings, they will remain a marginal tool for achieving 
environmental improvements and lessening the impact of industrialization on the natural 
environment.   
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 APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Requirements from Customers  
 
1. How do you interpret the environmental requirements from customers? (e.g. as strict 
mandates, softer expectations, simple guidelines, etc.). 
 
2. Would you have adopted EMS without the mandates? 
 
3. Are there any threats of punitive action from your customers for non-compliance?  
How does this differ among clients (point system for quality?) 
 
4. What kind of monitoring are you subject to wrt ISO certification from OEMs – how 
does this differ among companies (ask about each company individually)? 
 
5. Have you received any help in adoption/technical assistance with regards to the codes 
of conduct/requirements? 
 
6. How are environmental expectations communicated to you? 
 
7. What differences exist among your customers with respect to specific requirements 
and how you report your status? (get specifics here for each company) 
 
Ford 
 
GM 
 
Honda 
 
Toyota 
 
DCX 
 
Nissan 
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Requirements for suppliers  
 
1. What are the specific environmental requirements you demand? How do you 
communicate your expectations regarding environmental practices to your suppliers? 
 
2. Do you expect that your suppliers replicate your expectations?  If so, how do you 
communicate this expectation? 
 
3. Are there consequences for non-compliance with these expectations for supplier 
firms? If so, what are they?  Has your firm taken any punitive action against any 
suppliers for non-compliance?  If so, can you tell me about it?  Is there a similar point 
system for quality rating?  Have you had to discontinue relationships with any 
suppliers due to poor performance? 
 
4. How do you monitor compliance with requirements?  What methods do you use? 
 
 
5. What sort of help do you provide to suppliers/facilities to get them up to speed to 
meet your requirements/codes of conduct/expectations? 
 
 
Supplimentary Questions (time permitting): 
 
How are you implementing the ELV/IMDS requirements? 
o What are the specific challenges you are facing with respect to these 
requirements? 
o Are you, or your customer, responsible for this process? 
o What kind of assistance is received? 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT (ENGLISH) 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.  Most of these 
questions can be answered by checking a box next to the answer you choose or by 
writing in the blank space provided.  If there is a question you do not wish to 
answer, please bypass it and proceed to the next question.  All information you 
provide is strictly confidential. 
 
We appreciate your help with this project! 
 
 
 
 
I.  Environmental Management Activities in Your Facility 
 
Most manufacturing facilities must manage the environmental impacts of their operations in one 
way or another.  This section is designed to help us better understand how plants in different 
industries incorporate specific management practices to address those impacts.  Please answer 
the following questions as accurately as you can.   
 
Is there a formal environmental management system in place in your facility?  
____ no 
____ yes, my facility is ISO 14001 registered (date of registration ________________)  
____ yes, my facility has a formal EMS in place equivalent to ISO 14001    
____ yes, my facility has a formal EMS in place, but it is not equivalent to ISO 14001  
____ other (please specify__________________________________________________)                             
____ not sure 
  
Is your facility in the process of implementing a formal EMS? 
____ yes 
____ no 
____ I don’t know 
 
 
How would you classify your relationship in the automotive industry?  
___ tier-1 supplier 
___ tier-2 supplier 
___ other (please specify__________________________________________) 
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Please check the “Yes” box if the following statements accurately characterize activities  in 
your facility, otherwise, check “No”.   
 
 My facility:  Yes No 
a. has adopted a written statement of environmental policy goals. q q 
b. has set specific environmental performance objectives.  q q 
c. has planned specific, measurable steps to meet environmental 
performance objectives.   
q q 
d. has a single manager who has primary responsibility for environmental 
management activities. 
q q 
e. Trains employees in specific activities related to environmental aspects 
of their jobs. 
q q 
f. has a procedure in place for identifying legal requirements. q q 
g. regularly tracks and manages environmental compliance indicators. q q 
h. regularly tracks and manages environmental indicators other than 
compliance. 
q q 
i. posts environmental indicators for all employees to see. q q 
j. makes some environmental performance data available to the public.   
k. makes results of environmental performance available to employees. q q 
l. actively seeks out suggestions from non-management employees for 
improvements in environmental practices. 
q q 
m
. 
has a formal procedure for documenting environmental management 
practices. 
q q 
n. has a formal pollution prevention plan. q q 
o. has a formal waste minimization plan. q q 
p. has procedures in place for responding to environmental spills or 
accidents. 
q q 
q. periodically conducts top management reviews of environmental 
performance.  
q q 
r. conducts regular internal audits of environmental procedures. q q 
s. conducts regular external (3
rd party) audits of environmental 
procedures. 
q q 
t. has a procedure in place for taking corrective action in response to 
potential environmental problems. 
q q 
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Many manufacturing facilities have recently had to make the decision of whether or not to 
adopt a formal environmental management system (EMS). For each of the following statements, 
please use the scale below to indicate whether the following pressures or inducements were present in your 
facility and how important they were to your decision of whether or not to adopt an EMS. Please answer this 
question even if your facility did not ultimately decide to adopt a formal EMS.  
 
  N/A Low 
Importance 
Moderate 
Importance 
High  
Importance 
a. Major customer required us to implement 
an EMS 
q q q q 
b. Major customer encouraged us to 
implement an EMS 
q q q q 
c. Corporate required us to implement an 
EMS 
q q q q 
d. Corporate encouraged us to implement an 
EMS 
q q q q 
e. Insurer required us to implement EMS  q q q q 
f. Insurer offered lower rates with EMS q q q q 
g. Facility agreed to introduce EMS as part 
of a regulatory or legal settlement  
q q q q 
h. Government offered recognition or 
publicity for EMS adoption 
q q q q 
i. EMS necessary to compete in some 
markets 
q q q q 
j. Shareholders requested EMS adoption q q q q 
k. Facility adopted EMS to avoid a potential 
compliance problem 
q q q q 
 
 
Similarly, many businesses that are subject to mandates have decided to mandate or encourage the 
adoption of formal EMS or other environmental management activities on their own suppliers. Please 
tell us if any of following apply to your facility (please check all that apply): 
 
____ My facility requires the adoption of formal EMSs of our suppliers 
____ My facility encourages the adoption of formal EMSs of our suppliers 
____ My facility requires the adoption of environmental management practices of our suppliers, but 
not formal EMS 
____ My facility encourages the adoption of environmental management practices of our suppliers, 
but not formal EMS 
____ My facility neither encourages nor requires the adoption of environmental management 
practices by our suppliers 
____ Don’t know 
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Is there a formal Total Quality Management (TQM) system in place in your facility? 
 ____ Yes 
 ____ No 
 ____ Not sure 
 
.   
II.        Objectives of Environmental Activities 
 
When managing the environmental impacts of their operations, many 
manufacturing facilities find it useful to set formal objectives for the environmental 
activities in place.  Below are listed several statements regarding potential objectives 
associated with such activities.  For each statement, check No if the statement does 
not represent a written objective of your facility’s environmental management 
activities. Otherwise, check what approximate level of priority your facility assigns 
to each of these written environmental objectives.   
 
 
The written environmental objectives of my facility include… 
 
 
No 
Yes, Priority Level 
Low            ®                 High         
1            2            3             4 
a. Meeting regulatory requirements. q q q q q 
b. Monitoring the discharge of various pollutants. q q q q q 
c. Reducing materials used in production. q q q q q 
d. Recycling raw materials used in production q q q q q 
e. Reducing water, energy, raw materials used per unit 
output 
q q q q q 
f. Minimizing accidents such as leaks, spills and overflows. q q q q q 
g. Improving existing technology that will help minimize 
the discharge of pollutants. 
q q q q q 
h. Replacing old technology with newer equipment that will 
help minimize the discharge of pollutants. 
q q q q q 
i. Redesigning the production process to eliminate potential 
environmental impacts. 
q q q q q 
j. Redesigning products to reduce environmental impact. q q q q q 
k. Conducting life cycle analyses of products. q q q q q 
l. Evaluating the environmental impact of materials used. q q q q q 
m. Extending the useful life of products. q q q q q 
n. Incorporating the views of external stakeholders q q q q q 
o. Considering the effects on future generations q q q q q 
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How costly have environmental management activities in your facility been relative to 
benefits?  (Please check only one): 
 ____Costs considerably greater than benefits 
 ____Costs somewhat greater than benefits 
 ____Costs approximately the same as benefits 
 ____Benefits somewhat greater than costs 
 ____Benefits considerably greater than costs 
 
Please indicate if your plant tracks the following environmental indicators by checking only 
one box per row.  Check “N/A” if the item does not apply to your facility. 
 
 
 Does your plant track…?  
Yes 
 
No 
 
 N/A 
a. Water use q q q 
b. Energy use q q q 
c. Recycled inputs q q q 
d. Recycling of waste q q q 
e. Chemical inputs  per unit of 
production 
q q q 
f. Total material inputs q q q 
g. Hazardous waste generation q q q 
h. Non-hazardous solid waste generation q q q 
i. Pollutant levels in wastewater effluent q q q 
j. Air pollution emissions q q q 
k. Greenhouse gas emissions q q q 
l. Noise generation q q q 
m. Smell generation  q q q 
n. Disruption of the natural landscape q q q 
o. Soil contamination q q q 
p. Severe leaks or spills q q q 
q. Legal violations or potential violations q q q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 167 
 
IIII. Technical Assistance and Product Specifications  
 
Has your facility received technical assistance in adopting environmental management 
practices? 
____yes  
____no  
____don’t know 
 
If yes, in what form was this technical assistance? 
 ____Workshops 
 ____Educational materials (e.g. books, software programs, web pages) 
____Technical consultants 
____Financial awards/incentives   
____Other (please specify________________________________________________) 
 
If yes, from whom did you receive this assistance? 
 ____Industry association 
____Customer  
____Business partner 
____Local government 
____Federal government 
____Other (please specify_______________________________________________) 
 
Do you cooperate with other local manufacturers?  Please specify in the following areas: 
 
Area Never ßà Very Often 
a. Exchange of information and experiences 
b. Sharing orders 
c. Joint product development 
d. Lending machinery 
e. Joint marketing of products 
f. Joint employee training 
g. Joint purchasing of inputs  
1 ßà 5 
 
Do you cooperate with your suppliers of inputs/subcontractors?  Please specify in the following areas:  
 
Area Never ßà Very Often 
a. Exchange of information and experiences 
b. Negotiation of payment and delivery conditions 
c. Joint product development 
d. Improving quality 
e. Improving delivery time 
f. Employee training 
g. Setting of product specifications 
h. Technological upgrading 
1 ßà 5 
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Do you cooperate with the customers/buyers of your products?  Please specify in the following areas:  
 
Area Never ßà Very Often 
a. Exchange of information and experiences 
b. Negotiation of payment and delivery conditions 
c. Joint product development 
d. Improving quality 
e. Improving delivery time 
f. Employee training 
g. Setting of product specifications 
h. Technological upgrading 
1 ßà 5 
 
 
Please rank the most important way (with ‘1’ being the most important) your facility 
receives information about product specifications:  
____from our own design 
____a prototype from customers 
____CAD files from customers 
____Paper drawings from customers 
____video conferences, email messages, or telephone conversations with customers 
____in-person meetings with our customers’ engineers 
____ other 
 
Please indicate the amount of consultation needed after your facility receives information 
about product specifications: 
___None 
___Very Little 
___Some 
___A Great Deal 
___Constant 
 
For each statement below, please circle the number that most closely agrees with the                
experience at your facility 
 
On average how complex are the product specifications you receive from your major 
customers? 
a. 
Not very Complex 0      1      2      3      4      5      6 Very 
Complex 
Does not apply 
 
q 
 
 
How skilled must your employees be in order to manufacture the products in your 
facility? 
b. 
Not Very Skilled 0      1      2      3      4      5      6 Highly 
Skilled 
Does not apply 
 
q 
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V. Facility Information 
 
Is your facility part of a larger business organization?   
 ___ yes 
 ___ no  
 ___ don’t know 
 
Is your facility or parent organization (please check as many as apply): 
 ____ publicly traded 
 ____ privately held (not publicly traded on a stock exchange) 
 ____ foreign-owned subsidiary/transplant 
 ____ joint venture 
 ____ other (please specify___________________________________________) 
 
How many full-time employees work at your facility? _______________________ 
 
What is the primary product that you manufacture at your 
plant?________________________ 
 
 
Ownership of your facility is based in what country or region? 
 ____ Mexico 
 ____ United States 
____ Canada 
____ Europe (EU) 
 ____ Japan    
 ____ Latin America 
____Asia 
 ____ Other (please specify_______________________________________) 
 
In what country or region are your major customers located (please check all that apply)? 
 ____ Mexico 
 ____ United States 
____ Canada 
____ Europe (EU) 
 ____ Japan    
 ____ Latin America 
____Asia 
____Other (please specify_______________________________________) 
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In what country or region are your major suppliers located (please check all that apply)? 
____ Mexico 
____ United States 
____ China 
____ Korea 
____ Canada    
____ Japan 
____Europe (EU) 
____Other (please specify_______________________________________) 
  
Does your plant currently participate in PROFEPA’s “Clean Industry” program?  
____ Yes 
____ No   
____ Don’t know    
 
Has your plant participated in PROFEPA’s “Clean Industry” program in the past? 
 
____ Yes 
____ No   
____ Don’t know    
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT (SPANISH) 
 
Gracias por tomarse el tiempo para llenar el presente cuestionario. La mayor parte de estas 
preguntas pueden responderse marcando una casilla al lado de la respuesta de su elección, o 
bien escribiendo en el espacio en blanco correspondiente. Si hay una respuesta que usted no 
desea contestar, por favor ignórela y proceda a la siguiente. Toda la información que 
proporcione es estrictamente confidencial. 
 
Una vez que haya terminado la encuesta, por favor colóquela en el sobre timbrado 
adjunto y envíenosla de regreso. Apreciamos mucho su ayuda en este proyecto.  
 
 
 
I. Actividades de Gestión Ambiental en su Planta 
 
La mayoría de las plantas de fabricación deben manejar los impactos ambientales de 
sus operaciones de un modo u otro. Esta sección ha sido diseñada para ayudarnos a 
entender cómo incorporan las plantas de diversas industrias prácticas específicas de 
gestión para afrontar esos impactos.  Por favor conteste las siguientes preguntas tan 
precisamente como le sea posible.  
 
Existe un sistema formal de gestión ambiental implantado en su instalación?  
____ no 
____ sí, mi planta está certificada al ISO 14001 (fecha de certificación:________________)  
____ sí, mi planta cuenta con un SGA formal implantado equivalente al ISO 14001 
____ sí, mi planta cuenta con un SGA formal implantado, pero no es equivalente al ISO 
14001 
____ otro (favor de especificar__________________________________________________)                             
____ no estoy seguro 
 
¿Está su planta en el proceso de implantar un SGA formal?  
____ Sí 
____ No   
____ No lo sé   
 
¿Cómo clasificaría su relación comercial en la industria automotriz? 
____proveedor de primer nivel (tier-1)   
____proveedor de segundo nivel (tier-2)   
____proveedor de tercer nivel (tier-3)   
____Otro   
 
 
 
 172 
Por favor marque la casilla “Sí” si las siguientes declaraciones caracterizan adecuadamente las 
actividades en su planta; de otro modo, marque “No”.   
 
 Mi planta:     Sí No 
a. 
Ha adoptado una declaración escrita de intenciones de política ambiental. q q 
b. 
Ha establecido objetivos específicos de desempeño ambiental.  q q 
c. 
Ha planeado pasos específicos y medibles para lograr los objetivos de desempeño ambiental. q q 
d. 
Cuenta con un solo gerente que tiene la responsabilidad primordial de las actividades de gestión ambiental. q q 
e. 
Imparte capacitación a los empleados en actividades específicas relacionadas con los aspectos ambientales de su 
trabajo. 
q q 
f. 
Cuenta con un procedimiento implantado para identificar requisitos legales. q q 
g. Regularmente monitorea y gestiona indicadores de cumplimiento ambiental. q q 
h. Regularmente monitorea y gestiona indicadores ambientales diferentes de los de cumplimiento.  q q 
i. Publica internamente indicadores de desempeño ambiental y de cumplimiento para que todos los empleados los 
vean. 
q q 
j. Pone a disposición del público algunos datos de desempeño ambiental. q q 
k. Pone a disposición de los empleados los resultados del desempeño ambiental. q q 
l. Activamente busca sugerencias entre los empleados no gerenciales para mejorar las prácticas ambientales. q q 
m. Cuenta con un procedimiento formal para documentar las prácticas de gestión ambiental. q q 
n. 
Cuenta con un plan formal para la prevención de la contaminación. q q 
o. 
Cuenta con un plan formal de minimización de residuos. q q 
p. 
Cuenta con procedimientos implantados para dar respuesta a derrames o accidentes ambientales. q q 
q. 
Conduce revisiones periódicas de la alta gerencia sobre el desempeño ambiental.  q q 
r. 
Conduce auditorías internas regulares sobre los procedimientos ambientales. q q 
s. 
Conduce auditorías externas  regulares (de 3ª parte) sobre los procedimientos ambientales. q q 
t. 
Mi planta tiene un procedimiento aprobado y en ejecución para implementar acciones correctivas en respuesta a 
problemas ambientales que se pudieran suscitar. 
q q 
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Muchas plantas productivas han tenido recientemente que tomar la decisión de si adoptar o 
no un sistema formal de gestión ambiental (SGA). Para cada una de las siguientes 
declaraciones, por favor utilice la escala de abajo para indicar si las siguientes presiones o 
inducciones estuvieron presentes en su planta y qué tan importantes fueron para su decisión 
sobre si adoptar o no un SGA. Por favor conteste esta pregunta aún si su planta decidió por último 
no adoptar un SGA formal.  
  No Aplica 
Importanc
ia 
Baja 
Importanc
ia 
Moderada  
Importancia 
Alta 
Se 
Desconoce  
a. Uno de nuestros clientes principales 
nos requirió implantar un SGA. 
q q q q q 
b. Uno de nuestros clientes principales 
nos animó a implantar un SGA. 
q q q q q 
c. El corporativo nos requirió 
implantar un SGA 
q q q q q 
d. El corporativo nos animó a implantar 
un SGA 
q q q q q 
e. La empresa aseguradora nos requirió 
implantar un SGA 
q q q q q 
f. La empresa aseguradora ofreció 
tarifas menores con un SGA 
q q q q q 
g. La planta acordó introducir un SGA 
como parte de un convenio 
regulatorio o legal 
q q q q q 
h. El gobioerno ofreció reconocimiento 
o publicidad por adoptar un SGA 
q q q q q 
i. Se necesita el SGA para competir en 
ciertos mercados 
q q q q q 
j. Los accionistas requirieron la 
adopción de un SGA 
q q q q q 
k. La planta adoptó el SGA para evitar 
un problema potencial de 
cumplimiento 
q q q q q 
 
De manera similar, muchos negocios que están sujetos a directivas específicas han decidido requerir o 
sugerir a sus propios proveedores la adopción de Sistemas de Administración Ambiental (SAAs) 
formales o realizar algunas otras actividades de gestión ambiental. Por favor díganos si alguna de las 
siguientes opciones aplica a su planta (por favor marque todas las que apliquen): 
 
____ Mi planta requiere  la adopción de SAAs por parte de nuestros proveedores 
____ Mi planta sugiere y motiva la adopción de SAAs formales por parte de nuestros proveedores 
____ Mi planta requiere  la adopción de prácticas de administración ambiental por parte de nuestros 
proveedores, pero no que tengan un SAA formal. 
____ Mi planta sugiere y motiva la adopción de prácticas de administración ambiental por parte de 
nuestros proveedores, pero no que tengan un SAA formal. 
____ Mi planta no requiere ni motiva ni sugiere la adopción de practicas de administración 
ambiental por parte de nuestros proveedores.  
____ No lo sé.  
____ No aplica 
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¿Hay un sistema formal de Gestión Total de la Calidad (GTC) implantado en su planta? 
____ Sí 
____ No   
____ No lo sé   
 
 
II.        Objetivos de las Actividades Ambientales 
 
Tal gestionar los impactos ambientales de sus operaciones, muchas plantas 
manufactureras encuentran útil establecer objetivos formales para las actividades 
ambientales implantadas.  Enseguida se enlistan varias declaraciones referentes a 
objetivos potenciales asociados a tales actividades.  Para cada declaración, marque 
No si la declaración no representa un objetivo escrito de las actividades de gestión 
ambiental de su planta. De otra manera, marque el nivel aproximado de prioridad 
que su planta asigna a cada uno de estos objetivos ambientales documentados.  
 
Los objetivos ambientales documentados de mi planta 
incluyen… 
 
 
No 
Sí, Nivel de Prioridad 
Bajo            ®                  Alto         
1            2            3             4 
a. Satisfacer requisitos legales. q q q q q 
b. Monitorear la descarga de diversos contaminantes. q q q q q 
c. Reducir los materiales utilizados en la producción. q q q q q 
d. Reciclar materias primas utilizadas en la producción q q q q q 
e. Reducir agua, energía, materias primas utilizadas por unidad 
de producción 
q q q q q 
f. Minimizar accidentes tales como fugas, derrames y 
desbordamientos. 
q q q q q 
g. Mejorar la tecnología existente para ayudar a minimizar la 
descarga de contaminantes. 
q q q q q 
h. Sustituir tecnologías antiguas por equipo más nuevo que 
ayude a minimizar la descarga de contaminantes. 
q q q q q 
i. Rediseñar el proceso de producción para eliminar impactos 
ambientales potenciales. 
q q q q q 
j. Rediseñar productos para reducir su impacto ambiental. q q q q q 
k. Llevar a cabo análisis del ciclo de vida de los productos. q q q q q 
l. Evaluar el impacto ambiental de los materiales utilizados. q q q q q 
m. Extender la vida útil de los productos. q q q q q 
n. Incorporar los puntos de vista de partes interesadas externas. q q q q q 
o. Considerar los efectos que nuestras actividades puedan tener 
en las generaciones futuras. 
q q q q q 
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¿Qué tan costosas han sido las actividades de gestión ambiental en su planta en relación con 
los beneficios? (Por favor marque sólo una): 
 ____Los costos han sido considerablemente mayores que los beneficios 
 ____Los costos han sido ligeramente mayores que los beneficios 
 ____Los costos han sido aproximadamente equivalentes a los beneficios 
 ____Los beneficios han sido ligeramente mayores que los costos 
 ____Los beneficios han sido considerablemente mayores que los costos 
 
Por favor indique si su planta monitorea los siguientes indicadores ambientales. Marque la 
casilla apropiada o “N/A” si el concepto no se aplica en su planta.  
 
 ¿Monitorea su planta...? Sí No N/A 
a. Consumo de agua q q q 
b. Consumo de energía  q q q 
c. Entradas recicladas q q q 
d. Reciclaje de residuos q q q 
e. Entradas de químicos por unidad de 
producción 
q q q 
f. Entradas totales de materiales q q q 
g. Generación de residuos peligrosos q q q 
h. Generación de residuos sólidos no pelig q q q 
i. Efluentes de aguas residuales q q q 
j. Emisiones contaminantes al aire q q q 
k. Emisiones de gases de invernadero q q q 
l. Generación de ruido q q q 
m. Generación de olores q q q 
n. Alteración del paisaje natural q q q 
o. Contaminación del suelo q q q 
p. Fugas o derrames severos q q q 
q. Infracciones legales o potenciales q q q 
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III. Asistencia Técnica y Las Especificaciones de Producto 
¿Ha recibido su planta algún tipo de asistencia técnica en la adopción de prácticas de 
administración y gestión ambiental? 
____sí  
____no  
____no lo sé  
 
Si la respuesta es sí, ¿en qué forma se dió ésta asistencia técnica?  
     ____Talleres 
     ____Materiales educativos (p.ej. libros, programas de software, páginas web) 
     ____ Consultores técnicos 
     ____ Reembolsos / incentivos financieros 
      ____ Otro (por favor especifique ________________________________________________) 
 
Si la respuesta es sí, ¿de quién recibieron usted esta asistencia?  
      ____Asociación o cámara industrial  
      ____Cliente 
      ____Asociado de negocio 
      ____Gobierno local 
      ____Gobierno federal 
      ____Otro (por favor especifique _______________________________________________) 
 
Coopera usted con otros productores/manufactureros locales? Por favor responda de manera específica en las 
siguientes áreas  
 
 Nunca ßà Frecuentemente 
Intercambio de información y experiencias 
Ordenes conjuntas  
Desarrollo conjunto de productos 
Préstamo de maquinaria 
Mercadotecnia conjunta de productos  
Entrenamiento conjunto de empleados 
Compra conjunta de suministros y materias primas 
1 ßà 5 
 
Coopera usted con sus proveedores de materias primas o contratistas? Por favor responda de manera 
específica en las siguientes áreas  
 
 Nunca ßà Frecuentemente 
Intercambio de información y experiencias 
Negociación de pagos y condiciones de entrega 
Desarrollo conjunto de productos 
Mejora de la calidad 
Mejora del tiempo de entrega 
Entrenamiento y capacitación de empleados 
Establecimiento de especificaciones del producto 
Mejoras tecnológicas 
 
1 ßà 5 
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¿Coopera usted con sus clientes? Por favor responda de manera específica en las siguientes áreas  
 
 Nunca ßà Frecuentemente 
Intercambio de información y experiencias 
Negociación de pagos y condiciones de entrega 
Desarrollo conjunto de productos 
Mejora de la calidad 
Mejora del tiempo de entrega 
Entrenamiento y capacitación de empleados 
Establecimiento de especificaciones del producto 
Mejoras tecnológicas 
 
1 ßà 5 
 
Por favor priorice la forma más importante a través de la cual su planta recibe información 
acerca de especificaciones de producto (donde ‘1’ es la más importante):  
____de nuestro propio diseño 
____un prototipo de los clientes 
____Archivos de CAD (diseño asistido por computadora) de los clientes  
____Dibujos en papel de los clientes  
____Videoconferencias, mensajes de correo electrónico, o conversaciones telefónicas con 
clientes 
____Reuniones en persona con los ingenieros de nuestros clientes  
____Otras 
 
Por favor indique qué tanto requieren ustedes hacer consultas con los clientes después de 
que su planta recibe información sobre las especificaciones de los productos:  
___Nada 
___Muy poca 
___Algo 
___Mucho 
___Constantemente 
___ No aplica 
 
Por favor indique en la siguiente escala, en promedio, ¿qué tan complejas son las especificaciones de 
producto que ustedes reciben de sus clientes principales? 
a. 
No muy Complejas     1      2      3      4      5       Muy 
Complejas  
No aplica 
 
q 
  
Por favor indique en la siguiente escala, qué tan capacitados deben estar sus empleados para 
ser capaces de manufacturar los productos de su planta?  
b. 
No Muy Capacitados      1      2      3      4      5       Altamente 
Capacitados 
No aplica 
 
q 
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IV. Información sobre la planta 
 
 
¿Su planta es parte de una organización más grande?   
 ___ sí 
 ___ no  
 ___ no estoy seguro 
 
¿Su planta o su organización corporativa (por favor marque todas las que apliquen): 
 ___ cotiza en la bolsa de valores? 
 ___ tiene propietarios privados (no cotiza en la bolsa de valores) 
 ___ es subsidiaria de una empresa transnacional? 
 ___ es una empresa por asociación? 
 ___ es de otro tipo? (favor de 
especificar_________________________________________) 
 
¿Cuántos empleados de tiempo completo tiene su planta?  _______________ 
  
¿Qué su producto principal?  _____________ 
 
¿Los dueños de su planta se encuentran en qué país o región? 
____ México 
____ Estados Unidos 
____ Canadá  
____ Europa (Unión Europea) 
____ Japón    
____ América Latina 
____Asia 
____Otros (por favor especifique _______________________________________) 
 
En qué país o región se encuentran sus clientes principales? (por favor marque todas las 
celdas que apliquen) 
____ México 
____ Estados Unidos 
____ Canadá  
____ Europa (Unión Europea) 
____ Japón    
____ América Latina 
____Asia 
____Otros (por favor especifique _______________________________________) 
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En qué país o región se encuentran sus proveedores principales? (por favor marque todas 
las celdas que apliquen) 
____ México 
____ Estados Unidos 
____ China 
____ Corea 
____Canadá 
____ Japón    
____ Europa (Unión Europea) 
____Otros (por favor especifique _______________________________________) 
 
¿Participa su empresa actualmente en el programa "Industria Limpia" de PROFEPA?  
____ Sí 
____ No   
____ No lo sé   
 
¿Ha participado su empresa en el programa “Industria Limpia” de PROFEPA anteriormente? 
 
____ Sí 
____ No   
____ No lo sé   
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APPENDIX C: DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
PRIORITIZATION 
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